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ABSTRACT. 
The purpose of this paper is, first and foremost, to accurately describe 
how biopower enters IR.  It does this because so far IR theorists have inaccurately 
deployed the concept.  Due to the tripartite nature of biopower – sovereign, 
disciplinary, biopolitical – and idiosyncratic conceptualizations of sovereignty by 
predominant theorists, a number of disparate conceptualizations of biopower 
populate the literature, none of which satisfactorily extend Foucauldian analysis 
into international relations.  This paper attempts to remedy this conceptual 
ambiguity to produce the sorts of insights Foucault was concerned with.  Central 
to my argument is thus a discussion of sovereignty.  Notwithstanding Foucault‘s 
warnings about slavish devotion to his work, I nonetheless maintain that an 
accurate exposition of biopower in IR necessitates a conceptualization of 
sovereignty that adheres to Foucault‘s methodological principles.  Following a 
deconstruction of sovereignty that identifies a ‗history of practices,‘ I maintain 
that state sovereignty continues to play a central biopolitical role.  From this 
position, I then argue biopower must enter into international relations in a specific 
manner.  I argue that global, or more accurately, international biopower should be 
identified according to a genealogical method stemming from the biopolitics of 
states first elucidated by Foucault.  I proceed by investigating how ‗domestic‘ 
mechanisms of security are becoming transnational.  My ultimate argument 
focuses on identifying how processes of biopolitical normalization resonate with 
international processes, and successfully translates Foucauldian scholarship into 
IR by extending our understanding of how modern liberal societies are governed 
by norms.  By showing how biopolitical normalization is becoming a 
transnational phenomenon, I reconceptualize ‗global biopower‘ as international 
biopolitical normalization.   
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
The purpose of this paper is, first and foremost, to accurately describe 
how biopower should enter IR, since so far IR theorists have inaccurately 
deployed the concept.  The diverse ways in which biopower has been deployed 
are not helpful in extending Foucauldian analysis into world politics.  Although 
some of these deployments generate important insights, they fundamentally differ 
from what Foucault sought to uncover.  I do, therefore, begin from the position 
that Foucault‘s insights provide an essential contribution to contemporary 
political analysis.  A Foucauldian analysis of biopower in IR is fruitful because it 
points towards a program to identify how norms which relate to biopolitical 
governance are disseminated internationally.  A central insight of Foucault‘s 
work was his identification of the way modern societies are governed with 
reference to norms, and I would argue that knowing whether or not the particular 
process of normalization he elaborated has been extended beyond the state is 
helpful to further appropriate Foucauldian research in IR. 
Talk of biopower in International Relations (IR) is coming into vogue. 
Drawing on works by Foucault, Hardt & Negri, and Agamben, IR scholars either 
talk of global biopower in service to some transcendent liberal regime, or existing 
in zones of sovereign exception.  I argue that such predominant theorizations of 
biopower uncritically scale up Foucault‘s concept, and are thus problematic.  
Moreover, hazy notions of empire, zones of sovereign exception, or global liberal 
governance are unclearly linked to the specifics of biopower, and the concept is 
thus ambiguously deployed to problematically theorise a number of disparate 
phenomena. I argue that these conceptualizations fail to accurately grasp the way 
biopower might be operating in the international realm.  While accepting that 
helpful insights are generated by these deployments of biopower in IR, and that 
Foucault himself warned against slavish devotion to his work, I maintain that an 
accurate exposition of (Foucauldian) biopower in IR must adhere to the 
methodological principles Foucault outlined often and at great length. 
The intention of this research is to reaffirm central Foucauldian insights, 
insights which are lost according to predominant theorizations concerning the 
insertion of bodies into global apparatuses of power, and the government of 
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modern, liberal societies through norms.  Central to this project is the emphasis 
on what Foucault identified as a tripartite relation between sovereignty, 
disciplinary power, and governmentality.  In particular, the importance of 
sovereignty to biopower is highlighted.  In addition, by attempting to pin down 
the concept of biopower in IR, this project generates much needed conceptual 
clarity, and contributes to a project which might hesitantly be called ‗Foucauldian 
IR.‘  I believe an investigation of biopower in international relations that 
subscribes to Foucault‘s methodological precautions provides an ideal test case 
with which a Foucauldian IR can be outlined.  This is because a Foucauldian IR 
can identify how totalizing phenomena at the global level are connected to the 
subjectification of individuals.  I argue that global, or more accurately, 
international biopower should be identified according to a genealogical method 
stemming from the biopolitics of states first elucidated by Foucault.  I will 
suggest how an ascending analysis of biopower can be carried out in IR by 
adhering to Foucault‘s methodological principles.  Primarily this will proceed by 
investigating how ‗domestic‘ mechanisms of security are becoming transnational. 
After elaborating on the concept of biopower, the argument points out that 
predominant theorizations of biopower in IR are problematic, that is, they fail to 
capture what is specific about the operation of biopower, and thus restrict 
Foucauldian insights into contemporary political order.  While they all, in some 
way, try to account for the insertion of individual bodies into global apparatuses 
of power, their disregard of Foucault's methodological precautions inevitably 
results in fundamentally different insights.  This is not to say they are not 
valuable, but is instead to point out that such arguments elide the most important 
features of biopower.  On my reading, these are as follows.  Two are the most 
important; first, biopower operates with reference to a process of normalization, 
and second, due to the inability of this mechanism of rule to be comprehensive, it 
is backed up by a sovereign mechanism that enforces regulations when required, 
a mechanism that territorializes a population.  A number of related points are also 
important; first, the constitution of norms reflects the way that the general 
economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of 
security, and what is specific about such a domain is the way it subjectivizes 
individuals to exercise their freedom responsibly.  Thus mechanisms of security 
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are informed by a liberal governmentality.  Second, the constitution of norms is 
also a process immanent with society.  That is, in a normalizing society, norms 
are not exogenously given, but are instead the result of an interplay that occurs 
within, and extends throughout, civil society.  Accordingly, the sovereign 
capacity of the state becomes subsumed within the logic of civil society.  Third, 
biopolitical society, that is, a society regulated by mechanisms of security, is 
formulated in terms of the milieu.  Within the milieu, population is presented as 
possessing its own inherent naturalness in perpetual living interrelations with the 
environment.  The milieu is therefore an ‗artificial‘ environment created by a 
relationship with a population.  It is that in which circulation occurs, and a link is 
produced between cause and effect.  It is thus circulation, specifically the 
uncertainty of circulation that is problematized by biopolitical rationality, and by 
circumscribing this uncertainty the milieu generates a field of intervention. 
From the milieu – after a detour through a survey of the literature – I 
engage the issue of sovereignty.  I argue that sovereignty, specifically the scope 
of sovereignty, is the fundamental mechanism used to circumscribe the 
biopolitical milieu.  A number of related insights inform this position; first, a 
population is constituted by the aggregation of data about it.  This means the 
collection of data requires a certain structural constitution.  Due to its history of 
practices, the aggregation of data has been located, centralized even, in the state.  
This fact is yet to fundamentally change.  Even the Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), an International Organization (IO) 
which is in important respects a statistical agency, still relies on its statistical data 
to be collected by state apparatuses.
1
  The state, therefore, circumscribes the 
milieu because it circumscribes the population, and it is thus difficult to see how 
the link between cause and effect that biopolitical governmentality problematizes 
could extend transnationally.  Second, the sovereign function of biopower to 
constitute society as a population, and the normalization of regulations within it, 
repudiates the idea that global civil society is a biopolitical civil society.  Third, 
only sovereign power has the capability to enforce, when required, biopolitical 
regulations within a state.  As well as this internal dimension of government – 
                                               
1 Albeit state apparatuses governmentalized by the OECD, as membership in 
the OECD is partly based on a states statistical capabilities. 
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that is, biopolitical government, framed by a milieu, territorialized by the scope of 
sovereignty, and governed through a process of normalization – this argument 
highlights the importance of thinking about sovereignty as a power with an 
exterior.  Accordingly, the international is a space conditioned by multiple 
sovereignties.  Biopolitical sovereignty thus gets tied up with another art of 
government which is international. 
The paper finally argues that global biopower should be analyzed as an 
extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that are located within a 
sovereign space, and conceptualizes this process as international biopolitical 
normalization.  It thus subscribes to a methodological commitment to an 
ascending analysis of power relations and, I believe, successfully extends 
Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics.  This is in contradistinction 
to predominant theorizations of biopower in IR which have failed to 
methodologically account for sovereignty so as to provide the foundation for 
extending Foucauldian insights beyond the territorial boundaries of sovereignty.  
International biopolitical normalization is identified as consisting of two 
analytical axes; vertically, it constitutes an extension of domestic mechanisms of 
security, whereby international apparatuses are ‗folded‘ into a process of 
domestic biopolitical normalization.  Concomitantly, the process of international 
biopolitical normalization is also evident when international apparatuses, the 
OECD in particular, act as a nodal point that connects these domestic processes 
horizontally, through an extension of biopolitical techniques that facilitate an 
interplay between different distributions of normality – that is, ‗normal‘ states 
whose normality is determined by the fact that members of the international 
apparatus in question are sufficiently liberal states.  The paper thus reaffirms 
central Foucauldian insights which are elided by predominant theorizations.  In 
doing so it has provided a theoretical framework that improves our understanding 
of the way individual bodies are inserted into global apparatuses of power, and 
has extended our understanding of how the general economy of power in modern 
societies can be conceived of as a domain of security.  It identifies how ‗domestic‘ 
mechanisms of security are becoming transnational, and provides a window onto 
one of the processes through which the boundaries between the national and the 
international are blurring. 
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The paper is divided into four chapters.  Chapter one is an explication of 
biopower according to Foucault, supplemented by other key theorists.  It 
identifies mechanisms through which biopower acts upon life, namely statistics; 
the manner in which these mechanisms modify the way politics structure life; and 
the intimate relations these mechanisms have with the practices of sovereignty.  A 
new conceptualization of population distinct from a mere aggregation of subjects 
was the catalyst for a new political rationality.  In chapter two, the deployment of 
biopower in IR by predominant theorists is critiqued.  This critique will show that, 
from a Foucauldian perspective, the use of the concept of biopower in IR 
fundamentally diverges from what Foucault outlined.  In particular, it shows that 
disparate conceptualizations of biopower in IR are the result of idiosyncratic 
conceptions of sovereignty.  In doing so it points out that none of these 
deployments of biopower in IR share a similar conception of sovereignty with 
Foucault.  More generally this chapter argues that these conceptualizations of 
biopower in IR fail to capture what is specific about the operation of biopower, 
that is, its mechanisms of normalization, and thus restrict Foucauldian insights 
into contemporary political order.  The second part of this chapter then takes a 
brief detour to survey the junction of Foucault and IR more broadly, and reflects 
what has already been noted about the use of biopower in IR; that through a 
double-reading based on the existence of a supposed global liberal order, 
Foucault‘s insights are unreflectively scaled up.  The third chapter is a discussion 
of sovereignty from a Foucauldian perspective.  It argues that adherence to 
Foucault‘s methodological principles is essential to overcome the problems of 
applying Foucauldian concepts to IR, and can even provide insight into the 
continuing relevance of sovereignty.  This sets the scene for the final chapter – 
the beginnings of a foray into a more appropriate analysis of biopower in IR.  
Here I will put forward an argument for how I think biopower enters IR.  This 
chapter focuses on identifying how international apparatuses involve biopolitical 
normalization, which are situated in the context of a broader discussion about 
international governmentality. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS BIOPOWER? 
This section explains, in detail, the concept of biopower.
2
  It begins with a 
general explanation which identifies; the economic and political rationality 
behind biopower; its tendency towards centralization; its concomitant focus on 
general indicators of societal processes and the constitution of norms by novel 
epistemological tools; and its resultant perception of society as a dynamic 
population which is framed as a domain of uncertainty requiring mechanisms of 
security.  The historical emergence of biopower is then charted.  The chapter is 
genealogical in that it highlights a relationship in the constitution of biopower 
between truth, knowledge, and power.  It thus intersects with the 
contemporaneous emergence of other historical phenomena, such as political 
economy, and outlines concepts that Foucault generated to explain what is 
peculiar about this period, namely governmentality.  Foucault‘s history, 
paraphrased here with the help of other key theorists, is an investigation of 
modernity, beginning with a rupture with Machiavelli.  As such, it is extensive, 
hence the size of this chapter.  This extent is, however, necessary to fully 
comprehend the nature of biopower.  It especially helps us to appreciate the 
contingent nature of genealogical relationships, something we should keep in the 
front of our minds as we proceed afterwards to chart biopower in a globalizing 
environment. 
According to Michel Foucault (2009), ‗biopower‘ refers to ―[t]he set of 
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species 
became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power‖,  3  and 
Lemke (2010) tells us that ―biopolitics designates a political economy of life 
aiming to administer, secure, develop and foster life‖. 4   Biopower/biopolitics 
speaks to a web of relations that reflect the population as an object, the individual 
                                               
2 I use the terms biopower and biopolitics interchangeably, although an 
argument is made that they can and should be differentiated.  For example, see 
Derek Hook, Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power, ed. Tod Sloan, 
Critical Theory and Practice in Psychology and the Human Sciences (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 227-230 
3 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. 
Graham Burchell, Lectures at the College De France, 1977-1978 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1. 
4  Thomas Lemke, "From State Biology to the Government of Life: Historical 
Dimensions and Contemporary Persepctives of 'Biopolitics'," Journal of Classical 
Sociology 10, no. 4 (2010): 429. 
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as its correlative, and the environment within which these two objects are situated.  
The most important objective of biopower, its raison d’être, is the health of the 
population.  However, the health of the population is not ‗governed‘ for its own 
sake.  Instead, the health of the population is ―an economic and political problem: 
population as wealth, population as manpower or labour capacity, population 
balanced between its own growth and the resources it [commands].‖5  This is a 
rationality which reflects the historical context in which biopower emerged.  
Sexual conduct, and later other naturally occurring phenomena, became subjected 
to regimes of institutionally centered practices which try to transform conduct 
into ―concerted economic and political behaviour.‖6 
Biopolitics, according to Dean (2010), also designates ―a very broad 
terrain against which we can locate the liberal critique of too much government.‖7  
This is because inherent in its operation is the implementation of ―complex 
organs of political organization and centralization.‖8  Biopower thus represents a 
rupture with, yet transformation and continuation of an earlier form of power 
which Foucault called ‗pastoral power‘, a form of power that simultaneously 
individualises and totalises.
9
  However, what is novel about biopower is its mode 
of operation.  Where previous forms of pastoral power tried to intervene directly 
upon individuals, biopower governs in such a way as to operate at a ‗level of 
generality.‘  This ‗level‘ significantly accounts for the specificity of biopower.  A 
number of indirect mechanisms, as opposed to more direct apparatuses, are 
deployed.  ―The mechanisms introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, 
statistical estimates, and overall measures.  Their purpose is not to modify any 
given phenomenon as such, or to modify a given individual insofar as he is an 
individual, but, essentially, to intervene at the level at which these general 
phenomena are determined, to intervene at the level of their generality.‖ 10  
                                               
5 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One, 
trans. Robert Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998), 25. 
6 Ibid., 26. 
7
 Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2 ed. 
(London: Sage Publications, 2010), 118. 
8 Ibid., 119. 
9 See especially, Michel Foucault, ""Omnes Et Singulatum": Toward a Critique of 
Political Reason," in Power, ed. Paul Rabinow, The Essential Works of Michel 
Foucault (New York: The New Press, 2000). 
10 ———, Society Must Be Defended, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. David Macey, 
Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976 (London: Penguin, 2004), 246. 
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Central to this process is the constitution of norms, and the threat to society that 
liberalism wishes to assuage is that of a normalizing society which succeeds ―in 
covering the whole surface that lies between the organic and the biological, 
between body and population‖ with an intrusive and potentially totalitarian array 
of societal regulations.
11
  It is within this context that ‗rights‘ emerge.  ‗Rights‘ 
are ―the [liberal] political response to all these new procedures of power,‖ a 
response that the traditional right of sovereignty ―was utterly incapable of 
comprehending.‖12 
Biopower operates through the constitution of norms, and reflects the way 
that the general economy of power in modern societies can be conceived of as a 
domain of security. 
―[B]iopower is not typical of the [preceding] legal code or the 
disciplinary mechanism, but that of the dispositif of security … [an] 
apparatus of security [that] inserts the phenomena in question within a 
series of probable events … [according to which] the relations of 
power … are inserted in a calculation of cost … [and] instead of a 
binary division between the permitted and the prohibited, one 
establishes an average considered as optimal on the one hand, and, on 
the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be exceeded.  
In this way a completely different distribution of things takes 
shape.‖13 
The emergence of biopower does not eclipse, bracket off or cancel the preceding 
mechanisms; the disciplinary institution and the sovereign-juridical structure 
remain important techniques within a liberal governmentality focused on political 
economy and population processes.  However, ―[i]t is no longer a matter of 
bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living 
in the domain of value and utility.  Such a power has to qualify, measure, 
appraise, and hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendour; it 
                                               
11 Ibid., 253. 
12
 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One, 145.  
The tension between biopower and political economy can be seen when Foucault 
states: ―The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of 
security … state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the natural 
phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population‖; ———, 
Security, Territory, Population, 352-53.   This implies that mechanisms of security 
exist side-by-side, but operate according to different rationalities. 
13
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 6. 
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does not have to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from 
his obedient subjects; it effects distributions around the norm.‖ 14   Law, the 
expression of the sovereign‘s will, does not, however, ―[fade] into the 
background‖, within this new mechanism of security, but instead itself begins to 
operate ―more and more as a norm … the judicial institution is increasingly 
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) 
whose functions are for the most part regulatory.‖15 
Ewald (1990) tells us that the conception of norms facilitates the shift 
from the level of the micro-political evident in disciplinary institutions, where 
norms (distinct from previous connotations of ‗rule‘) first emerged but were 
specifically local in character, to that of the biopolitical, evident with the 
implementation of insurance schemes and social security systems.
16
  Norms, 
therefore, constituted by new forms of knowledge such as statistics, demography, 
epidemiology and psychology, provide a standard with recourse to which a 
population can be acted upon.  Combined, such disciplines, or more accurately 
and to differentiate from ‗discipline,‘ such ‗truth regimes‘  provide the conditions 
both for an analysis of life on the level of populations, and to govern individuals 
and populations by practices of correction, exclusion, disciplining  and 
optimization, all based upon the constitution of norms.
17
  As Dean points out, ―[a] 
norm … is not simply a value arrived at, but a rule of judgment and a means of 
producing that rule.‖18  This is to say the biopolitical norm does not exist prior to 
interventions that act on the population.  Foucault (2009) uses the terms 
‗normation‘ and ‗normalization‘ to make a distinction between biopolitical a 
posteriori norm formation (normalization), and a priori norms, upon which 
disciplinary power is based (normation).   
                                               
14 ———, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One, 144.  Note 
on rationality: with raison d‘état there are no longer enemies of the sovereign, but 
deviations from the norm. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Francois Ewald, "Norms, Discipline, and the Law," Representations 30 (1990): 
139-41. 
17 This is a re-organization of something Lemke (2010) says, I have emphasized the 
role that norms play, and would argue that normalization constitutes a fundamental 
nodal point for all other techniques; Lemke, "From State Biology to the 
Government of Life: Historical Dimensions and Contemporary Persepctives of 
'Biopolitics'," 430. 
18 Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 141. Ewald, "Norms, 
Discipline, and the Law," 154. 
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Disciplinary normation ―consists first of all in positing a model, an 
optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and the operation of 
disciplinary [normation] consists in trying to get people, movements, and actions 
to conform to this model, the normal being precisely that which can conform to 
this norm, and the abnormal that which is incapable of conforming to the 
norm.‖19  The norm is thus prior to disciplinary intervention, whereas within a 
biopolitical dispositif what is fundamental is ―an interplay between these different 
distributions of normality and in acting to bring the most unfavorable in line with 
the more favorable.‖20  A ‗normalizing,‘ biopolitical, society is thus distinct from 
a disciplinary society (even though norms still exist within discipline) because 
normalization, distinct from normation, sees individuals acted upon by a different 
and broader range of interventions.
21
 
This new process of normalization was made possible by a number of 
novel factors.  First was the development of statistics, in particular the technique 
of determining statistical probabilities.  Second was the emergence of the concept 
of population as a process with its own natural tendencies; whereas previous 
conceptions of population saw it in negative or positive terms, as being deficient 
or an emblem of sovereign power, biopolitical population is conceived as 
dynamic.  This conceptualization of population as dynamic, and the emergence of 
new techniques of intervention based upon statistics, results in the establishment 
of what Foucault calls ‗mechanisms of security,‘ wherein the population is no 
longer a mere collection of subjects, but it is instead a set of natural phenomena 
that ―will have to be framed in such a way that they do not veer off course, or in 
such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind intervention does not make them veer 
off course.  That is to say it will be necessary to set up mechanisms of security.  
The fundamental objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security … 
state intervention with the essential function of ensuring the natural phenomena 
of economic processes or processes intrinsic to population.‖22 
                                               
19 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 57. 
20 Ibid., 63. 
21 Pierre Macherey, "Towards a Natural History of Norms," in Michel Foucualt 
Philosopher, ed. Francois Ewald (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
22
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 352-53. 
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Central to a mechanism of security, due to the understanding of a 
population as possessing its own inherent naturalness, is the idea ―the population 
and environment are in a perpetual living interrelation, and the state has to mange 
those living interrelations between those two types of living beings.‖23  Foucault 
thinks of this reality in terms of the milieu, as a site that, although expresses a 
naturalness, in that processes within it will be self-regulating, is not in itself 
natural; it is a phenomenon created by a relationship with the population.  ―The 
milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out.  The milieu is a set of 
natural givens ... and a set of artificial givens ...  The milieu is a certain number of 
combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it.  It is an element in which a 
circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one 
point of view will be a cause from another.‖24  The milieu is both a field of 
intervention and a site of uncertainty, and it is this problematization of 
governmental practices that informs biopolitical rationality.   
Biopower emerges as a new technology of power focused on the problem 
of the population, not as a group of subjects, nor as a multiplicity of individuals, 
but as an object that interacts with an indefinite number of elements.  This 
conceptualization of society, does however, make visible phenomena that occur 
only at the collective level, with a longitudinal temporality, thus displaying 
regularities or constants that can become subject to governmental rationality.  The 
complexity of social processes leads to a new constellation of power relations.  
The traditional juridical-legal techniques of the sovereign, and the disciplinary 
techniques that emerged under a mercantilist reason, are reactivated according to 
a mechanism of security that attempts to regulate life, still to maximise and 
extract forces, but within an aleatory and unpredictable environment – the milieu.  
―The specific space of security refers then to a series of possible events; it refers 
to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be inserted within a given space.  
The space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold…‖25  It is within this 
space that biopolitical apparatus such as statistics emerge, and thus ‗general‘ 
phenomena are determined (a level of generality).  The phenomena in question 
                                               
23 Michel Foucault, "The Political Technology of Individuals," in Power, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 2000), 415-16. 
24 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 21. 
25
 Ibid., 20. 
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initially emerged as an effect of socialized medicine within the context of a 
massive demographic upswing, namely, the growing administrative capacity of 
an increasingly institutionalized medical apparatus.
26
  Statistics played a 
fundamental role in the process of making visible overall phenomena.  
Demographic analysis is established, ratios of births to deaths are recorded, rates 
of reproduction and fertility statistics.  Accordingly, birth control practices are 
introduced, working practices that had deleterious effects on life-expectancy and 
productivity are eliminated, medical care is coordinated, public hygiene, 
immunization and vaccination campaigns are launched, and so on.  Other 
mechanisms are also introduced to deal with accidents, anomalies and old age, 
which supplement the traditional apparatuses of assistance: insurance and safety 
regulations, for example. 
To sum up, biopolitics reflects the way that the general economy of power 
in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security.  This represents 
the way in which the treatment of life in general, the life of people, has changed 
according to the governmental rationality of society.  No longer, as it was under a 
juridical conception, is government merely concerned to let people live and to 
take life as it sees fit, it is now concerned with making people live, that is, 
subjectifying them according to a web of relations tied up with economic and 
political effects.  Disciplinary power began this transformation, and biopower 
takes it to a new level.  With discipline you have the initial capture of the 
individual body, a technology integral for the management of a demographic 
explosion and to facilitate industrial processes in service to a statist principle.  
Discipline logically emerged first – a localized technique, or constellation of 
techniques, like surveillance and training – as a direct response to particular 
situations and economic analyses.  However, although the disciplinary institution 
was gradually dispersed throughout society, it nevertheless remained a 
fragmentary regime due to its spatial requirements.
27
  Later, with the 
conceptualization of the living environment, including the population, and the 
milieu understood as a multiplicity of open relations, we have a; 
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―second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: 
a technology which brings together the mass effects characteristic of a 
population, which tries to control the series of random events that can 
occur in a living mass, a technology which tries to predict the 
probability of those events (by modifying it, if necessary), or at least 
to compensate for their effects.  This is a technology which aims to 
establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but by 
achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the 
whole from internal dangers...  Both technologies are obviously 
technologies of the body, but one is a technology in which the body is 
individualized as an organism endowed with capacities, while the 
other is a technology in which bodies are replaced by general 
biological processes.‖28 
Historical Context. 
 The significance of the emergence of the population as a variable factor of 
government is that it is prior, and essential, to the constitution of modern political 
societies.  For Foucault, population is an operator (opérateur) of transformation, 
and its emergence is the primary catalyst for the emergence of modernity, 
founded as it is on the establishment of the human sciences.
29
 The identification 
of the naturalness of processes that are tied up with population displaces the 
thesis that politics is dictated by God, or his proxy on earth.  Instead politics 
becomes about the management of open series‘ of events contingent on a fluid 
reality.  To fully appreciate what is specific about this perspective on modernity, 
and thus adequately prepare us for further investigation of this phenomenon, this 
section presents a genealogy of biopower.  
Political Economy. 
A genealogy of biopower, as this section shows, intersects with the 
emergence of political economy, which was in turn intimately tied up with the 
emergence of the population.  The section begins with theories of raison d’état, 
and an appreciation of the newly introduced concept of force by mercantilism 
which lead to the institution of Police.  Early conceptions of Police are shown to 
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be fundamentally concerned with urbanization and circulation, whilst informed 
by a classical notion of economy based upon the rule of a household, a notion 
which lead to highly specific interventions in society.  Importantly, the activity of 
police is seen as representing the initial colonization of sovereign power, a 
process which is continued from then on.  The specificity of regulation carried out 
by Police, however, engendered powerful criticism by novel political thought 
which ultimately resulted in its delegitimization.  In contradistinction to detailed 
intervention, Économistes introduced thought based on the naturalness of things 
in themselves, and modified raison d’état to be in service to the State instead of 
the Prince.  This new statist principle leads economic reasoning towards the 
concept of political economy; considerations on the population echo the initial 
‗unearthing‘ of the naturalness of prices, and mercantilism is displaced, as 
artificial regulation of either is proved undesirable.  The emergence of political 
economy is finally cemented by the modification of central power/knowledge 
relations within the state. 
Contemporaneous and concomitant with the emergence of ‗population‘ is 
the concept of political economy, the history of which is central to the 
identification of ‗population‘ as an observable phenomenon.  To chart the 
emergence of political economy, however, a genealogy must identify the 
mutation of thought and practice that led to its formation.  This section, then, 
outlines in a schematic fashion Foucault‘s genealogy of political economy, before 
exploring in more depth the links between political economy and population.  
Beginning with the emergence of raison d’état within Europe, a new 
governmental reason is identified that differentiates state activity from that which 
is tied up with Christian universalism.  Within this new framework mercantilism 
and police science is elaborated, before critiques of this mode of government of 
Western states introduce a conception of society as constituted by processes 
possessing their own natural tendencies which must be respected.  Political 
economy thus emerges as the major form of knowledge concerned with 
government, and in doing so is immanent in the constitution of population as a 
target for government.  The combination of these two factors and the idea of 
mechanisms of security are then used to further explain Foucault‘s elaboration of 
governmentality.  Finally, governmentality and biopower are placed in the 
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context of liberalism, which is considered by Foucault to be the general 
framework of biopolitics, and thus liberal modernity. 
For Foucault, rather than signalling the dawn of a new age of modern 
politics, Machiavelli represents the highest point of sovereign power, whereby the 
Prince‘s theoretical concern with territorial control reaches its most 
sophisticated.
30
  However, even though Machiavelli‘s thought does not possess an 
art of government, a prerequisite of Foucault‘s for identifying governmental 
modernity, Machiavelli does provide a strand of continuity linking pre-modern 
and modern society.  This strand is embedded in the concept of raison d’état.  
The ‗pre-modern‘ state of The Prince begins the process of becoming modern 
because it signifies the emergence of a new political reality.  This political reality 
is basically the entry of Europe into political consciousness, a field of organized 
competition symbolized by the Treaty of Westphalia, and has two correlatives.  
First, as opposed to ‗pre-modern‘ political organizations, the state is only 
organized by reference to itself, no longer subscribing to the tenets of positive, 
natural or divine law, which in turn denies the legitimacy and potential dictates of 
any external law.  ―In this perspective, the plurality of states is not a transitional 
phase between a first unitary kingdom and a final empire in which unity will be 
restored...  In fact, the plurality of states is the very necessity of a history that is 
now completely open and not temporally oriented towards a final unity.  The 
theory of raison d’état ... entails an open time and a multiple spatiality.‖ 31  
Second, the Treaty of Westphalia effectively concluded the disappearance of 
previous forms of universality – Empire and Church.   
―We are now dealing with absolute units, as it were, with no 
subordination or dependence between them, at least for the major 
states, and ... these units assert themselves, or anyways seek to assert 
themselves, in a space of increased, extended, and intensified 
economic exchange.  They seek to assert themselves in a space of 
commercial competition and domination, in a space of monetary 
circulation, colonial conquest, and control of the seas, and all this 
gives each state‘s self-assertion not just the form of each being its 
own end... but also this new form of competition ...  [A] state can only 
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assert itself in a space of political and economic competition, which is 
what gives meaning to the problem of the state‘s expansion as the 
principle, the main theme of raison d’état.‖32  
Raison d’état is concerned with the maximization of a state‘s wealth-
power at the expense of the wealth-power of other states, a new understanding of 
government that conflates princely rivalry and statist competition.  It is within 
this new political reality of statist competition that mercantilism emerged 
whereby the practice of commerce becomes a strategy, a weapon in a new game, 
the main instrument of the state‘s power in a new field of competition.  This 
actual practice of raison d’état, however, produced a new element of political 
reason that the theoretical texts of raison d'état did not formulate, an element of 
force; with this ―new theoretical and analytical strata ... We enter a politics whose 
principle object will be the employment and calculation of forces.  Politics, 
political science, encounters the problem of dynamics.‖33  With the mercantilist 
conception of wealth-power as a zero sum game and the rationalization of force 
by Western societies, a new, ‗open,‘ economic and political field came into being, 
and in response a mercantilist rationality of government attempted to organise 
what Foucault calls a police state, a gross regulation of society according to 
mercantilist principles. 
The establishment of police ―is absolutely inseparable from a 
governmental theory and practice that is generally labelled mercantilism, that is to 
say, a technique and calculation for strengthening the power of competing 
European states through the development of commerce and the new vigor given 
to commercial relations.‖34  Hence, the role of the police becomes ―good use of 
the state‘s forces and a way of increasing the state‘s forces to the maximum while 
preserving the state‘s good order.‖35  Historically, mercantilism is situated at a 
time of a massive demographic upswing, and a fundamental object of the state‘s 
concern becomes the space of circulation, which encompasses all forms and 
components of men‘s co-existence with each other and it is the function of Police 
to govern this fundamental object.  The co-existence of men becomes problematic 
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with urbanization, when co-existence becomes dense, hence ―police is essentially 
urban and market based.‖36  It is urban because it is concerned with all the aspects 
of circulation that make dense co-existence problematic; health and hygiene, 
access to food, keeping idle hands busy, maintaining public peace; it is actually a 
condition of urban existence – without the regulation of cohabitation, circulation 
and exchange the (urban) town would not exist.  It is market based because the 
circulation of men and goods cannot be un-coupled from the problems of the 
market; the problems of buying and selling and exchange are closely related to 
the other problems of urban life.  Also, of course, because the police apparatus is 
put in place to manage, maintain, and increase a state‘s force, ―the project of the 
police hangs on the activity of men as a constitutive element of the state‘s 
strength.‖37  With the emergence of the economy in this way, the market becomes 
the site of action for a police created to facilitate the maximization of a state‘s 
forces.  Economy here, however, is yet to refer to the ‗economy‘ of modernity, it 
continues to refer instead to the household; to ―the proper way of managing 
individuals, goods, and wealth, like the management of a family by a father who 
knows how to direct his wife, his children, and his servants, who knows how to 
make his family‘s fortune prosper.‖38 
The mercantilist apparatus of police represents a new form of power; it 
often uses traditional methods, but in entirely new domains.  The initial activity 
of police used modes of action that were not radically different from those of the 
juridical power of the sovereign, but the emergence of police activity tied up with 
mercantilism represented a completely different form of power than that of the 
judicial institution; it ―is not an extension of justice, it is not the king acting 
through his apparatus of justice; it is the king acting directly on his subjects, but 
in a non-judicial form.‖39  In that it is a function of raison d’état, police is the 
governmentality of the sovereign acting upon itself, trying to increase its own 
force.  Although it utilises some of the traditional methods of justice, it does so 
according to its own rationality, activity that will clearly distinguish it from the 
exercise of royal power, which takes the form of justice.  The police apparatus 
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uses the law, but in a specific way, it dictates what must be done, not merely what 
is prohibited.  This is important because the embodiment of a rationality not that 
of the king makes of police activity a permanent coup d’état; it represents the 
emergence of a new form of power that usurps the will and divine authority of the 
king and replaces the sovereign space with raison d’état.  It is the modus 
operandi of the police, tied up with its involvement in a whole new set of 
domains, that sets in motion this gradual coup d’état which is effectively the 
colonization of sovereign power – ―a specificity of police compared with the 
general functioning of justice‖ 40  that causes itself to be involved in ever 
increasing involvement with human activity, ―a world of indefinite regulation, of 
permanent, continually renewed, and increasingly detailed regulation.‖41 
Raison d’état presupposes a world of regulation, a world of discipline.  
Not only the discipline that Foucault talks about explicitly, for example in 
Discipline and Punish,
42
 but ―an attempt at a general disciplinarization, a general 
regulation of individuals and the territory of the realm in the form of a police 
based on an essentially urban model.‖43  No longer can the sovereign take a 
dispassionate view of the population, instead the state makes visible a population 
that is potential productive capacity.  The workforce is both disciplined and 
regulated: those who cannot work are excluded and placed in localized 
disciplinary institutions to be cared for; those who can are obliged to do so; and 
when they do so they find themselves in an increasingly professionalized sphere 
where, for example, regulations begin to encourage lifelong commitment to a 
career.  The activity of regulation and discipline is to turn the mere ‗being‘ of an 
individual‘s life into ‗well-being‘ and the objective of the police, therefore, ―is 
everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being 
beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state‘s 
strength.‖44 
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Raison d’état, police, commerce, European equilibrium and competition, 
urban co-existence; all of these things represent a cluster of intelligible and 
analysable relations that emerged in the seventeenth century and together led to a 
fundamental reconfiguration of relations of power, and opened up a whole new 
field of objects for governmental intervention, thus constituting a new 
governmental rationality that can be generalized as the police state.  The police 
state was ultimately related to mercantilism, a strategy which, according to 
Foucault, requires,  
―first, that every country try to have the largest possible population, 
second, that the entire population be put to work, third, that the wages 
given to the population be as low as possible so that, fourth, the cost 
of the price of goods is the lowest possible and one can thus sell the 
maximum amount abroad, which will bring about the import of gold, 
the transfer of gold into the royal treasury, or in any case, in this way 
the country will triumph commercially.‖45  
Hence commercial activity is reduced to a simple net in-flow equation; the cost of 
production must be suppressed for the greatest profits to be generated, and police 
becomes the instrument for the enforcement of regulations that attempt to 
maintain the ideal conditions required to achieve commercial success.  For 
example, the mercantilist conception of wealth being dictated by commerce led to 
a prioritization of exchange and therefore of the urban environment.
46
  This 
rationale, along with regulations designed to suppress the price of primary inputs, 
notably grain, in no way identified rural or agricultural inputs to be of any 
significance, beyond the fact that agricultural policy set the price of grain.  The 
agricultural component of mercantilist governmentality was maintained 
artificially as a constant.  Thus while the emergence of raison d’état did 
fundamentally challenge previous thought about the functioning of (state) power, 
within a mercantilist rationality the problem of scarcity remained fundamental, 
seriously affecting the well-being of the state.  The actual effects of police 
governmentality were later called into question by a new set of political thinkers, 
initially the physiocrats, but more generally the économistes, when the scarcity of 
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grain continued to remain a cyclical problem.  Through a criticism aimed at 
police regulation of grain circulation, the économistes generated a number of 
fundamental oppositions to raison d’état as it was conceived at the time.  This is 
not to say that raison d’état was replaced, but an economic reason was deployed 
that ―gives it a new content and so gives new forms to state rationality.‖47  
The économistes insert agriculture as a fundamental aspect of rational 
governmentality – no longer is the circulation of products prioritized, production 
itself becomes a fundamental object of governmental rationality.  The insertion of 
production into calculations of wealth results in the thesis that for scarcity of 
grain to be avoided, it must fetch a high price.  Not only is this in direct 
opposition to the mercantilist idea, but it directly affects the operation of police 
regulation, basically delegitimizing them.  The price of grain was suppressed by 
mercantilist policy because it was assumed that in times of scarcity the price 
would rise to such profitable heights that scarcity would be compounded by the 
hoarding of grain by producers.  The économistes counter this argument by a 
thesis of just price, calculating that the price of grain will not rise indefinitely but 
will instead settle at the appropriate level.  The just price would occur according 
to a spontaneous regulation, while regulation of prices inhibiting this naturalness 
would incur a stubbornness of the natural process resulting in perverse outcomes.  
Therefore, ―a regulation based upon and in accordance with the course of things 
in themselves must replace regulation by police authority.‖48  The économistes 
thesis remains in the realm of raison d’état – ―in this new governmentality 
sketched by the économistes the objective will still be to increase the state‘s 
forces within an external equilibrium in the European space and an internal 
equilibrium in the form of order‖49 – but the relationship to other states that 
mercantilism cultivated is fundamentally challenged.  Not only is the idea of free 
trade promoted, in the sense that products, like grain, will be traded at their 
‗natural‘ price, but trade will be allowed to occur between private individuals – 
―it is precisely this game of the interest of competing private individuals who 
each seek maximum advantage for themselves that will allow the state, or the 
group, or the whole population to pocket the profits, as it were, from this conduct 
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of private individuals.‖ 50   No longer will states be independent and unitary 
entities in a field of both princely rivalry and statist competition, but instead a 
question of governmentality will concern integrating a number of states into 
mechanisms of regulation that function within each state.  Raison d’état, as it was 
expressed before the économistes, began the transformation from a 
governmentality based upon princely rivalry towards statist competition, wherein 
for a time they existed simultaneously, but it was the introduction of economic 
reasoning that completed the transformation.  With the rationale of the 
économistes, no longer is the wealth of the state still conflated with the 
sovereign‘s wealth-power, wherein other previous forms of the sovereign‘s power 
remain as part of the calculation of wealth-power, such as alliances and familial 
connections to other states.  Instead, the wealth of the state is considered on its 
own terms, in all its intricacies, and alliances with other states become organized 
according to provisional combinations of interest.  With this transformation, the 
idea of territorial expansion, at least within Europe, is displaced and the internal 
development of state‘s forces becomes the principle of a new type of competition: 
Raison d’état begins to operate according to society, in service to a visible and 
analysable reality. 
The analysis of issues surrounding the circulation of grain conducted by 
the physiocrats facilitated the introduction of economic reasoning as we know it 
today.  No longer does the word ‗economy‘ designate a form of government, but 
instead a principle of decipherment – ―a level of reality and a field of intervention 
for government.‖51 Henceforth, politics ―has to work in the element of a reality 
that the physiocrats called, precisely, physics, when they said that economics is a 
physics.‖52  Within this new economico-political reality a concept of population 
emerges that echoes the naturalness of commodity prices – as a naturally 
occurring phenomena with the capacity to spontaneously regulate itself.  This 
new concept of population represents a final break with the mercantilist police 
state.  As befits the zero-sum attitude of mercantilism, within this governmental 
rationality population has an absolute value; basically, there are never enough 
people.  A large population results in greater productive capacity and suppressed 
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wages.  It is the role of the police in this regime to ensure both the well-being of 
as many people as possible, and to maintain their docility.  As with commodity 
prices, the police apparatus within mercantilism therefore artificially regulates the 
population.  With the économistes, however, population takes on a relative value - 
with the introduction of agriculture alongside commerce, an appreciation of the 
rural and the urban, the économistes recognise a relationship between territory 
and population, whereby ―[t]here is an optimum number of people desirable in a 
given territory, and this desirable number varies according to resources, possible 
work, and the consumption necessary and sufficient to bolster prices and the 
economy generally.‖53  
The naturalness of society, that is, the idea that society possesses natural 
processes that must be respected, thus constitutes the ontological condition of 
possibility for a new form of knowledge to appear, political economy, a 
knowledge that presumes scientific rationality and argues for the rule of evidence.  
No longer is raison d’état simply concerned with enriching the state, but with 
―knowledge of processes that link together variations of wealth and variation of 
population on three axes: production, circulation, consumption.‖54  In this way is 
scientific knowledge introduced into governmental reason, or more accurately, 
comes to found a new governmental reason; it establishes a new relationship of 
power and knowledge, on an axis between government and (economic) science.  
Because political economy takes society as its object, it insists on being taken 
seriously by the art of government, and it establishes itself in such a way that it 
confuses the traditional knowledge and power relationship.
55
  It constitutes itself 
both as a type of knowledge internal to government and as a science external to 
government.  Government cannot escape the consequences of this new science; 
no longer can it justify regulatory systems of injunctions, imperatives, and 
interdictions on processes that will henceforth be considered natural – economic 
processes based on facts of population.  No longer is the population a collection 
of subjects, but is instead a set of natural phenomena: 
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―The basic principle of the state‘s role, and so of the form of 
governmentality henceforth prescribed for it, will be to respect these 
natural processes, or at any rate to take them into account, get them to 
work, or to work with them...  An entire domain of possible and 
necessary interventions appears within the field thus delimited, but 
these interventions will not necessarily, or not as a general rule, and 
very often not at all take the form of rules and regulations.  It will be 
necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laisser faire, in other words to 
manage and no longer to control through rules and regulations...  
Natural phenomena will have to be framed in such a way that they do 
not veer off course, or in such a way that clumsy, arbitrary, and blind 
intervention does not make them veer off course.  That is to say, it 
will be necessary to set up mechanisms of security.   The fundamental 
objective of governmentality will be mechanisms of security ... state 
intervention with the essential function of ensuring the security of the 
natural phenomena of economic processes or processes intrinsic to 
population.‖56  
The over-arching, over-regulatory police apparatus begins to be replaced by a 
mechanism of security – a constellation of apparatuses of security, of which the 
police becomes one part.  The police, with its dual use of regulation and law, 
takes on a purely negative function, while a new governmental reason begins to 
formulate techniques that can act on the population from a distance.  Political 
economy becomes a new governmental rationality that is constitutive of a 
mechanism of security, a rationality that acts at a distance but has a hold on the 
population through calculation, analysis and reflection; the economy becomes a 
principle of decipherment, and political economy becomes precisely the analysis 
(and ultimately government) of society (population) with reference to the 
economy. 
The police state becomes outmoded because with the introduction of the 
naturalness of population, with nature in general, a positive conception of desire 
is also introduced.  No longer, as in the previous ethical-juridical conception of 
government, is desire considered an evil that must be denied, it instead becomes 
the expression of a natural force that must be fostered as well as managed.  The 
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problem of government then becomes – ―how they can say yes; it is to say yes to 
this desire.‖57  Political economy, therefore, is a technique of government that 
begins the self-limitation of an already established governmental reason, and 
radically transforms the basis on which governmental reason was hitherto 
founded.  Prior to the emergence of political economy, governmental reason was 
based upon original right; its legitimacy was located in the past.  The 
governmental rationality of political economy inverts this relationship and locates 
the legitimising effect of governmental reason in the present, whereby ―[t]he 
economic question is always to be posed within the field of governmental 
practice, not in terms of what may found it by right, but in terms of its effects: 
What are the real effects of the exercise of governmentality?‖58  Ultimately, the 
police apparatus is suppressed so the natural economic processes of society are 
not.  The new field of objects that political economy revealed, founded on the 
establishment of the population as the natural object par excellence – conceived 
not only as intelligible mechanisms but as natural phenomena, processes and 
regularities, as elements of natural law – dictate that their impediment would 
generate effects detrimental to the functioning of society.  Hence the kernel of 
‗truth‘ that goes on to found a whole new regime of governmentality, the techno-
political philosophy of government based upon laissez-faire: a principle that 
celebrates the naturalness of economic processes, and enshrines an attitude that 
facilitates the removal of impediments to a supposed natural course of events.  
The introduction of political economy therefore engenders the emergence of a 
type of freedom within governmentality.  No longer is freedom only spoken in a 
rights-based manner, freedom from the abuse of rights, but is inserted into 
governmental reason.  The freedom of economic processes to play out naturally 
becomes a governmental imperative, a more fundamental principle of 
decipherment than the economy itself.
59
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The introduction of desire into governmental thought is the causal factor 
leading to the modification of knowledge/power relations.  It is the core notion 
which leads to a liberalism based on the naturalness of society.  Overall, this 
constellation of ideas is encapsulated within the constitution of civil society.  The 
remainder of this section will explore this complex and complete the genealogy of 
biopower with reference to its central biopolitical feature – mechanisms of 
security.  It continues with a discussion of Police, specifically identifying how 
Police is re-articulated according to a mechanism of security, a re-articulation 
which allows for the notion of desire.  Desire is linked to liberty, and it is shown 
that central to a mechanism of security is a circular relation between liberty and 
security, a relationship which establishes a new governmentality, based on 
conducting individuals to use their freedom responsibly.  The overturning of 
Police, and concomitant demise of mercantilism is traced to phenomena 
established precisely by this regime; the detailed administration produced an 
‗avalanche of numbers‘ which identified a naturalness of processes intrinsic to 
population itself,
 60
 that in turn lead to the delegitimization of police 
governmentality.  Following this, my own example of a mechanism of security is 
used to help explain the concept.  This leads into a general discussion of the 
tripartite character of biopolitical governmentality, tying together the already 
discussed aspects of population, political economy, and mechanisms of security.  
In doing so, the intricate relationship between biopolitics and liberalism is shown 
to rest upon the constitution of civil society, a transactional reality that, in 
conjunction with liberalism, serves to governmentalize the state. 
Mechanisms of Security. 
Political economy thus introduces the idea of liberty, not as an effect of 
governmental practice, but as a governing technology itself.  In doing so, it 
clashes with an already established police apparatus that envisages such a detailed 
level of intervention on the population as to be detrimental to society.  As a result 
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of this clash, ―the notion of police is entirely overturned, marginalized, and takes 
on the purely negative meaning familiar to us.‖61  Some of the functions of the 
police will be embodied in different institutions and mechanisms of incentive-
regulation, leaving only a negative function of preventing disorder, and will 
become one of a number of components in a mechanism of security.  This new 
conception of government framed by mechanisms of security establishes, with 
recourse to norms, a new distribution of things.  Instead of liberty being a branch, 
or consequence, of security, it becomes a condition of security,
62
 and; 
 ―[t]here is a kind of circular relation between security and liberty.  
On the one hand, security entails the regulation of certain individuals 
and groups in order to lead them to choose to exercise their liberty in 
a disciplined and responsible manner.  On the other, this responsible 
liberty is necessary to the security of those natural processes of 
economy and population which in turn will secure the well-being of 
the state.  The problem of laissez-faire then is not about the retreat 
from regulation but to set up mechanisms of security.‖63 
The problematization of scarcity with reference to grain put forward by the 
économistes results in a new policy of ―curbing scarcity by a sort of ‗laisser-faire,‘ 
a certain ‗freedom of movement (laisser-passer),‘ a sort [of] ‗[laisser]-aller,‘ in 
the sense of ‗letting things take their course.‘‖64  Tierney (2008) points out that 
this idea is at the heart of Foucault‘s conception of security.65  With this critique, 
the concept of freedom begins to take on new meaning:  
―no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the 
possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation 
of both people and things.  [Foucault thinks] it is this freedom of 
circulation, in the broad sense of the term, it is in terms of this option 
of circulation, that we should understand the word freedom, and 
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understand it as one of the facets, aspects, or dimensions of the 
deployment of apparatuses of security.‖66  
The transformation of the concept of population from merely positive or negative 
to dynamic, mentioned above, is immanent with this new concept of freedom.  
The political economy of mercantilism (or cameralism) no longer merely ‗advises 
the prince‘ on how to ―maintain his territory, as Machiavelli did, [it] instead 
argued that the sovereign should be primarily concerned with governing the 
subjects that inhabited the territory, as a father governs his household.‖67  Within 
this political economy of the seventeenth century the population becomes the 
fundamental element of the strength of the state (and sovereign), ―that is to say 
[an element] that conditions all the others.‖68  It does this, within a mercantilist 
political economy, primarily by supplying manpower, but also by creating 
workforce competition thus ensuring low wages.
69
  However, while mercantilism 
can be credited with seeing the population as a productive force it also remains 
well within a disciplinary dispositif of power relations, ―and considered the 
problem of population essentially in terms of the axis of sovereign and 
subjects.‖ 70   Related policies can only be achieved through an overarching 
regulatory apparatus imposed from above.  Instead, a mechanism of security 
begins to emerge when the physiocrats and économistes consider population ―as a 
set of processes to be managed at the level and on the basis of what is natural in 
these processes.‖71  
The concept of freedom as circulation was immanent with mercantilism 
because, even though it was completely top down, the overarching regulatory 
apparatus known as police was ―an administrative system that was concerned 
with maximizing the size of the state‘s population in relation to the natural 
resources of it s territory, ensuring that this population was productive and 
healthy, and promoting the circulation  of both people and goods through the 
creation and maintenance of adequate roads, canals, and other public 
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amenities.‖ 72   It was a result of this system of administration that statistics 
emerged, providing the ontological traction necessary for the elaboration of the 
naturalness of things in themselves.  The naturalness of things in themselves does 
not, however, simply correlate to a biological reality.  Hence policy advice 
centered around the concept of laisser-faire.  As Gudman-Hoyer and Lopdrup-
Hjorth (2009) point out:  
―[T]he population is not merely a biological species, a group of legal 
subjects, or individual bodies of discipline; it also represents its own 
intrinsic logic, constituted as it is by different probabilities, by 
uncertainties and temporalities, by dangers, risks, and contingent 
events, in the same ways as this population varies with the climate, 
the material surroundings, the intensity of commerce, the circulation 
of wealth, laws and traditions, etc.‖73  
It is this expansion of the concept of population, brought about as an ontological 
reality thanks to the practice of statistics, that explodes the police mentality of 
mercantilism, moving governmental knowledge relevant for biopolitics beyond 
such disciplines as social medicine, public hygiene and demographics to a 
political economy that reflects upon ―a range of factors and elements that seem 
far removed from the population itself.‖74  Population is, on the one hand, seen as 
something that, although beyond the reach of direct sovereign intervention, is 
penetrable through techniques of transformation informed by (‗enlightened, 
reflected, analytical, calculated and calculating‘) political economy.  On the other 
hand, such an appreciation of the population as an entity that possesses a nature 
that cannot be minutely policed simultaneously produces an inverted reality, 
wherein ―this population is of course made up of individuals who are quite 
different from each other and whose behaviour, within a certain limit at least, 
cannot be accurately predicted.‖75  The response to this inverse reality is what 
Foucault calls ‗dispositifs of security.‘  Gordon sums this up by saying that 
―[l]iberalism discards the police conception of order as a visible grid of 
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communication; it affirms instead the necessarily opaque, dense autonomous 
character of the processes of population.  It remains at the same time, preoccupied 
with the vulnerability of these same processes, with the need to enframe them in 
‗mechanisms of security.‘‖76 
A brief example of a mechanism of security is appropriate here.  Take the 
circulation of goods and things on roads, an aspect of circulation Foucault also 
emphasized.
77
  A mechanism of security around the function of roads, which are a 
pretty obvious and important example of circulation, can be outlined in the 
following way.  First, consider the volume of traffic on roads.  Basically, there is 
far too much circulation for the sovereign to impose its will on all of its subjects 
individually; such an attempt would break the two central principles of political 
economy – on the one hand, it would run the risk of governing too much and 
interfering with the naturalness of the circulation of processes intrinsic to 
population, while on the other, it would be enormously expensive, and thus not 
economical.  Second, consider the impact of accidents on society, which is 
multitudinous.  Not only are there direct costs to the health system, and secondary 
health issues concerning the emotional well-being and functionality of other 
members of society (i.e. un-injured participants in the accident & family 
members), there is also the issue of continuing circulation (i.e. accidents during 
peak hour), the loss of labour in the economy, increases in insurance costs, and so 
on.  On the basis of these sorts of considerations, a mechanism of security does a 
number of things, almost all of which are based on statistical phenomena.  First, it 
establishes speed limits based on a number of pertinent factors – the nature of the 
terrain (urban, rural, windy, frosty, etc); the quality of drivers; the quality of the 
national fleet of automobiles, and so on.  Second, it regulates drivers and their 
mode of transport through examination procedures.  Third, insurance schemes are 
established.  Fourth, it attempts to generate the self-government of drivers 
through normalization campaigns in the media.  This probably doesn‘t exhaust 
the list, but it does highlight how a mechanism of security works.  It should also 
be noted that the rationality which informs a mechanism of security is generated 
by a relationship between government agencies and civil society.  The demand 
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for norms according to which the roads should be governed is a reflective process.  
For example, (in NZ) many of the rescue helicopters that operate are community-
funded.  This sends an indication to governmental agencies, who respond in turn 
with complementary strategies, deploying a certain amount of police, for one 
thing.  Then again, while there are definitely police on the roads representing the 
will of the sovereign (after all, sovereign power is not eclipsed by biopower ), 
there are only so many as is feasible according to political economy, and even 
their presence serves to reinforce the mechanism of security, whereby the 
knowledge of their presence by subjects inculcates self-government.  They are 
also on hand to a certain extent to facilitate circulation, after an accident, for 
example.  Remember also, that the precepts of political economy which inform 
the amount of police on the road is tied to liberalism‘s fear of the state governing 
too much. 
Even the speed limit, which at first glance represents a concrete example 
of sovereign law, is, on further inspection, more closely aligned with a 
mechanism of security.  A speed limit more accurately represents an optimum, 
while a bandwidth of the acceptable exists on either side.  A 100kph speed limit 
in New Zealand is considered optimal, not only is going much faster than this 
considered dangerous, but also going much slowly than this negatively affects the 
circulation of things.  In addition to this, however, there is a bandwidth of the 
acceptable that appreciates a certain variability in speed around this optimal point.  
Hence why we don‘t actually get in trouble until we start going 110kph (or 
indeed, take Easter weekend in New Zealand, which represents a statistical 
anomaly due to the high level of fatal crashes in recent years, and where political 
economy tells us that it is economically appropriate to reduce this bandwidth, and 
deploy more police on our roads to enforce this reduction; or the recent 
introduction of lower speed limits in urban areas in New Zealand due to the 
statistically high number of pedestrians killed).
78
  Although this is just one 
example of one mechanism of security, and a biopolitical regime is made up of 
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many (providing greater context and depth of analysis with which to argue for the 
existence of a biopolitical regime), what it indicates is that biopower does not 
operate according to law, but according to an imperative to distribute the living in 
the domain of value and utility, which is construed as a mechanism of security, 
whereby the biological well-being of the population is surrounded by a raft of 
regulations – a mechanism of security; driver licensing, speed regulation, 
physical infrastructure, car registration, insurance, and so on.  A mechanism of 
security is thus a ―specific principle of political method and practice, distinct 
alike from those of law, sovereignty and discipline, and capable of various modes 
of combination with these other principles and practices within diverse 
governmental configurations.‖79 
Governmentality. 
Now we get to the tripartite character of biopolitical governmentality, 
which has the population as object; political economy as knowledge; and 
mechanisms of security as instrument.
80
  However, it should first be made clear 
that Foucault meant two things by governmentality.  First is an historically 
located biopolitical governmentality: ―[t]he ensemble formed by institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses 
of security as its essential technical instrument.‖81  This is an historically specific 
version of a more general sense of governmentality which deals with ―how we 
think about governing, with the different rationalities or, … ‗mentalities of 
government.‘‖82  Hence, police governmentality is not the same as (contemporary) 
biopolitical governmentality.  This broader sense of governmentality becomes 
important later, when I engage with biopower and international governmentality.  
For the time being, however, I will set it aside as I describe the emergence of 
biopower as a rationality of rule focused on the idea of a population. 
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 As Dean points out, governmentality is distinct from an ‗art of 
government,‘ which again refers more broadly to a concern with and reflection on 
what it is to govern.
83
  Confusingly, in the literature both are referred to as 
governmentality, hence my repeated reference to biopolitical governmentality 
throughout the paper.
84
  Biopolitical governmentality is an historically specific 
version of an art of government.
85
  Donzelot (2008) sums up the biopolitical type 
by telling us it was coined ―in order to explain the introduction of political 
economy into the art of government.‖86   Prior to the emergence of political 
economy, within mercantilism, the rationalization of the exercise of power 
biopolitically was blocked – the art of government available to those who 
governed was either too abstract or too narrow, being tied either to the framework 
of sovereignty, or the framework of the family.
87
  The emergence of the 
population via political arithmetic (otherwise known as statistics) was central to 
overcoming this blockage and for political knowledge – knowledge of the state 
that can be employed for tactics of government – to continue evolving.   
―How in fact did the problem of population make possible the release 
of the art of government?  The perspective of population, the reality 
of phenomena specific to population, makes it possible to eliminate 
the model of the family and to re-focus the notion of economy on 
something else.
88
  
The family then appears as an element within population, fundamentally a relay 
within this new art of government
89
, and the notion of economy becomes 
implicated with the polis, ontologically perceived as a population.  Therefore, the 
emergence of political economy, linked to the emergence of the problem of 
population, constitutes the moment where it becomes possible ―to think, reflect, 
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and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of 
sovereignty.‖90  Connected intimately to the development of political arithmetic 
(statistics), this new constellation of political technologies provides the historical 
conjuncture necessary for the transformation of an art of government into 
governmentality. 
Governmentality, then, implies the governmentalization of the state, and 
represents the jettisoning of raison d’état.91  This reflects Foucault‘s argument 
that ―[t]he nature of the institution of the state is … a function of changes in 
practices of government, rather than the converse,‖92 which in turn implies ―a 
transformation in the relationship between knowledge and government.
93
  
Political economy, tied up as it is with the naturalness of population and its 
corresponding milieu, ―inaugurates a new mode of objectification of governed 
reality, whose effect is to resituate governmental reason within a newly 
complicated, open and unstable politico-epistemic configuration.‖ 94   Political 
economy thus disqualifies economic sovereignty, whereby ―a ‗dialectic of 
spontaneous multiplication‘ which unfolds in a condition of radical immanence, 
of inextricable circumstance and accident, [is] incapable in principle of becoming 
accessible to the totalizing scrutiny of subject or sovereign.‖95  From this follows 
a liberal idea of economic government perceived in a dual sense, being both 
informed by economics and economic itself.  Importantly, this latter sense leads 
to government that economises its own costs, and liberal governmentality is thus 
perpetually in search of new techniques to govern with less effort.  The 
combination of this ethic with the disqualification of economic sovereignty leads 
techniques of government not down the path of panopticism with its dreams of 
total control, but instead to a decentralization of regulation, whereby existing 
economic structures and institutions are endowed with certain functions of a 
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governmental infrastructure.
96
  Liberalism thus undertakes ―the construction of a 
complex domain of governmentality, within which economic and juridical 
subjectivity can alike be situated as relative moments.‖97  This complex domain is 
civil society, what is for Foucault a ‗transactional reality,‘98 and a correlate to a 
liberal technology of government, within which technologies evolve that 
governmentalise the state.  Accordingly, ―‗[t]he social‘ designates a field of 
governmental action‖ and the state ―is no longer at stake in social relations, but 
stands outside them and becomes their guarantor of progress.‖99  A distinction 
thus emerges between a state and its society, and in doing so creates a connection 
between the two.  According to Foucault, (liberal) governmentality has a 
responsibility for civil society,
100
 a responsibility that Dean (2002) points out is 
comprized of a cluster of ‗folding‘s‘; 
―an unfolding of the (formally) political sphere into civil society; an 
enfolding of the regulations of civil society into the political and a 
refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto 
the political.‖101 102 
Ultimately, it is the introduction of civil society into the art of government that 
sums up the transformation of a sovereign regime into a biopolitical regime; due 
to the repudiation of mercantilism and thus raison d’état by political economy, 
and the theorization of a distinction between population and state that Police had 
been unable or unwilling to admit, civil society is constituted as a target of 
governmental tactics – it ―is the outcome of a peculiar technique of government 
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that proceeds by autonomization of individual subjects as well as of society as a 
whole.‖103 
It is important to highlight that from a biopolitical governmentality 
perspective, traditional liberal theory that posited civil society as residing outside 
and in opposition to the state is repudiated.  Instead, the liberal-biopolitical state 
and civil society are immanent with each other; they exist in a mutually 
reinforcing role.  Rather than fostering a disjunction between the two spheres, 
liberalism connects formal state agencies and programmes to civil society. 
104
  
The fundamental outcome of this process, this governmentalization of the state 
summed up by Dean‘s foldings, is the constitution of society according to the 
nature of civil society whereby the state is ―secondary and [a] derivative of ‗civil 
society‘ outside its legitimate scope.‖105   This point is very important to the 
argument developed later, as it indicates that that the sovereign capability has 
become subsumed within a logic of civil society, especially with reference to a 
process of norm constitution.  This will be fully developed in chapter four.  For 
the time being, however, this is most relevant for my upcoming critique of the 
way the concept of biopower has so far been deployed in IR, where I argue that 
sovereign means are still essential for enforcing the norms determined by civil 
society whenever necessary.   
Problematically, predominant theorizations of biopower in IR make no 
reference to the concept of civil society, without which their conceptualizations 
struggle to maintain conceptual coherence with the history of the concept.  
Notwithstanding this deficiency, the following section critically investigates the 
three most influential theorists of biopower in IR.  In addition to the lack of a 
civil society correlate which, I later argue, is essential to an explanation of 
biopolitical governmentality, an appropriate understanding of sovereignty is 
missing.  All three theorisations are shown to have different conceptions of 
sovereignty, and thus deploy fundamentally different conceptions of biopolitical 
world politics.  Such a situation is not helpful to the project of advancing our 
understanding of contemporary IR.  This is because, following Dingwerth and 
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Pattberg (2006), concepts should be considered as the most basic tool social 
science has at its disposal, and hence their clarity is fundamental to our success at 
explaining the world.  Two extremes undermine this clarity.  On the one hand, 
new concepts should not be identified for each single observation that differs 
from a previous one.  On the other, and most importantly, ―concepts should … 
not group objects together that do not share similarities; in other words, a single 
concept should not be used for phenomena that are essentially different 
(polysemy).‖106  Regrettably, the following deployments of biopower in IR do 
exactly this.  The next section will show that the most influential accounts of 
biopower in IR theorize disparate phenomena due to idiosyncratic 
conceptualizations of sovereignty.  In particular, Hardt and Negri use the concept 
of biopower to theorize the material and agential constitution of the whole world; 
Agamben uses it to theorize the increasing salience of a mode of power based on 
a ‗state of exception‘; and Dillon uses it to theorize the operation of something 
called global liberal governance. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BIOPOWER IN IR. 
This chapter departs from an explanation of the concept of biopower and 
engages with predominant theorizations of biopower in IR.  Due to the nature of 
these deployments it is inevitably somewhat of a rupture with the paper so far.  
Beginning with Hardt & Negri, and Agamben, who are least concerned with 
traditional IR, it then moves on to Dillon, one of the most prolific writers on 
biopower in IR.  The influence of these authors is then briefly identified in a 
wider discussion of the literature.  Afterwards, the issues raised here are tied 
together in a discussion which more generally surveys the junction of Foucault 
and IR.  From this junction of Foucault and IR, the third chapter investigates the 
relationship between Foucault and sovereignty.  In it I put forward an argument 
for how I think sovereignty should be conceptualized so as to extend Foucauldian 
insights.  Armed with this conceptualization of sovereignty, I then move on to the 
final chapter, which is my argument explaining how biopower should accurately 
be treated in IR literature.  The first part of this chapter identifies; a) that Hardt 
and Negri claim the dialectic of modern sovereignty between civil and natural 
realms has come to an end and subsumes biopower within a Marxist-inspired 
analysis that attempts to account for the material and agential constitution of the 
whole world; b) that Agamben locates sovereign power in an 
originary/foundational moment defined by the concept of bare life and claims 
biopower is nothing but the hidden operation of sovereignty and theorizes the 
increasing salience of a mode of power based on a ―state of exception‖ and; c) 
that Dillon redeploys sovereign power as 'post-sovereign‖ governmental power 
and uses it to theorize the operation of something called global liberal governance.  
The second section of this chapter then surveys the rest of the literature 
concerning biopower and IR.  It identifies not only how these problematic 
conceptions of biopower in IR have influenced the broader literature, but also the 
few conceptualizations which reflect accuracies.  While it is noted that these few 
examples tend to miss what I think is essential to biopower and thus international 
biopower, they still serve to help push my ensuing argument in the right direction.  
Afterwards, in the third and final section of this chapter, the issues concerning the 
deployment of global biopower in IR are related to more general concerns with 
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the use of Foucault in IR.  This will lead me in to the chapter dealing with 
Foucault and sovereignty. 
Hardt & Negri, and Agamben.  
Biopower has entered IR discourse primarily through two influences; 
Hardt & Negri (2000), especially with reference to their concept of ‗Empire‘; and 
Agamben (1995), with his concept of ‗Bare Life‘.  Both of these (sets of) authors 
acknowledge an explicit debt to Foucault, yet both also claim Foucault‘s concept 
of biopower is deficient, and go on to modify it.  For Hardt and Negri, Foucault‘s 
thought was dominated by a structuralist epistemology which reintroduced a 
functionalist analysis that; 
―sacrifices the dynamic of the system, the creative temporality of its 
movement, and the ontological substance of cultural and social 
reproduction…  What Foucault fails to grasp finally are the real 
dynamics of production in biopolitical society.‖107 
Meanwhile, Agamben finds Foucault‘s distinction between sovereign power and 
biopower superfluous and that; 
―[t]he Foucauldian thesis [needs] to be corrected or, at least, 
completed, in the sense that what characterizes modern politics is not 
so much the inclusion of zoē in the polis – which is, in itself, 
absolutely ancient – nor simply the fact that life as such becomes a 
principal object of the projections and calculations of state power.  
Instead the decisive fact is that, together with the process by which 
exception becomes the rule, the realm of bare life – which is 
originally situated at the margins of political order – gradually begins 
to coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, 
outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of 
irreducible indistinction.‖108 
These authors appreciate the insight Foucault generated with the concept of 
biopower, but ultimately find that in its original form it is unable to fully grasp 
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the important features of modernity.  Hardt and Negri‘s ‗materialist‘ approach 
seeks to discover the originary productive forces that animate the biopolitical 
body, a context indicative of the ―process of the constitution of the world‖, that 
apparently Foucault‘s biopower fails to comprehend.  Agamben, on the other 
hand, seeks to explain the concept of the sovereign exception in terms of 
biopower, which Foucault‘s distinction between sovereign power and biopower 
cannot accommodate. 
Hardt and Negri locate the ―dynamics of production in biopolitical society‖ 
within the organization of global capital.  In particular, ―[t]he huge transnational 
corporations construct the connective fabric of the biopolitical world in certain 
important respects.‖109  These ―great industrial and financial powers‖, they argue; 
―produce not only commodities but also subjectivities.  They produce 
agentic subjectivities within the biopolitical context: they produce 
needs, social relations, bodies, and minds – which is to say, they 
produce producers.  In the biopolitical sphere, life is made to work for 
production and production is made to work for life.‖110 
This statement reflects Hardt & Negri‘s departure from Foucault, with the 
reintroduction of Marxist-inspired analyses of production.  They hope to account 
for the ‗why‘ of world order, and in attempting to do so analyse biopower in 
terms of productive labour.  They argue recent transformations in productive 
labour, namely its tendency in becoming immaterial, communicative, and 
‗immediately social‘ 111  produces new subjectivities according to a global 
mechanism of exploitation.  The problem with their analysis is that their attempt 
to rectify Foucault‘s supposed neglect of agency implicitly reintroduces a 
superstructural component, precisely what a Foucauldian methodology seeks to 
avoid.  As Coleman & Agnew point out, by de-territorialising the contemporary 
world and de-actualising the place of politics, Hardt and Negri produce a 
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transcendent/immanent dichotomy that ―implicitly reinstates a transcendental 
view of history – the ‗view form nowhere‘ with all of its fallibilities.‖112 
Hardt and Negri‘s conceptualization of the biopolitical production of 
empire is a response to the increasingly complex relationship between life and 
capitalism, an approach which expands the biological component of desire in 
biopower to include a psychological component.  ―Biopolitical production,‖ 
therefore, ―entails the implication of all the body‘s capacities, desire, language, 
affect, and style into the networks of activities productive for capital.‖113  Hardt 
and Negri thus generate an idea of immanence based on production; without this 
productive principle, ―nothing allows society to become political.‖ 114   This 
ontology of production reveals the potentially transformative immanence 
embodied in the subjects of capitalism; it apparently ―reveals the way in which 
the world is continually made and remade by the bodies and desires of the many, 
thus exposing the way in which the world can be made otherwise.‖115  However, 
this immanence is juxtaposed with the transcendent nature of Empire, a 
juxtaposition that problematises the efficacy of individual agency.  According to 
Hardt and Negri, Empire ―effectively encompasses the spatial totality … 
effectively suspends history … [and] operates on all registers of the social order 
extending down to the depths of the social world.‖116  The site of Empire is 
therefore everywhere and nowhere at once, completely penetrating the social 
world, a transcendent regime that would always seem to have the upper hand.  
Both Hardt & Negri and Giorgio Agamben modify Foucault‘s concept of 
biopower according to dissimilar views of sovereignty.  Hardt & Negri‘s de-
territorialising analysis of contemporary world order generates a global 
conception of sovereignty, in which the dialectic of modern sovereignty between 
civil and natural realms has come to an end.  Agamben, on the other hand, 
maintains a distinction, albeit purely formal, between the inside of sovereignty, 
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and the outside as a zone of exception.  Agamben argues that a distinction 
between sovereign power and biopower is a misinterpretation resulting from the 
historical concealment of biopower by sovereign power.  His work; 
―concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the 
juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power.  What this 
work has had to record among its likely conclusions is precisely that 
the two analyses cannot be separated, and that the inclusion of bare 
life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – 
nucleus of sovereign power.‖117 
Due to Agamben‘s view of sovereignty, it is clear that his conception of biopower 
is fundamentally dissimilar to Foucault.  Some go so far as to say they are not 
talking about the same thing.
118
  Agamben‘s biopower rests on the idea that ‗bare 
life‘ is its object, a mode of life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death 
via the suspension of sovereignty, a foundational practice that serves to 
perpetually constitute sovereign power.  Bare life exists in a ‗state of exception,‘ 
a constitutive operation that links bare life directly to sovereign power.  The state 
of exception thus produces bare life which is the hidden foundation of biopolitics, 
which itself had been concealed until Foucault identified practices of government 
that made it explicit.  This objectification of bare life is absolutely incongruent 
with Foucault‘s subjectification of the life processes of a population.  It also 
directly contradicts Foucault.  For Agamben, sovereign biopower produces bare 
life to establish itself, a process that is ―immensely reductive,‖ 119  while for 
Foucault, the practice of biopower is productive – to turn the mere ―being‖ of life 
into ―well-being.‖ 120   Ojakangas sums up the problem with Agamben‘s 
perspective most succinctly when he says that ―[b]io-power needs a notion of life 
that corresponds to its aims.‖121 
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The necessary correspondence between biopower and ‗more-than-life‘ 
does mean Agamben is effectively talking about something different  to what 
Foucault meant.  Schinkel (2010) even resolves this divergence in a model based 
on citizenship as a technology of government.  On this reading Foucauldian 
biopolitics is directed towards the bios, taking as its object the social body, while 
Agambean biopower is a zoēpolitics externally directed to persons outside the 
state.
122
  This is an important and helpful distinction, but it leaves unresolved 
what branch of biopower is most pertinent to the study of international relations.  
Like Hardt & Negri, the influence Agamben‘s work wields within the discipline 
of IR forces a complete appraisal of his conceptualization, and from a perspective 
that hopes to extend Foucault‘s insights, methodological problems upset his 
argument.  In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History Foucault eschews the search for 
truth in origins, whereby history becomes a handmaiden to philosophy.
123
  
Agamben does not observe this methodological precaution and effectively 
identifies an originary moment, whereby the articulation of the concepts of zoë 
and bios by Aristotle constitute the birth-moment of sovereignty.  Not only does 
this ―naively and problematically [assume] that there was once a separation 
between zoë and bios,‖ 124  Blencowe points out that this reading also de-
historicises biopower in a dual sense.  First it removes Foucault‘s work from its 
contexts of concern with constructed and historical statuses, which ―[forecloses] 
any transhistorical distinctions such as zoë/bios, bare life/human life, or 
nature/culture‖.  Second, ―the historical specificity of notions that are central to 
biological thinking, such as species, is obliterated while all thought of living 
physicality is subsumed under a ‗mere‘ physicality.‖ 125   The genealogical 
component of Foucault‘s insight is thus completely removed, and an abstract 
transhistorical category –zoë – is introduced. 
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In summary, both sets of authors discussed above commit, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, fundamental methodological errors.  Hardt & Negri 
explain power relations according to a transcendent logic, and explicitly break 
one of Foucault‘s methodological rules; ―not to attempt some kind of deduction 
of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which 
it permeates into the base, of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and 
including the most molecular elements of society.‖126  Meanwhile, Agamben‘s 
analysis is also anti-genealogical, in that it places the present need of explaining 
zones of exception at the supposed origin of sovereignty, albeit an origin that 
perpetually re-inscribes itself as the function of sovereignty.  Yet both sets of 
authors have a predominant influence in the IR literature, over a dearth of more 
accurate Foucauldian readings.  It should seem odd then, that when the 
shortcomings of biopower in IR literature are identified, it is Foucault that gets 
the blame.  This is especially so when Foucault made it quite clear that, although 
his concepts and insights were produced to be freely interpreted and redeployed 
according to the directions of others‘ investigations, certain methodological 
principles were integral to his work.  I maintain that a Foucauldian IR can only be 
built upon a certain level of methodological adherence to these principles. 
Dillon. 
The direction in which Agamben, and Hardt & Negri have ultimately led 
biopower is best represented by Michael Dillon, probably the most explicit and 
prolific theorist of biopower in IR.
127
  Dillon is particularly interested in the 
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ramifications of Foucault‘s insights into security, war, and race, and views 
biopolitics from this perspective.  For Dillon, the central import of biopower is 
not that it is a strategy which promotes life, but that in promoting life its central 
concern is to differentiate between the fit and unfit. 
―Biopolitics is therefore always involved in the sorting of life for the 
promotion of life.  Sorting life requires waging war on behalf of life 
against life forces that are inimical to life.‖128 
War becomes a central concern for Dillon because, as Foucault first states in The 
History of Sexuality, vol 1, biopower not only is a power that fosters life, but 
concomitantly disallows life.
129
  Foucault, however, did not pursue this line of 
inquiry to fully develop its implications, and Dillon‘s project launches itself from 
the point made by Bigo that ―[t]he question of security as it relates to war, and to 
international war, is not really discussed by Foucault and the Foucaultians.‖130  
Dillon‘s concern with war is founded, as it also was for Foucault, on 
Foucault‘s concept of race, which is much broader than race conceived as a 
simply biological trait.  It instead refers to the political enfranchisement of life; in 
a biopolitical regime, rather than being a taken-for-granted ethnic marker, racial 
fitness ―is ultimately dependant upon utility measures for the promotion of life 
biologically.‖131  Dillon therefore draws on Society Must Be Defended, which is 
effectively Foucault‘s genealogy of the modern state.  In this re-reading of history 
the formation of states is seen as the institutionalization of the results of war, 
whereby a certain conceptualization of life is promoted at the expense of others, 
and modern politics is seen as the extension of (race-)war by other means.  The 
institutionalized warfare that is modern politics is biopolitical in that it continues 
to promote a certain form of life at the expense of others, and that this biopolitics 
hides its violent side by focusing on its imperative to foster life.  From this 
foundation, and the focus on the idea that liberal biopolitical states must 
                                                                                                             
Life Live, ed. Richard Falk and R. B. J. Walker, Global Horizons (New York: 
Routledge, 2009). 
128 Dillon and Neal, "Introduction," 8. 
129 Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One, 138. 
130 Bigo in Dillon and Neal, "Introduction."  See also Didier Bigo, "Security: A 
Field Left Fallow," in Foucault on Politics, Security and War, ed. Michael Dillon 
and Andrew W. Neal (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
131
 Dillon, "Security, Race, War," 168. 
48 
 
proactively ‗let die‘ to ‗make live,‘ Dillon argues that there exists a regime of 
global liberal biopower.  For example, the global effort to combat terrorism is 
theorized as part of global biopolitical strategy due to the necessity to make 
secure the type of life that biopower defends, from which the type of life 
‗terrorists‘ promote diverges.132  Dillon problematically correlates ‗international 
warfare‘ with biopower.  Centered on the idea that modern politics represents an 
inversion of war, his general thesis appears to be based on the idea that conflict in 
the international sphere is gradually being incorporated into an institutional 
framework that is assumed to be biopolitical.  He thus exemplifies a double-
reading common in the literature, also evident in Empire, whereby biopower is 
scaled-up in connection to  globalized liberalism. 
Dillon‘s overriding concern with the martial expression of the imperative 
to ‗make live‘ is linked to a discourse of value provided by capitalism.  In his 
view liberalism is necessarily biopolitical,
133
 and global liberal governance is 
intimately allied with the globalization of capital.
134
  His alliance of global 
capitalism with global liberal governance, lies at the root of his conclusion that 
biopower is going global.  For him, ―[t]he biopolitical imperative to make live 
finds its expression today … in making life live the emergency of its emergence; 
for that is what species life is now said to be‖,135 and species-life is intimately 
related to a discourse of value, provided by capitalism.  According to Dillon; 
―[i]n as much as the liberal form of rule takes species life, as well as 
subjectivity, as its referent object of rule, the liberal way of rule also 
governs by reference to species properties, principal among which is 
contingency…  Contingency is foundational, especially to how the 
operations of living systems are now conceived.‖136 
Contingency is a new epistemic domain associated with probability analysis, risk 
analysis, and ―increasingly, a wide variety of techniques for patterning behaviour 
employed extensively from anti-terror surveillance, health and commercial 
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marketing to [bibliometric and informetric techniques to investigate the 
Internet],‖137 and ―allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an 
account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and 
emergence.‖138  This perspective reflects ―pluripotent life, characterized by its 
continuously unfolding potential.‖139  Such life is immanently dangerous, both to 
itself and other life forms, and for biopower to be effective it must identify life as 
either of these two options, by attributing value to one, and not the other.  Dillon 
points out that once a discourse of life is established, an discourse of value 
ineluctably follows, and therefore that ―‗[s]pecies‘ means classification as such, 
classification as living thing and classification as value, specifically monetary or 
capital value.  These three things are locked into a very tight and radically 
interdependent triangulation.‖140 
Dillon‘s substitution of species for population, however, is problematic.  
His concept of species replaces Foucault‘s emphasis on population, the 
unearthing of which provided the ontological traction for the emergence of 
biopower; ―species-being is a biopolitical imaginary in which ‗life‘ is taken as the 
referent ontopolitical object of governance, self-governance and rule.‖141  The 
major conceptual implication of the use of species, instead of population, is 
Dillon‘s position that the biopolitical question is not confined to that of 
territorially-constituted populations, thus setting the conceptual stage for a global 
biopolitics of the human race.  This problematic conception of species-being as 
the referent ontopolitical object of global biopower is a result of his neglect of the 
concept of milieu, and especially the role sovereignty plays in the global milieu
142
.  
The milieu, for Foucault, is the space that frames security; ―it refers to a series of 
possible events; it refers to the temporal and the uncertain, which have to be 
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inserted within a given space.‖143  Furthermore, his discussion of space identifies 
that this space, the milieu, is acted upon by all three governmental regimes in his 
tripartite division of modern power;
144
  
―problems of space are equally common to all three.  It goes without 
saying for sovereignty, since sovereignty is first of all exercized 
within the territory.  But discipline involves a spatial division, and I 
think security does too, and the different treatment of space by 
sovereignty, discipline, and security is precisely what I want to talk 
about.‖145 
By neglecting the concept of milieu, Dillon inevitably neglects, or at least 
misrepresents the role sovereignty plays in constituting a biopolitical regime, 
which in turn allows him to scale up biopower. 
In an effort to link the operation of sovereignty to a global population, 
Dillon, drawing on Agamben, likens a continuous state of exception at the level 
of state sovereignty to a continuous state of emergence at the global level, 
claiming that ―[g]overnmental power – specifically in the forms increasingly 
characteristic of global liberal governance – is, like sovereign power, a certain 
strategic ordering of power relations that derives from insisting on a state of 
emergency.‖ 146   Like a state of exception whereby the outside is constituted 
through its relationship with the inside, effectively blurring the spheres of 
inside/outside which sovereign power claims to establish and preserve, an 
analogous, global, state of emergence, or emergency, as Dillon puts it, creates 
zones of indistinction subject to governmental power.  This governmental power, 
global and liberal in nature, subjectivises states of emergency within a 
knowledge/power relationship that problematises them biopolitically according to 
the concept of species.  Dillon thus situates biopower within a space of security 
that implies ‗global-liberal‘ ‗security‘ operations, involving international 
terrorism and humanitarian events, constitute the operation of biopower.
147
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Dillon‘s redeployment of sovereign power as post-sovereign governmental power 
significantly modifies the tripartite governmental regime Foucault imparted to us.  
This is not to say that biopower can only ever remain situated within a sovereign 
state – such a claim would deny the transgressive nature of Foucault‘s analysis.  
However, the methodological manner in which Dillon redeploys the role of 
sovereignty, thus introducing a transcendental nature, sits uncomfortably with 
Foucault‘s methodological precaution not to theorise in a top-down manner. 
Dillon‘s analysis is a misrepresentation of the concept of population, 
which he represents as species.
148
  Senellart tells us liberalism ―constitutes the 
condition of intelligibility of biopolitics,‖ 149  whereby ―subjects of right over 
whom political sovereignty is exercized appear themselves as a population that a 
government must manage.‖150  This appearance of a  population is the founding 
principle that Dillon evokes when he refers to the administration and production 
of life.  However, such activity cannot be linked to a complex regime of global 
liberal governance, because, on the one hand and as noted above, global 
liberalism does not possess the requisite civil society, and on the other, it implies 
―complex systems of coordination and centralization‖ found at the level of the 
state.
151
  As Senellart confirms, ―[b]iopolitics therefore can only be conceived as 
bioregulation by the state.‖152  This statement points to the concrete practices of 
government carried out by the state, and is central to my argument which will be 
fully outlined in the following chapters.  Dillon therefore elides the explicit 
relation posited by Foucault between the population and sovereignty constituted 
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by a seizure of power, and misses the importance of the relationship between 
sovereign power and biopower – which are reduced to each other in Agamben‘s 
work; in particular the fact that it was with recourse to the administrative power 
of sovereignty that biopolitical techniques of government – namely the use of 
statistics and establishment of mechanisms of security – managed to objectify 
population(s).  Due to the blurring of inside/outside, the specific mechanisms by 
which populations are formed and governed – sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical 
– are lost to analysis. 
Dillon‘s conceptualization of sovereignty neglects the actual practices of a 
juridical-legal-regulatory apparatus that serves not only to enforce, when 
necessary, biopolitical norms, but also plays a central role in determining those 
norms.  This access to and objectification of a population is a seizure of power 
over a population that was integral to the operation of biopower as Foucault saw 
it.  The elision of this aspect of sovereignty is also present in the works of Hardt 
and Negri, and Agamben.  Although Hardt & Negri‘s argument that the dialectic 
between civil and natural realms is increasingly untenable is insightful, a 
considerable amount of historical practices and national histories maintain it as a 
concept which continues to have institutional capacity. Meanwhile, at first sight, 
Agamben‘s conception of sovereignty may seem to have this aspect of 
sovereignty in common with Foucault.  After all, his work is precisely about 
understanding who gets to live within the sovereign realm, and who does not.  
However, Agamben‘s transhistorical conception of sovereignty pays no attention 
to the actual, physical activity of government – the genealogical component of 
Foucault‘s work.  Sovereignty is instead theorized according to its symbolic role 
only; that is, as a division between the inside and outside of political community.  
Again, as with Hardt & Negri, this is, in many respects, a fruitful insight, but in 
no way can it help us to understand how individual bodies are inserted in 
mechanisms of power in an attempt to transform their being into ‗well-being.‘  A 
more accurate reading of biopower in IR, at least if we wish our work to resonate 
with what Foucault sought to uncover, needs to pay close attention to the 
continued operation of state sovereignty in biopower, both domestically and 
internationally.  This dilemma is engaged with in the final section, but first the 
influence of this authors is situated in an overview of other uses of biopower in 
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IR literature, before I complete this chapter with a general discussion concerning 
the junction of Foucault and IR.  This next two sections will thus tie together the 
themes in this chapter and set us up for the concluding argument. 
Biopower in the Wider Literature. 
The above authors have made it easy for others to take the concept of 
global biopower for granted.  Stone (2010) uncritically accepts Hardt & Negri‘s 
imperial re-reading of sovereignty.
153
  Edkins (2008) also takes global biopower 
for granted, although through association with Agamben‘s ‗bare life‖, by 
ambiguously linking a regime of global governance to the production of bare life 
at local levels.
154
  Following Hardt & Negri, Reid (2005) labels the United 
Nations, the NGO community and ‗global civil society‘ biopolitical agencies 
―that do not simply enact a deterritorialisation of sovereignty, but rather which 
figurate the reterritorialisation of deterritorialising flows of immanence in the 
name of political sovereignty.‖155  He argues that this process is a defining feature 
of the modern international system, which dangerously lends itself to the 
reterritorialisation of sovereignty at the global level.  For him, ―[t]he idea of a 
universally coded and legally enfranchized humanity invokes the idea and pursuit 
of a universal state.‖156  Jaeger (2010) sees within the process of recent UN 
reform efforts, a ―biopolitical reprogramming of sovereignty and global 
governance whose political finality is the vitality, security and productivity of the 
global population.‖157  Evans (2010) argues that a ―global imaginary of threat 
[has] allowed for the possibility to govern all illiberal life on the basis that the 
species as a whole would be less endangered.‖158  This has led to a ―liberal 
expansionism [that has] proceeded on the basis of alleviating unnecessary 
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suffering in zones of political instability and crises.‖159  The global liberal regime 
is therefore conditioned by a development-security nexus that imposes liberalism 
and justifies ‗liberal war‘.  All of these examples are heavily influenced by Hardt 
& Negri, Agamben, or Dillon, and all, in one way or another associate biopower 
with a global correlate. 
Selby (2007) articulates this criticism.  He points out that much IR 
appropriation of Foucault has, through a double-reading, unreflectively scaled up 
his insights on the basis of a supposed world order reflecting the same liberal 
nature that Foucault engaged with.  International political relations, he notes, ―are 
read first as liberal and, on the strength of this, these global liberal realities are 
analysed as the products of disciplinary and bio-political power.  Without such an 
effective ‗double reading‘, a characterization of contemporary world politics as 
‗globalized bio-politics‘ would be impossible.‖160  Chandler (2009) furthers this 
argument and states that such uncritical scaling-up of biopower nullifies an 
understanding of international relations mediated by interstate competition, and 
this globalized understanding of power ―becomes increasingly abstracted from 
any analysis of contemporary social relations.‖ 161   As Chandler points out; 
theorizations of liberalism as an abstract global reality cannot account for the ad 
hoc and often irrational interventions of Western states and international 
institutions.  Indeed, such readings of history go against the Foucauldian 
injunction to seek out and account for precisely those phenomena that do not 
align with the dominant framework of understanding.  Furthermore, in a critique 
of Dillon & Reid (2009), Chandler points out that the scaling-up of biopower, 
which goes against Foucault‘s attempts to concretely ground his conceptual 
categories, ―denude[s] the conception of biopolitics of theory, politics and history. 
Instead, biopolitics becomes merely a technical expression or way of viewing the 
world which takes humanity as its starting point.‖162 
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This is not to say that deployments of biopower in IR influenced by Hardt 
& Negri and Agamben have not been put to good use in developing fruitful 
insights.  Agamben can be helpful in understanding many facets of contemporary 
international life.  Salter (2006) and Vaughan-Williams (2009) both draw on 
‗bare life‘ and ‗zones of exception‘ to develop an appreciation of the role of 
borders play suitable to contemporary political life.  Vaughan-Williams, for 
example, uses the concept to point out how the border no longer necessarily 
operates at a country‘s territorial boundary, but instead can be thought of as 
generalized throughout a sovereign space.  Through a modified reading of bare 
life, he identifies how sovereign boundary practices occur at diffuse locations 
throughout sovereign space.  ―Thinking in terms of  the generalized bio-political 
border unties an analysis of the activity of sovereign power from the territorial 
limits of the state and relocates such an analysis in the context of a bio-political 
field spanning domestic and international space.‖163   In specific reference to 
biopower, Salter highlights how territorial border zones actually operate 
according to the logic of permanent exception, a place where non-citizens are 
both subject to the law and have no recourse to the law (because they are not 
sovereign subjects).  Salter‘s analysis implies an international biopolitical order 
tied to the specific operation of sovereign states.
164
  He points out how a global 
visa regime administers a target population by utilising confessionary techniques 
to determine the viability of entry seekers to sovereign spaces, according to a 
number of  indicators that ascertain an individuals threat to society.
165
  This is a 
concrete indication of an international biopolitical order not in any way linked to 
some sort of global sovereignty, but instead shared by sovereign states in an 
effort to control and ‗defend‘ internal populations.  This is a good example of the 
way shared norms operate in separate biopolitical regimes, and ultimately it does 
not reflect any transformation of sovereignty, focused as it is on territorial 
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integrity, and thus does not indicate any fundamental change to the nature of 
biopolitical governmentality proposed by Foucault. 
Even the most accurate account of biopolitics in IR does not imply a 
transformation of sovereignty.  Di Muzio analyses the attempted government of 
global slums, framed by Goal 7, target 11 of the Millennium Development Goals.  
He only briefly mentions Agamben‘s ‗zones of exception‘ and instead draws 
almost exclusively on Foucault.  While he freely uses the term ‗global liberal 
governance‘, his analysis is specific and insightful.  Following Agamben, Di 
Muzio claims slums instead of camps may soon be the true ―biopolitical 
paradigm of the modern.‖166  However, that is where any reference to Agamben 
ends, and his Foucauldian analysis, on my reading, confirms, like Salter, that 
zones of exception are real political spaces, but are not biopolitical.  ―[T]he 
biopolitical imperative to improve the vital chances of slum dwellers‖ which Di 
Muzio correlates with UN activity
 167
 is, I argue, more accurately a project to 
‗extinguish‘ the exception. 
Drawing on Rabinow and Rose (2006), Di Muzio discusses three elements 
of biopower present in the attempted governance of so-called global slums: life 
discourses; intervention strategies; and modes of subjectification.
168
  He notes 
that the problematic of slums has largely been displaced from a wholly local and 
national context to one of ―global biopolitical importance.‖169  That slums have 
become a global phenomenon is a product of UN institutional architecture which 
has facilitated statistical analysis that identifies the phenomenon as ‗global.‘  It 
also acts to coordinate international initiatives.  Within the UN context an official 
discourse defines the target population(s), another identifies the conditions of life, 
and a third determines initiatives to be taken to improve the quality of life within 
slums.
170
  Di Muzio states ―the overarching goal of biopolitical interventions is to 
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transform slum settlements into vital neighbourhoods,‖ and that such 
interventions identify public hygiene and circulation as critical issues.
171
  Both 
are necessary to ―make live,‖ while fostering circulation is also a strategy used to 
prevent further slum formation.  These undeniably biopolitical strategies, 
however, are undermined by the fact that, as UN Habitat admits, ―more accurate 
and comprehensive data collection needs to be carried out if the biopolitical 
project to help slum dwellers is to be fulfilled.‖172  In essence, the biopolitical 
project needs to have more effective sovereignty over the target population.  
Without the accurate collection of statistics, programs cannot be effective because 
the natural processes of society, their ‗level of generality,‘ must be registered in 
order to generate appropriate programs. 
The fact that the UN is operating in these environments is an indicator of 
‗conditional sovereignty,‘ facilitated by a state‘s incapacity to govern 
effectively.
173
  While it may seem to indicate a modification of sovereignty, this 
change is normative and not operational, by which I mean that the institutional 
capacity of sovereignty does not change, but the norms according to which it is 
supposed to operate do.  Conditional sovereignty reflects international norms and 
provides for the denial of sovereignty to state representatives who are seen as 
failing in their responsibilities as sovereign representatives.  When this stripping 
of sovereignty occurs, the operational capacity of the state is turned over to, and 
supplemented by, international actors so as to fulfil sovereign responsibility.  
That is, according to liberal precepts, to successfully govern biopolitically.  Once 
this normative component of governing has successfully been (re)instated, the 
sovereign capacity to act is ideally returned to national representatives.  Therefore, 
according to conditional sovereignty, the operational capacity of sovereignty as a 
particular activity does not change, but is instead turned over to different actors 
for an indefinite period of time.  The norm of autonomy is simply replaced by a 
norm of privilege and responsibility.  As Slaughter points out, ―[h]owever 
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paradoxical it sounds, the measure of a state‘s capacity to act as an independent 
unit within the international system – the condition that ―sovereignty‖ purports 
both to grant and to describe – depends on the breadth and depth of its links to 
other states.‖174   This point draws on an argument by Raustiala (2003) that 
international institutions ―actually serve as a means to reassert sovereignty.‖175 
 Di Muzio provides an example of how biopower becomes an IR concern, 
but does not show us how biopower might be becoming international.  Indeed, the 
difficulty the UN has described stemming from data collection (i.e. inscription of 
population processes) problematises the ability of international agencies to 
effectively administer a local population.  It is precisely the requirement to 
govern locally by capturing a population within biopolitical sovereignty that 
problematises the potential effectiveness of a regime of global biopower.  Finally, 
and reflecting the idea behind conditional sovereignty, when the normative 
motivation behind conditional sovereignty has successfully reinstated endogenous 
biopolitical governmentality, then the state of exception that such locales 
represent will have been successfully extinguished.  That is, if and when the UN 
successfully inculcates or rehabilitates a population so as to address biopolitical 
concerns, the exception which that locale represents will have been rearticulated 
within the sovereign fold.
176
  Therefore, the phenomenon which links biopower to 
international agencies is inevitable transitory, occurring in diverse locations and 
at different times without any necessary linkages between them.  The 
international system in this sense is only biopolitically-minded haphazardly, and 
even then is not itself biopolitical, for the sovereignty it uses to achieve 
biopolitical goals is territorialized at a different scale.  This idea will be built 
upon later, where it will be argued that biopolitical governmentality is but one 
component of a regime of international governmentality. 
 As noted above, a liberal world view infuses much of the IR literature, 
whereby a global liberal dispositif of power relations is uncritically presumed to 
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dominate international relations, a self-prophesising world view that engenders 
globalized biopower.   Pace Selby and Chandler, I disagree with this manoeuvre.  
Without an identifiable transformation of sovereignty, I argue that biopower can 
only remain territorially defined, and the tendency to ‗globalise‘ biopower 
apparent in much of the literature is a development that should set off alarm bells 
when coming from a Foucauldian perspective.  A number of phenomenon support 
the idea that a global liberal dispositif, necessary for global biopower to exist, is 
not operating.  One could point to the continuing relevance of sovereign states in 
determining their own affairs, their capacity and intention to resist neoliberal 
policies encouraged by international institutions, or Raustiala‘s argument that 
sovereignty is actually reasserted by international institutions.  One could also 
point to persistent coordination problems between liberal states, especially 
concerning the implementation of laissez-faire policies.  Finally, and most 
fundamentally, the lack of a correlate civil society strongly suggests a distinct 
lack of global biopolitical liberalism. 
Foucault and IR. 
   Selby‘s argument reflects a predominant criticism of ‗Foucauldian IR,‘ 
that is, its supposed propensity to reinscribe contemporary discursive framings of 
power, liberal
177
 or realist.
178
  The problem is not, however, with Foucault but 
with the discipline itself.  These accounts of Foucault in IR reflect a discipline 
struggling to adapt to change, a ―conflation between the fluidity of the 
international and the frozen waters of IR that have been produced by disciplinary 
fiat.‖179  Criticisms of Foucauldian IR represent an inability to overcome the 
universal categorization of the ‗international‘ that discursively and ontologically 
frames IR.  Following Calkivik, the strength of Foucault's work lies precisely in 
its ability to unsettle established accounts of the international.  She asks, rather 
than subjecting Foucault to ―the court of disciplinary reason that operates by 
sacrilizing [sic] its object – ‗the international‘ – could one not work with Foucault 
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toward unravelling this ‗it‘ and attending to [its] historical and political 
production?‖180  Calkivik‘s argument goes right to the heart of the Foucauldian 
method: 
―I start from the theoretical and methodological decision that consists 
in saying: Let‘s suppose that universals do not exist.  And then I put 
the question to history and historians: How can you write history if 
you do not accept a priori the existence of things like the state, society, 
the sovereign, and subjects?‖181 
This decision elides top-down analyses of power and encourages an approach 
from the opposite direction, a micro-physics, ―or in other words looking in 
historical terms, and from below, at how control mechanisms could come into 
play.‖ 182   Not only does this avoid interpretations of power that reinforce 
contemporary dominations, it also avoids issues with the ontological framing of 
IR by identifying the state as a transactional reality.  Therefore, the primacy 
Foucault afforded a micro-physical approach is not, pace Selby, an ontological 
primacy.
183
  Instead it is precisely the micro-physical approach that obviates any 
ontological difficulties involved with overcoming the domestic/international 
dichotomy.  Indeed, Foucault‘s ―special kind of history‖ itself replaces 
ontology.
184
  
 Foucault‘s elucidation of biopower was implicitly a response to criticisms 
that such ―micro-physical architectures, techniques and procedures‖ are 
insufficient to interrogate the extent of power-relations.
185
  It was a criticism of 
his obviation of the state as an actor, which as I will show, we must not forget if 
we are to translate Foucault into IR.  Extending Foucault into the realm of IR 
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therefore becomes not only possible but necessary if insights generated by 
Foucault within liberal capitalist societies are to be placed in a contemporary (not 
necessarily liberal-biopolitical) international context.  Unless one wishes to claim 
that local realities are isolated from global processes, some instances of the 
micro-physical architecture of power relations will only be explained by the 
internationalization of Foucault.  Hindess supports this position when he says that 
―if government in the general sense that Foucault identifies is a matter of aiming 
to structure the possible field of action of others, and sometimes oneself, there is 
no reason why the concept should not be extended beyond the limits of the state 
to the study of international affairs.
186
  There can be no argument today that 
power relations transcend state boundaries, and it is precisely Foucault‘s micro-
physical approach that allows us to trace these power relations. 
 This is essentially to argue that there are no ontological constraints to 
Foucauldian IR – it is a fundamentally transgressive philosophy, and―[i]n contrast 
to theories which assume given limits to their object and to explanation and 
judgment, Foucauldian theories emphasise the fluidity and fragility of limits.‖187  
The deployment of Foucault in IR is therefore to be directed towards the blurring 
of the boundaries between domestic and international politics, and thus the 
continued displacement of the state as the primary site of analysis: 
―[T]he Foucauldian international relations scholar will pay more 
attention to the sub-state and trans-state strategic relations of power 
through which the state is enabled to effect its appearance as a unitary 
actor in the international context.‖188 
However, this investigation will not necessarily identify global biopower.  It 
should be remembered at the outset that biopower is nothing if not a spatially and 
temporally specific version of governmentality.  This is why Foucault‘s 
methodological concerns should reside at the forefront of our thoughts as we 
proceed with an IR programme that attempts to extend Foucauldian insights.  
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Considering the problematic of state/sovereignty is one of the major 
stumbling blocks of an IR theory that hopes to account for contemporary changes 
in international politics, Foucault‘s methodological legacy is eminently suitable 
for IR theory.  However, it should be remembered that the displacement of 
sovereignty does not make sovereignty a redundant category, only that it is no 
longer the primary prism of understanding politics.  It continues to play a central, 
albeit deconstructed role, and the difficulties associated with ‗internationalizing‘ 
Foucault can be directly attributed to the continuing relevance of sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER THREE: FOUCAULT AND SOVEREIGNTY. 
The difficulty in overcoming problems in IR that are connected to the 
concept of sovereignty, combined with the fact that the elision or 
misrepresentation of sovereignty in influential accounts of ‗global biopower‘ is 
the main causal factor leading to claims that global liberal governance 
biopolitically orders life, allows this investigation of biopower in IR not only to 
respond to a substantive debate, but also to contribute to the project of developing 
a productive and coherent Foucauldian approach to IR, based on an ascending 
analysis of power relations.  Before moving on to the final chapter then, I will 
present a conceptualization of sovereignty from a Foucauldian perspective that 
will provide the foundation for my argument. 
 Foucault was not an international relations theorist, and his concept of 
sovereignty reflects his preoccupation with the internal dimensions of 
government.  To get at this internality the predominant theorisation of 
sovereignty had to be displaced, which for Foucault is tied up with the juridical 
thought that emerged around, and then displaced, the absolute monarchical power 
of the middle ages.  Therefore, ―Foucault‘s main target is the Hobbesian juridical 
model of sovereignty, a system of power with a single center.‖189  This juridical 
thought, due to its relationship with royal power, established a theory of right the 
essential role of which has been to establish the legitimacy of power, organized 
around the problem of sovereignty. 
―To say that the problem of sovereignty is the central problem of right 
in Western societies means that the essential function of the technique 
and discourse of right is to dissolve the element of domination in 
power and to replace that domination, which has to be reduced or 
masked, with two things: the legitimate rights of the sovereign on one 
hand, and the legal obligation to obey on the other…  it is, in other 
words, ultimately an elimination of domination and its 
consequences.‖190  
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Sovereignty, as described in Society Must Be Defended, is the outcome of a 
history of conflicts and represents ‗politics as war by other means,‘ whereby ―the 
binary schema of war and struggle, of the clash between forces, can really be 
identified as the basis of civil society, as both the principle and motor of the 
exercise of political power.‖191  Foucault‘s displacement of sovereignty, therefore, 
is justified by the belief that ―sovereignty works at the level of the symbolic, 
while government claims to act on the real,‖192 and that this symbolic device is a 
technology of government, or a performative practice.
193
  Foucault‘s project, then, 
was to avoid the centripetal effect of sovereignty produced by its discursive and 
symbolic power in order to identify actual operations of government.  It tries to 
account for the way power operates devoid of justifying claims, to account for the 
way modern power, when viewed as being significantly invested in state 
apparatuses, is really a domineering force that produces certain subjectivities.  As 
Neal points out, the real challenge in ‗cutting off the kings head‘ ―is to force open 
the massive overdetermination of the problem of sovereignty.‖194  To achieve this 
displacement of sovereignty as the locus of modern power, Foucault places it in a 
tripartite relation with disciplinary power and governmentality.  In this way, 
sovereignty becomes but one regime of governmentality, that is, one way of 
reflecting on the practice of government, within the state, which is ―nothing else 
but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities.‖195 
Foucault‘s displacement of sovereignty is made possible by his 
methodological commitment to nominalism, what he called ‗eventalisation‘.  
‗Eventalisation‘ is a procedure to breach the self-evidence of things, to make 
―visible a singularity at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical 
constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself 
uniformly on all‖, and then in the breach to rediscover ―the connections, 
encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a 
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given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, 
and necessary.‖196  That is to say, eventalization unearths all of those other things 
that have contributed to making something that is taken for granted in a general 
form.  In the case of sovereignty, ―government by state agencies must be 
conceived of as a contingent political process and a singular historical event in 
need of explanation rather than a given fact.‖197   
Jessop (2007) tells us that ―Foucault stressed three themes in his 
‗nominalist‘ analytics of power: it is immanent in all social relations, articulated 
with discourses as well as institutions, and necessarily polyvalent because its 
impact and significance vary with how social relations, discourses and institutions 
are integrated into different strategies.‖198  Such a process helped Foucault to 
account for the governmentalisation of the state, whereby the state, instead of 
sovereignty, became the locus and scope of the ‗conduct of conduct.‘  The 
contingency and singularity of state formation that problematises any supposed 
universality leads to a number of ―how‖ questions summed up by Lemke (2007): 
―How does the state come to act, if at all, as a coherent political force? How is the 
imaginary unity of the state produced in practical terms? How does a plurality of 
institutions and processes become ‗the state‘? How to account for the apparent 
autonomy of the state as a separate entity that somehow stands outside and above 
society?‖199  In this way the state is thought of by Foucault as a transactional 
reality: ―a dynamic ensemble of relations and syntheses that at the same time 
produces the institutional structure of the state and knowledge of the state.‖200 
To get at these governmental questions, Foucault proposes an analytics of 
government which ―goes well beyond the limits of both positivist accounts of the 
state and theories that dispense with the state altogether.  It proposes an approach 
to the state that does not take for granted the idea of some originating subject that 
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pre-exists and determines political processes and is referred to as the state; nor 
does it simply denounce the statist account as an ideology or myth that doesn‘t 
correspond to the complexity of political and social reality.‖ 201   Instead, an 
analytics of government elevates the role of ‗political knowledge‘ for state 
analysis.  Historically, modern states emerged intimately connected to the 
establishment of the human sciences and subsequent knowledge about the 
population and its individuals; ―[s]tate actors and agencies used statistical 
accounts, medical expertise, scientific reports, architectural plans, bureaucratic 
rules and guidelines, surveys, graphs, and so on to represent events and entities as 
information and data for political action‖; technologies which ultimately 
constituted the state.
202
  An analytics of government which elevates of the role of 
‗political knowledge,‘ and devaluates sovereignty, displaces metaphysical 
knowledge of the state. 
Foucault‘s ambiguous treatment of sovereignty, necessary on his part so 
as not to reaffirm its traditional centrality to political discourse, has led to diverse 
readings.  For some, ―[a]lthough Foucault constantly challenges sovereignty as 
the essential modern paradigm, it still provides the ultimate framework for his 
analyses,‖203 while for others, the displacement of sovereignty as prime analytical 
category has invariably led to its demotion as a viable analytical category at all.  
In this vein, Singer & Weir argue that: 
―Foucault‘s treatment of sovereignty resulted in its reduction to a 
residual category, subject to historical change over the last four 
centuries only through its attachment to the truth-telling of 
governance.  The treatment of sovereignty as residual continues 
among historians of the present who, despite occasional minor 
qualifications, suppose sovereignty as displaced by governance.  Thus 
sovereignty would appear to be of little importance; governance is 
where the action lies.  Sovereignty has become a hollow category in 
Foucauldian work, lacking analytic specificity.‖204 
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These seem to be contradictory readings, but I argue both are valid.  In 
Foucauldian work, sovereignty does remain the ultimate paradigm, and 
sovereignty has become a hollow category.  This apparent contradiction can only 
be accounted for by situating Foucault‘s treatment of sovereignty in an IR context.  
In this vein, Lui-Bright (1997) argues that; 
 ―Foucault‘s discussion of the state pays insufficient attention to the 
‗international‘ conditions of sovereignty.  That is, the structural 
transformations that allowed the emergence of the early modern states, 
which by effect, enabled the features and programs of government 
Foucault talked about to be possible…  Absent from his account of 
modern government is how the creation of a plurality of at least 
nominally independent states are preconditions for and indeed, part of 
the art of government.‖205  
This thesis was produced at a time when the English-speaking world was still 
without translations of Foucault‘s entire lecture series, and we now know that 
Foucault did situate his investigations in a broader historical context that accounts 
for the international features of modernity.
206
  However, Lui-Bright‘s work 
remains helpful.  Most importantly, he points to how (external) sovereignty ―is 
central to the viability of an art of government‖ of the international state 
system.
207
  ―Rather than a hindrance to the development of an art of government, 
the idea of sovereignty in interstate relations helps to secure the conditions that 
make the art of government that Foucault speaks of possible.‖208 
Superficially, Foucault‘s work is tied up in the inside/outside game of 
political philosophy/international relations theory.  His work only ever dealt with 
power relations within states.  More accurately, he was concerned with the 
internal dimension of government.  However, he never explicitly considered 
relations between states, except when documenting historical transformations, 
and in no way did he consider biopolitical relations between states.  In a world 
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problematized by phenomena under the umbrella of globalization, his work on 
liberalism, biopower and the internal dimension of government has thus been 
rendered incomplete.  If we accept that the scope of sovereignty did frame 
Foucault‘s efforts, albeit only because of his documentation of a history of 
techniques, his methodological decision to focus on the subject of power causes 
‗domestic‘ politics to be logically predominant in his work.  Not only is the 
individual logically more enmeshed in ‗domestic‘ power relations than 
‗international‘ power relations, due to the fact of locality there are more domestic 
power relations than international power relations.  What I mean by this is that 
locally there are two types of power relation acting on a subject, ones that 
eventuate and are situated locally, and also ones that do not eventuate locally yet 
do still come to act on an individual.  The subjectification of individuals, which 
ultimately occurs locally even though it may be traced to terminal forms of power 
at a broader scale, relies on a number of technologies, some of which are 
discursive, but even more important, due to the concealing tricks discourses are 
made to play, are material technologies.  Thus the effective ‗scope‘ of sovereignty, 
identified by an analytics of government, is determined for Foucault by material 
practices only, that is, a history of practices, as his ultimate frame of reference.  
Here then we have the seeming contradiction in Foucault‘s work, or more 
accurately, the problem with which Foucault was implicitly trying to get round: 
how to explain the real operation of government without mentioning sovereignty, 
which as a discourse is used to conceal those effects. 
Foucault‘s methodological precautions stem from this understanding of 
sovereignty as a mode of rule that conceals techniques of power that are 
ultimately domineering, and only by bypassing sovereignty can the effects of 
domination and subjugation be revealed.  A number of methodological 
precautions he lays out to successfully investigate phenomena of subjugation and 
domination generally revolve around the idea of an ascending analysis of 
power,
209
 an analytic endeavour that seeks to more accurately reveal the operation 
of power in society.   This is achieved empirically by ―analyzing power relations 
through the antagonism of strategies‖ rather than from the point of view of 
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power‘s own internal rationality. 210   Therefore, rather than analyzing 
governmental power-relations in accordance with its own, sovereign, rationality, 
which might reproduce something like social contract theory, thus inscribing the 
supposed equality of individuals, an ascending analysis unearths ulterior 
rationalities, hence the displacement of sovereignty.  It is with recourse to such 
practice that biopower, and even disciplinary power (albeit with less explicit 
reference to methodology), were genealogically unearthed.  While much 
Foucauldian scholarship has in this vein gone some distance to disavow the 
concept of sovereignty, it also remained, at least for Foucault himself, the 
‗ultimate framework.‘  How is this so? 
 We can begin to answer this question with reference to Bartelson‘s (1995) 
genealogy of sovereignty, whereby he deconstructs sovereignty along three axes, 
source, locus, and scope: ―While the first question concerns the philosophical 
legitimacy of the state, the second concerns its status as an acting subject, while 
the third concerns the objective conditions of its unity.‖211  Interpreting Foucault 
from this perspective, the ‗source‘ of sovereignty, its philosophical legitimacy, 
has already been revealed as a technique for concealing power relations that he 
wished to uncover, and is effectively ignored to overcome its symbolic power.  In 
doing so, the question of the ‗locus‘ of sovereignty, i.e. ―[w]here, and with whom, 
does sovereignty reside in the state?‖212 is no longer conceived of in terms of 
sovereignty, but instead is conceived in other terms, as (biopolitical) 
governmentality, informed by a diverse range of political knowledges, the 
analysis of which is prioritized by an analytics of government.  Sovereignty, of 
course, continues to function, but no longer as a central, symbolic, and unifying 
rationality.  Instead, sovereignty has been co-opted; governmentality includes 
both the legitimising discourses of sovereignty, and, most importantly for my 
argument, the operative logic of civil society as well as the ability to both 
constitute a population and enforce regulations when necessary.  This reflects the 
intentional but non-subjective nature of power relations, whereby according to 
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Foucault, ―there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims or 
objectives‖ 213  and this remains true of sovereign power.  However, the 
governmentalisation of the state means that sovereign power is now deployed 
according to objectives determined by a rationality not its own, a biopolitical 
strategy.  Sovereignty has been colonized by biopower.  The non-subjective 
nature of strategies – which are unintentional, yet institutionally and socially 
regularized effects caused by intentional tactics – results in the real social 
function of an institution being obscured by unintended consequences of action; 
history marred by contingency.  This reflects the ‗hollowness‘ of (Foucauldian) 
sovereignty that Singer & Weir point out, and is the result of an unintentionally 
produced institutional transformation.  However, the ‗scope‘ of sovereignty 
remains.  The scope of sovereignty represents the actual practices of government 
that capture, objectify, and regulate a specific population.  They are the objective 
conditions of its unity and represent the territorialization of the state, which ―is a 
matter of marking out a territory in thought and inscribing it in the real, 
topographizing it, investing it with powers, bounding it by exclusions, defining 
who or what can rightfully enter.‖214  A pertinent example of this can be seen in 
Barry‘s (1996) explanation of technologies of communication.  Barry notes that 
liberal thought, in reconciling the opaque character of society with its desire to 
govern, generated a dual relationship between communication technology and its 
governmentality.  On the one hand, communication networks are essential in 
facilitating the ―self-governing capacities of society itself.‖215  On the other hand, 
and more importantly for the present discussion, ―communications networks 
came to provide a necessary link between the deliberations of public authorities 
and the dispersed space of the national territory.‖216  The facilitation of adequate 
communication capacity within the state was integral to establishing the feedback 
loop required for liberal government to work. ―Thus communication networks 
created what Deleuze and Guattari have called a striated space: a space within 
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which movements and flows are regulated in ways which enable authorities to 
act.‖217  This is an example of how sovereign power, therefore, is essential in that 
it empowers the biopolitical state to frame its ‗field of vision.‘  It is practices like 
this that frame the milieu as a site of intervention. 
Bartelson‘s articulation of the scope of sovereignty is, I argue, what 
remains of sovereignty for Foucault.  Sovereignty is merely viewed according to 
its concrete ability to structure a territorial space, which it now does so according 
to biopolitical rationality.  From an IR perspective, however, this is not the end of 
the story for sovereignty.  At the international level, sovereignty cannot be 
displaced in the same manner as Foucault displaced it in his analyses because it is 
situated on a different onto-epistemological register.  Instead of conditioning the 
social space in a superstructural relation, the global/international social space is 
mutually conditioned by multiple sovereignties.  Whereas the operation of power 
within a sovereign space could be effectively explained according to biopolitical 
governmentality without almost any reference to sovereignty, or with only its 
disavowal, the same cannot be said for the operation of power across sovereign 
spaces, whereby biopolitical sovereignty gets tied up with another art of 
government.  For Foucault‘s domestic analyses, the state was displaced precisely 
as a unit of analysis, but in IR those units remain constitutive of the field.  As 
Bartelson says, when dealing with ―political phenomena that are conditioned by 
the presence of states, it will be necessary to presuppose some answer to the 
question of sovereignty in its attempt to classify and investigate those 
phenomena.‖218 
When we investigate the idea of sovereignty vis-à-vis biopower in the 
international realm, we must not only deal with its internal dimension, which 
Foucault displaced, but we must also account for its external dimension.  As 
Singer & Weir point out, government with reference to sovereignty must be 
conceptualized as a power with an exterior. 
219
  Lui-Bright echoes this thought: 
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 ―Even though the principle of sovereignty was in place, securing 
sovereignty became a task of government.  The regulatory 
mechanisms of interstate relations had to be invented.  In their mutual 
relationship, the principle of sovereignty organises states‘ internal and 
external relations.  Therefore the new political order marked a gradual 
intensification of internal and external regulation.‖220 
Lemke also recognises this aspect of sovereignty, whereby; 
 ―the state is not only an effect but also an instrument and a site of 
strategic action.  It serves as an instrument of strategies insofar as it 
establishes a frontier regime that is defined by the distinction between 
inside and outside, state and non-state.  This borderline does not 
simply separate two external and independent realms, but operates as 
an internal division providing resources of power.‖221  
Launching off from this point, the main contention of my argument, which will 
begin to be outlined here, is that sovereignty should be conceptualized according 
to a process of deconstruction which identifies its functional component, that is, 
its scope.  This is another way of thinking about how biopower was first 
elucidated with reference to sovereignty, and helps to appreciate the idea that 
biopower remains intimately connected to a space delimited or territorialized by 
sovereignty.  Although, as has been pointed out, an investigation of 
governmentality can and should proceed beyond statist assumptions, the 
conclusion of my argument is that biopower continues to be fundamentally 
connected to the specific operations of states, that is, to a history of practices 
based around the state form.  Simply put, governmentality exists beyond the 
state/sovereignty, but not biopolitical governmentality.  As opposed to an analysis 
of governmental power that is internal to sovereign power and thus disavows 
sovereignty, an analysis of global, or international governmentality needs to 
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recognise the way sovereignty has a significant material role which cannot be 
dissociated from its internal dimension or its history of practices, much in the 
same way that Cox (1992) defines the state as a ‗transmission belt‘ from the 
global economy to the local.
222
  A couple of examples will help explain this 
distinction. 
Border practices are perhaps the most obvious, and can be divided into at 
least three categories: human (the global visa regime); biological (the global 
biosecurity regime); and economic (the global trade regime).  What these three 
regimes have in common is a performative function, a functionality that goes 
beyond a view of the border as a simple line indicating the limits of sovereign 
jurisdiction.
223
  ‗Border performativity‘ (Wonders 2006) ―takes as its theoretical 
starting point the idea that borders are not only geographically constituted, but are 
socially constructed via the performance of various state actors.‖224  The central 
insight of border performativity is that although the performance of state actors 
does include law-making bureaucrats, ―state policies have little meaning until 
they are ‗performed‘ by state agents or by border crossers‖ 225  226   Wonders 
deploys this concept in the realm of migration and tourism practices, and the 
movement of people more generally, however, it can equally be applied to other 
border practices, such as those concerning biosecurity and trade.  
What ‗embodied‘ border performances represent is the actual practice of 
policing a sovereign space, a territorialisation which frames a population 
according to biopolitical rationality.  Border performativity works to facilitate 
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positive circulation, by preventing aspects of circulation that are counter-
productive to the project of turning being into well-being.  This means biosecurity 
of the state is not only about screening, for example, incoming people for virulent 
strains of contagious disease which could directly affect the health of the 
population, but it is also about policing biological life that may damage local 
biological industries, exogenous fruit flies, for example, that could devastate a 
local fruit industry.  Border practices are thus related through the notion of ‗threat‘ 
–  ―the risk of future harm that security measures seek to mitigate,‖227 and border 
performativity constitutes threats as objects of thought and practice.  The threat 
that an exogenous species of fruit fly poses to the economic well-being of a 
country links biosecurity operations to border performativity organized around 
risks associated with trading, just as the threat of someone entering a country with 
a virulent disease links biosecurity operations to border performativity based on 
the visa regime (for example, people who have visited certain ‗high risk‘ places 
before entering a country are conducted to declare themselves).  Such 
interconnections are constitutive of an apparatus of security rationalized by an 
ontological distinction between inside and outside, due to the fact that 
sovereignty is a power with an outside. 
By arguing that sovereignty is a government with an exterior, one can also 
argue that sovereignty is internal to a governmentality that transcends its scope.  
This is because, from a Foucauldian perspective, there is no outside of power.  
However, this is not necessarily to argue that it is biopolitical governmentality 
that transcends its scope.  All power relations are framed by an apparatus, which 
for biopower essentially includes a sovereign component.  Barry Hindess helps 
explain the difficulty of transferring the concept of biopower into an IR context:  
―[I]f government, in its most general sense, aims to structure the possible field of 
action of others, then the modern system of states should itself be seen as a 
regime of government …  Thus where the classical view treats the state as the 
‗highest of all‘ forms of community, the modern system of states reflects the 
emergence of a more complex form of political reason.‖228  This more complex 
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form of political reason, for Hindess, indicates that ―the modern art of 
government‖ is not only concerned with the government of populations; 
―but also the larger population encompassed by the system of states 
itself.  It addresses this task first by promoting the rule of territorial 
states over populations, and secondly by seeking to regulate the 
conduct both of states themselves and of members of populations 
under their control.  States are expected to pursue their own interests, 
but to do so in a field of action that has been structured by the 
overarching system of states to which they belong.‖229  
The fact that the international system is not only concerned with the government 
of populations necessarily means it does not operate, at least primarily, according 
to biopolitical rationality.  Hindess‘s analysis helps point out that, from an IR 
perspective, there are competing governmentalities, not just between biopolitical 
regimes within an overarching system, but also between this expression of 
biopolitical governmentality and a nation-state/international system 
governmentality.  Perhaps an analogy can be drawn between Hindess‘s insight 
into states possessing territorial integrity in a structured field of international 
governmental activity and Foucault‘s insight‘s about disciplinary institutions 
being spatially delimited while at the same time being structured by an 
overarching biopolitical framework.  The heuristic purpose of such an exercise is 
to argue that although there are linkages on the one hand between disciplinary 
institutions and biopolitical governmentality, and on the other between 
biopolitical states and international governmentality, due to their existence at 
fundamentally different scales the rationality behind one does not lend itself to 
wholesale translation at the other. 
   This chapter has argued that what is important about sovereignty from a 
biopolitical perspective has not fundamentally changed.  The aim of the next and 
final chapter is to make the argument, contra many of the theorizations of 
biopower in IR highlighted in chapter two, that biopolitical governmentality does 
not transcend sovereignty.  It does so by investigating the internationalisation of 
biopower notwithstanding its essentially sovereign character.     Due to the fact 
that what is relevant about sovereignty has not changed, the next chapter will 
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argue that neither has what is relevant about biopower.  Instead it will be argued 
that what has happened is that biopower has extended its process of biopolitical 
normalization to include transnational apparatuses without fundamentally 
changing its operation.  By identifying this dynamic we will be able to account 
for one of the ways through which the demarcation between the national and the 
international is becoming blurred.  This chapter has pointed out that the 
enforcement of biopolitical regulations still remains a sovereign capacity which 
remains linked to the state.  This is due to the fact that sovereignty is a set of 
performances, based on the constitution of political knowledge, which represents 
a history of practices.  Furthermore, and due to the claim that that sovereignty 
hasn‘t changed, the chapter argued that, so as to be able to account for an 
international biopolitical dimension, sovereignty should be considered as a power 
with an exterior.  This allows us to consider biopolitical relations between states 
and thus to extend biopolitical insights and work towards completing our 
understanding of processes of biopolitical normalization.  On this reading 
sovereignty is seen as an apparatus which conditions the international space 
through its multiple iterations, in that it biopolitically bounds a parcel of territory 
for which it effectively has responsibility.  In addition, this function of multiple 
sovereignties indicates that there is an international governmentality, but the 
continuing relevance of territorially bounded sovereignty means that it effectively 
operates at a different scale than that of the state, and thus cannot be biopolitical.  
The next and final chapter begins with this idea of international governmentality, 
and moves towards a new idea for conceptualizing biopower in world politics.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: BIOPOWER IN WORLD POLITICS. 
 This chapter elaborates on an idea that has so far only been mentioned in 
passing, that of biopolitical normalization.  I argue that this is what should be 
considered as specific to biopolitical governmentality, and thus identifying how it 
involves international governmentality and apparatuses is the most appropriate 
way for theorizing biopower in IR.  Through this argument I hope to outline a 
new research programme for the investigation of biopower in IR; a programme 
that would illuminate an important aspect of the liberalization of international 
society.  The chapter thus presents the central features of my argument.  It begins 
with a brief discussion of international governmentality, in which I argue that if 
biopolitics is becoming international it must be part of an international 
governmentality.  The governmentality to which I refer is informed by Dean‘s 
nomos of world order.  The place of discipline within international 
governmentality is then situated.  It is noted that disciplinary power in 
international relations is necessarily indirect.  Drawing on the argument so far, a 
distinction is then made between disciplinary indirect rule and biopolitical 
indirect rule.  Due to the scale of international governmentality, indirect rule is 
identified as a general technique of international governmentality.  Using this 
distinction, disciplinary indirect rule is associated with IOs such as the IMF and 
IBRD, while biopolitical indirect rule is identified as a rationality which is found 
in organizations such as the OECD, and the European Commission (EC).  Having 
made this second distinction, biopolitical indirect rule is identified as biopolitical 
normalization, the idea of which is further elaborated with reference to the role of 
expertise and processes of socialization.  This discussion is linked to an existing 
governmentality, unearthed within a normative governmental analysis carried out 
by the European Commission.  It is argued that although biopolitical 
normalization is a process coextensive with society, and inevitably escapes 
formal or explicit governmental interventions, the EC paper identifies a 
governmentality that is attempting to formalize as much as possible the process of 
normalization.  This identification of the desire to formalize biopolitical 
normalization by a governmental rationality is then used to inform a discussion of 
OECD practices, and more generally practices illuminated by Slaughter‘s notion 
of ‗disaggregated sovereignty.‘  In conclusion, it is argued that biopower enters 
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international relations through a governmentality with at least two aspects.  On 
the one hand, it can be seen operating within transnational and supranational 
processes as they aim to be legitimate and effective, without recourse to 
sovereign mechanisms, while on the other hand, it is a rationality trying to help 
facilitate the contemporary liberal project of moving societies from being ‗passive‘ 
to being ‗active.‘ 
International Governmentality. 
To think about international governmentality we need to return to the 
discussion of the way governmentality has been articulated.  As has already been 
noted, international governmentality is not biopolitical, namely because it does 
not possess a requisite population.
230
  While international governmentality will 
necessarily embody some specificity, what this might be is yet to be determined.  
Therefore, we must return to the drawing board, so to say, to move forward.  This 
means returning to the general definition of governmentality as a general ‗art of 
government,‘ and building up an analysis from there.  Following Larner & 
Walters; 
―[t]his is an approach that explores how governing always involves 
particular representations, knowledges, and expertise regarding that 
which is to be governed.  This second understanding draws attention 
to the complex relationship between thought and government. 
Whether it is the government of an enterprise, a state, or one's own 
health, the practice of government involves the production of 
particular "truths" about these entities. Seeking out the history of 
these truths affords us critical insights concerning the constitution of 
our societies and ourselves.‖231 
I see no reason to foreclose an argument claiming that an international 
governmentality does exist due to the non-liberal condition of many parts of the 
world, or more generally, its ‗unevenness.‘ 232   Additionally, in no way does 
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international governmentality necessarily correspond to global governmentality, 
with its problematic connotations.  It simply, to begin with, refers to an art of 
government that transcends the internal governmentality of nation-states.  Due to 
my concern with the potentiality of international biopower, the international art of 
government I hope to uncover specifically refers to one which transcends yet 
remains connected to biopolitical states. 
 Dean (2004) tells us that governmentality analyses should be situated 
within a liberal nomos of world order; that ―[t]he narrative about the formation of 
modern forms of governmentality should … be re-situated in a narrative about the 
formation of the European state system.‖233  This refers to the capacity of the 
system to define both the norms of state sovereignty, and to define the ‗state of 
exception‘ as that place beyond sovereignty but still subject to its logic.  This 
duality reflects the fact that governing is not reducible to sovereignty, that is, an 
internal logic, but is instead ―about the subtle manipulation of the laws of 
production, consumption and distribution.‖234  Thus the liberal nomos, according 
to Dean, embodies Foucault‘s critique of the role of sovereignty, in that it 
―suppresses the question of appropriation within domestic government.‖ 235  
Therefore, through the displacement of sovereignty, and concomitant with the 
posing of the question of the liberal nomos, an art of government can be identified 
that transcends nation-states and liberal governmentality as we know it.
236
  More 
importantly for my purposes, it is by investigating this, admittedly nascent, art of 
government, that I can then show how biopower is folded into international 
relations. 
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 Dean goes on to say that ―[i]f a ‗global governmentality‘ is today 
propounded by multiple agencies (for example WTO, IMF, OECD), it operates 
through both the existing arts of government within nation-states and as an 
attempted extension and generalization of them across the planet.‖237  To situate 
biopower in IR, I need to explain how this happens.  The discussion proceeds in 
the following way.  First we must expand on Foucault‘s brief discussion about the 
tendency of discipline to escape the institution.  It will be shown that, outside its 
institutional setting discipline becomes a form of indirect rule. Drawing on 
research in the literature on IOs, I will show how disciplinary techniques are 
already being deployed by ‗liberal‘ IOs.   Disciplinary indirect rule is then 
differentiated from biopolitical indirect rule.  Using the distinction between these 
two types of indirect rule, IOs operating within the liberal nomos will be 
differentiated.  Whereas the operation of the IMF and IBRD are shown, at least 
predominantly, to subscribe to disciplinary mechanisms, OECD and EC 
governmentality, it will be argued, is more aligned with biopolitical techniques.  
From here it is argued that international governmentality founded on the liberal 
nomos produces a sort of division of labor.  It is argued that, as well as 
disciplinary techniques having escaped the institution without inscribing a 
disciplinary regime at a scale incommensurable with such activity, biopolitical 
techniques have escaped the sovereign space without inscribing a biopolitical 
regime beyond its permitted logic.  This idea is supported by an analogy with 
Foucault‘s explanation of the complementary nature of disciplinary and 
biopolitical mechanisms within the tripartite governmental regime of domestic 
liberal societies. 
Discipline and International Governmentality. 
 While disciplinary effects remain most effective within an institutional 
setting, this is not to say they do not escape the institution.  Indeed, Foucault told 
us that ―discipline in fact always tends to escape the institutional or local 
framework in which they are trapped.  What is more, they easily take on a statist 
dimension in apparatuses such as the police, for example, which is both a 
disciplinary apparatus and a state apparatus (which just goes to prove that 
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discipline is not always institutional).‖238  Not only can they take on a statist 
dimension, but as will be shown, disciplinary techniques can be deployed by an 
international governmentality.   
Disciplinary techniques had long been in existence before they were 
generalized throughout society,
239
 for example, in monasteries.  Discipline 
constitutes methods that divide and control time, space and movement, and 
operates through three distinct mechanisms; hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgement, and examination.
240
  Although the ability to control objects of 
government outside of the institution is problematic for discipline, nonetheless 
disciplinary techniques are put to use.  Importantly, within a regime of 
international governmentality, instead of individuals being subjected to 
disciplinary power, IOs subject states to discipline, and although distinct from 
disciplinary power to which individuals are subjected, a resemblance exists.  The 
disciplining of states, like the disciplining of individuals, is part of a 
governmentality with an objective to elicit the self-government of subjects.  Both 
are therefore a governmentality to constitute ethical subjects, by which I mean the 
governmentalization of both individuals and states attempts to inculcate a process 
of reflection upon their respective actions that conforms to normalization..  
However, while Foucault identified three techniques of discipline, only two 
techniques are effectively deployed by international governmentality; 
normalizing judgment, and the examination.  Due to the continuing relevance of 
sovereignty and its effectiveness as institutional capacity to dictate what happens 
within a state, hierarchical observation of states by IOs is often fraught with 
practices of resistance.
241
  This resistance can take multiple forms and does not 
necessarily imply outright refusal to allow related observational practices.  
Falsifying statistics or economic indicators, for example, is just one technique.  It 
should also be noted that the continuing capability of sovereignty is primarily 
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what distinguishes international disciplinarity from the disciplining of individuals, 
which, in turn, problematizes the effectiveness of all three techniques of 
discipline.  Notwithstanding this caveat, normalization and examination 
techniques can be identified that are effectively utilized by IOs. 
The establishment of non-juridical norms constitutes the most effective 
technique for the elicitation of self-government.  International governmentality 
embodied in institutions such as the IMF and IBRD constitutes non-juridical 
norms in the form of governance indicators.  Non-juridical norms are what Dean 
refers to as technologies of performance which constitute ―the mobilisation of 
benchmarking rules‖ that are set as parameters against which (self-)assessment 
can take place and which require the conduct of a particular set of 
performances.
242
  The application of non-juridical norms engenders ownership of 
the results of an asymmetric power-relationship, because rather than benefits, that 
is, financial payments, being lost as part of a punishment, the negative outcome 
of an examination is seen as the result of the weak capacity of the examinee.  
―From the governmentality perspective international rating and ranking indices 
and reports produce the examined state as an ethical subject responsible for what 
occurs within its borders.‖243  What ultimately makes these practices disciplinary 
is the way they are linked to rewards and punishments in the form of granting or 
withholding funds.  Such incentivizing is also put into play through a further 
attempt to impose non-juridical norms, that is, norms associated with liberal civil 
society.  (Neo)liberal civil society is posited as a constellation of norms, and 
IBRD practices in particular ‗carve out a space‘ for civil society by channeling 
development funds through appropriate NGOs.  NGOs thus come to fill this space, 
and their control of funds incorporates local actors into a liberal framework.
244
  In 
addition, one of the main demands made of government by civil society is a 
demand for transparency.  Transparency is another technique that engenders rule 
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at a distance; it is a disciplining strategy that forces countries to adopt certain 
standards, referred to as ‗governance indicators.‘245 
Like governance indicators, Reports mobilize particular forms of 
knowledge and are projected as objective truth.  The Report, much like the 
application of governance indicators, is in truth an examination.  It determines an 
‗objective‘ reality that presupposes a particular course of action.  Due to the type 
of knowledge that constitutes IOs, issues, such as the establishment of sound 
macro-economic policies, can only be satisfactorily addressed if certain policy is 
prescribed.
246
  The outcome is policy ostensibly self-determined, however, the 
autonomy of the target country is severely eroded by a power relationship 
(discursively referred to as a partnership) predicated on ‗objective‘ knowledge 
and financial resources.  Abrahamsen sums up such ‗partnership‘ with what Dean 
refers to as technologies of agency; techniques of self-esteem, empowerment, 
consultation and negotiation.
247
  According to Abrahamsen, such techniques ―are 
part of an advanced liberal form of governmentality, in which ‗technologies of 
partnership‘ reveal the will to rule ‗at a distance‘; that is, partnerships involve a 
suite of practices which make it possible to structure, shape, and predict the 
operation of the freedom of the subject, without resorting to direct control or 
conditionality.‖248 Swyngedouw puts it more succinctly, for him; technologies of 
agency refer to ―strategies of rendering the individual actor responsible for his or 
her own actions.‖249 
‘Indirect rule’: Disciplinary and Biopolitical. 
The above are just some examples of disciplinary rule in international 
relations.  Disciplinary practices deployed by an international governmentality are 
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not, however, the only form indirect rule takes.  Discipline in international 
governmentality is, I argue, complemented by indirect rule that resonates with 
biopower, both of which serve to normalize biopolitical sovereignty.  By this I 
mean two things.  First, that international governmentality is not only concerned 
with disciplining states that do not possess norms of institutional capacity, but is 
also concerned with conducting ‗mature,‘ liberal states to exercise their freedom 
responsibly; while second, and concomitantly, that biopolitical techniques can 
also escape their institutional setting.  To explain, a distinction needs to be made 
between biopolitical and disciplinary indirect rule.  Basically, biopolitical indirect 
rule is liberal, while disciplinary indirect rule is not.  Biopolitical indirect rule is 
liberal because of the way it resolves the conflict between otherwise competing 
individual subjectivities, economic and juridical; individuals‘ (and states) 
governed in this way remain constitutionally distinct and formally independent.  
Within a disciplinary framework, on the other hand, individuals‘ economic 
interests are not respected.  Both mechanisms elicit self-government, but only 
biopolitical governmentality minimizes the need for direct political intervention.  
That the IMF and IBRD deploy disciplinary techniques to elicit ‗ethical,‘ self-
governing states, that is, a biopolitical state, can thus be seen from a twofold 
perspective.  First, they subscribe to a model of normation whereby an optimal 
model is imposed from the outside.  This model is, of course, that of a society 
based on the operation of liberal markets.  Second, and related, this imposition 
necessarily means that no internal play of interests is respected in the process of 
norm formation.  Finally, there is the requirement of direct political intervention 
to ensure self-government is elicited.  This is achieved by the IMF and IBRD 
through the manipulative financial practices already mentioned 
All disciplinary techniques deployed by IOs are backed up by financial 
incentives.  Direct political intervention, that is, discipline, in the attempt to elicit 
self-government, is achieved by the threat to withhold funds, which is a form of 
punishment.  Biopolitical ‗rule at a distance,‘ while sharing some techniques with 
disciplinary governmentality, does not operate in this way.  Instead, biopolitical 
action at a distance attempts to frame the decisions of individuals and groups to 
engender ―self-steering mechanisms‖ by ―enrolling individuals as allies in the 
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pursuit of political, economic and social objectives.‖ 250   These self-steering 
mechanisms are part of more general mechanisms of security, the combination of 
which allow for ‗private‘ spaces to be ‗ruled‘ without breaching their formal 
autonomy.  Central to the attempt to elicit ‗self-steering‘ mechanisms is the role 
of experts.  As was implied above, knowledge production is also very important 
to the disciplinary techniques of the IMF and IBRD, however, without coercive 
mechanisms, it becomes the pivotal factor in eliciting biopolitical 
governmentality.  It is precisely experts that have ―made it possible for self-
regulation to operate in a way that minimizes the need for direct political 
action.‖251 
I argue that this distinction between types of indirect rule differentiates an 
organization like the OECD and the EU from other prominent IOs.  Basically, 
this is because the primary governmentality of these organizations is non-coercive.  
The distinction can be linked to the earlier discussion between ‗normation‘ and 
‗normalization.‘252  Normation, which is a disciplinary technique, is the process 
by which an optimal model is constructed and then imposed upon subjects.  The 
normal is that which can conform to this model, while the abnormal is that which 
is incapable of conforming. Normalization, on the other hand, is the result of an 
interplay between different distributions of normality, and acts to bring the most 
unfavorable in line with the more favorable.  The IMF and IBRD both operate 
according to the disciplinary model.  Due to their commitment to neoclassical and 
monetarist economics, they infamously impose a similar set of policy 
prescriptions upon heterogeneous states.  The goal of these policies is the 
inscription of liberal society, something which has been determined through 
techniques which serve to frame much of the input from the societies in question; 
all neoliberal governmentality is directed toward the creation of markets and, 
concomitantly, homo œconomicus.  Even the post-Washington consensus, which 
ostensibly addressed the one-sided nature of neoliberal policies, ultimately 
continued the disciplinary character of the overall program.
253
  The primary 
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governmentality of the OECD or the EU, on the other hand, is not directed 
towards the creation of liberal rationalities, for membership in the these 
organizations already indicates their existence.  A secondary governmentality, 
directed towards non-member states, is concerned with the engendering of liberal 
subjectivities; however, even then its activities are not disciplinary.  Instead, 
OECD and EU governmentality resonates with biopolitical governmentality due 
to their normalizing strategies.  Shortly, I will explain why I think this is the case, 
but first I take this idea of biopolitical indirect rule and translate it into the 
concept of international biopolitical normalization. 
International Biopolitical Normalization. 
I begin by exploring some more this idea of normalization, minus the 
international context.  While the general idea is comprehensible, little empirical 
work has been done on the subject.  Indeed, the opacity and density of societal 
relations makes the project of identifying, in sufficient detail, processes of 
normalization within society extremely difficult.  Dean (1997, 1994) is, again, 
instructive.  Dean notes the sociological nature of such an enterprise, and the 
deficiencies of much sociological theory faced with this problem.  First, I conflate 
my understanding of normalization with his discussion of socialization.  I argue 
that, within liberal societies at least, they are essentially the same thing.  They 
both focus on the way individuals are subjectified by ―the more or less explicit 
attempts to problematise our lives, our forms of conduct, and ourselves found in a 
variety of pronouncements and texts, employed in a diversity of locale, using 
particular techniques, and addressed to different social sectors and groups.‖254  If 
a distinction is to be made, normalization is the plural of socialization, and refers 
to the interplay between different socialized individuals, which is in turn reflected 
in the variety of pronouncements etc. in which individuals find themselves.  
Normalization, then, is a particular understanding of how (liberal) socialization is 
part of a dynamic, or dispositif, that attempts to move the less favorable in line 
with the more favorable.  Socialization is thus a process through which 
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individuals are subjectivized, which in a liberal society is also a process of 
biopolitical normalization.  This occurs as an individuals are ‗socialized‘ to the 
extent that they ‗fit‘ into society, albeit a fit which occurs in an indefinite number 
of ways – according to the singularity of the dispositif of power relations that 
travel through their bodies.   
The reason this is important is because of the way Dean talks about what 
is necessary for an investigation of socialization.  He states: 
―If we are to talk about processes of socialisation as a general way in 
which ‗society‘ affects ‗individuals‘, then we must give an account of 
how this ‗socialisation‘ is itself constructed, the historical forms it 
takes, the rationalities it deploys, the techniques, mechanisms, 
practices and institutions by which and in which it is proposed that we 
work on, divide, make whole, sculpt, cultivate, pacify, contain and 
optimise not only our own lives, selves and conduct but the lives, 
selves and conduct of those over whom we claim some authority.‖255 
Dean takes pains to highlight the complexity and immanence of processes that 
subjectify individuals, pointing out that the construction of individual identity, 
that is, its normalization, is the result of a multiplicity of agencies and authorities: 
―This is clearly illustrated by the multiple and overlapping 
jurisdictions involving local, regional, national, international, and 
global authorities within which actors are located.  It is evidenced by 
the widespread development of non-profit community and social 
services in advanced liberal democracies which are funded partially 
by the national state but run by citizen associations, and by the 
neoliberal use of corporations, charities, and families, to achieve 
governmental objectives (e.g., the provision of welfare and domestic 
care, the establishment of prisons, job-centres, etc.).‖256 
To break down and analyze this complex field of social processes, Dean 
generates a three-way distinction between political subjectification, governmental 
self-formation, and ethical self-formation.  He argues that what is needed is to 
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account for the diversity of processes of self-formation, ―in particular the 
autonomy and interrelationship of governmental and ethical practices in this 
regard, and the relation between these practices of self-formation, on the one hand, 
and political subjectification, on the other,‖257 and thus that ―we should turn our 
attention to the very situations in which the regulation of personal conduct 
becomes linked to the regulation of political or civil conduct‖258 
It is from this point that I would like to begin a discussion of how 
normalization is connected to transnational governmental practices, that is, what 
is specific to a process of international biopolitical normalization.  Knowing full 
well that the three distinctions mentioned above overlap and presuppose one 
another, I restrict my investigation to governmental self-formation.  This is not a 
methodological attempt to isolate variables, but is an acknowledgment of the fact 
that the international dimension of biopower is only reflected in governmental 
self-formation; political subjectification remains primarily nationalized, in that 
the primary identity of individuals as citizens of a country is not explicitly 
challenged; and ethical self-formation is, of course, a primarily individualized, or 
self-reflective, relationship.  While biopolitical normalization necessarily includes 
all three categories, internationally only one is present:  I argue that biopower 
enters international relations through of practices of governmental self-formation, 
and with examples of transgovernmental and supragovernmental processes I will 
put forward an account of the way governmental self-formation transcends the 
state.  This argument will support the conclusion that biopower is not 
international in the sense that it exists independent of sovereign biopolitical states.  
Notwithstanding this point, it will be shown that processes of biopolitical 
normalization are becoming connected to ‗supra‘ sovereign apparatuses, and in 
doing so are blurring the line between the ‗national‘ and the ‗international.‘  
International biopower is more accurately defined as an extension of biopolitical 
practices that are essentially nationalistic. 
Dean tells us that ―[g]overnmental self-formation refers to the ways in 
which various authorities and agencies seek to shape the conduct, aspirations, 
needs, desires, and capacities of specified categories of individuals, to enlist them 
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in particular strategies and to seek defined goals.‖259  These processes are tied to 
political subjectification at the level of the state; the extra-sovereign nature of 
these processes that I describe in no way seek to re-subjectify individuals in a 
political way.  They do not seek to reconstitute individuals as ―global citizens‖ or 
the like; they remain sovereign subjects or citizens within their respective liberal 
democratic states.  Indeed, the nature of the processes reinforces already existing 
political subjectification by reinforcing already existing practices, which are ―not 
necessarily located within the state but are constructed from practices operating 
from multiple and heterogeneous locales (citizen associations, charities, trade 
unions, families, schools, workplaces, etc.),‖ 260  yet often serve to reinforce 
sovereignty.  My analysis is necessarily one-sided; an analysis of political 
subjectification requires both an investigation of governmental and ethical self-
formation, as well as a range of practices that exist on a continuum in between 
these two points; although these practices depend on governmental and ethical 
practices, they can also be analyzed as distinct.  Governmental self-formation is 
critical to this paper, however, because of its intimate relation with the 
constitutive element of the ‗doublebind‘ established by humanism/biopolitics.   
This is because governmental self-formation is intimately connected to the 
role of experts; the biopolitical relationship between experts and governmental 
self-formation establishes a technical matrix that reinforces the spread of 
biopower: 
―Biopower spread under the banner of making people healthy and 
protecting them.  When there was resistance, or failure to achieve its 
stated aims, this was construed as further proof of the need to 
reinforce and extend the power of experts.  A technical matrix was 
established.  By definition, there ought to be a way of solving any 
technical problem.  Once this matrix was established, the spread of 
biopower was assured, for there could be nothing else to appeal to: 
any other standards could be shown to be abnormal or to present 
merely technical problems.  We are promised normalization and 
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happiness through science and law.  When they fail, this only justifies 
more of the same‖261 
Within a biopolitical regime, experts are situated between individuals and social 
authorities, acting as translation devices ―shaping conduct not through 
compulsion but through the power of truth, the potency of rationality and the 
alluring promise of effectivity.‖262  It is this strategy which allows for liberal-
biopolitical rule, and it is a strategy deployed within trans-governmental 
processes.  It is a strategy especially visible within EU processes.  The following 
discusses an example of how EU governmentality is biopolitical.  My reading of 
a European Commission strategy paper reflects the crucial role of expertise in 
making liberal-biopolitical rule operable within a context that problematizes 
supra-national government.  The problematization of EU governmentality is a 
fruitful standpoint for identifying international biopower.  The nature of the EU, 
especially the amount of effort expended by EU organizations investigating its 
governmental challenges, is extremely insightful.  Indeed, due to the need of EU 
governmentality to ‗get around‘ the continuing sovereign function, the 
governmentalization of the state is perhaps best appreciated from a governmental 
perspective, albeit not in those exact words, of certain actors within the EU. 
Governmental Self-Rule: The Formalization of Normalization. 
In 1997 the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission (EC) 
published an extremely insightful paper,
263
 which tells us a lot about the changing 
nature of government in advanced liberal states.  What is most insightful about 
this paper is the way that it articulates a desire to institutionalize, or at least codify, 
the role of, governmentalization within more a formal governmental apparatus.  
This is framed in two ways; as a tension between functional organization and 
increasing societal complexity; and as a tension between functionality and 
democratic accountability.  It stems from two conclusions; on the one hand, ―the 
model of representative democracy and the bureaucratic state upon which 
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government action has traditionally been founded is increasingly inadequate to 
cope with both the scale of problems confronting it and with the emergence of 
new governance arrangements.‖264  On the other hand is a belief that ―the process 
of the production and application of norms in society is changing.‖ 265   The 
biopolitical undertones are easily identifiable, especially when it uses the 
environment as the prime example of the difficulty of achieving coordination 
which can better accommodate complex interdependent problems, a description 
which echoes the concept of the milieu.  The paper identifies how many policies 
have direct effects on the environment, thus requiring an approach that respects 
the complexity inherent in the problem.  This leads to an understanding that 
―demonstrates the limits of traditional approaches to regulation where policies 
were seen to be founded on stable models upon which detailed regulatory 
programmes could be established and implemented.  The constant production of 
new (and often contentious and contradictory) information about environmental 
issues, however, renders this approach to regulation obsolete.  There is a need, 
then, to move from a rigid and top-down approach to regulation to a flexible and 
inclusive approach.‖266   
Central to this new approach to complexity is the desire to include and 
coordinate as many actors as possible in policy processes.  As well as being what 
is seen as a necessarily new approach to solving problems, it is also to achieve the 
implementation of policies without recourse to sovereign mechanisms that do not 
exist, that is, a European Union (EU) constitution that can enforce policies.  This 
is primarily achieved through the ―implementation of ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation procedures.‖ 267   The paper proposes ―a new mode of democratic 
regulation which rests on proceduralisation of the production and the application 
of norms, and more generally, of the co-ordination of collective action and the 
modes of structuration of collective actors.  This mode of regulation does not 
substitute the foregoing substantive modes but rather represents an attempt to 
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increase their potential by achieving a better linkage between systems of 
knowledge, bureaucratic, expert, social, etc.‖268 
Due to a concern with the difficulty of imposing an ―a priori formulation 
of public problems (let alone solutions)‖ the paper implicitly refers to a an ideal 
process of normalization:  
―Coupled with the consequent difficulty of organising collective 
action on the basis of standardized norms, this situation suggests the 
creation of opportunities for the formulation of problems which 
brings together all affected actors in settings where there is the 
possibility for collective or mutual learning – in other words, the 
contextualisation of the production and application of norms.‖269   
The discussion becomes more explicit when it states that it ―[i]nvolves affected 
actors in clarifying the presuppositions and hypotheses that they bring to a 
particular issue, the mutual critique of those positions, the consequent possibility 
of their evolution and thus of collective learning.‖270  Furthermore, this process 
fully resonates with Foucault‘s truth claims by being ―not a one-off, unilinear 
process but rather one that involves the ongoing re-examination of the context 
and its reinsertion into the process (a feedback loop) means that the limitations of 
substantive rationality can be avoided.‖271 
The EC paper reflects an understanding of society as existing in a milieu: 
―A general theme running through the various interventions by external experts 
taking part in this project has been the context of complexity, diversity, 
interdependence and uncertainty within which governmental action must now 
operate.‖272  And although it is never explicitly mentioned, it often seems that the 
authors are fully aware of the governmentalization of the state and seek to 
intervene in a way that maintains or fosters its alignment with state objectives: 
―All [experts taking part in this project] pointed to a situation of increasing 
complexity in which the most pressing problems of society appear beyond the 
reach of the political programmes and the bureaucratic administrative bodies 
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which have traditionally been deployed to resolve them.‖ 273  In this vein, an 
important problem that their investigation into this new mode of governance 
seeks to overcome is the diversification of values which ―threatens to render the 
notion of the general will which underpins the traditional models of 
democratically representative government redundant.‖ 274   Such an approach 
incorporates the idea of constitutionally distinct and formally independent 
individuals co-existing in a world that presupposes regulatory interventions. 
The EC paper focuses on the need for the contextualized production and 
application of norms ―which stresses the need to consider problems in context, to 
incorporate the different perspectives and values held by different stakeholders 
and to accommodate the possibility of new information and emergent difficulties.‖  
And it is a model which ―has implications for all the stages of the process of 
governance from the formulation of problems and solutions, through the 
implementation of mechanisms of action, to their evaluation and revision.‖275  It 
goes so far as to say that this new mode of governance represents a clear change 
in governmental rationality, whereby the techniques incorporated are fundamental 
to the understanding of government.  This can be seen by the way this 
governmentality relies upon mechanisms of evaluation and monitoring.  Such 
techniques elicit self-government, and the paper claims that ―policy can only be 
understood by such evaluation and monitoring which can discover what is 
actually happening as opposed to relying on what is supposed to happen when a 
policy is implemented.‖276 
The limits of this attempt at codification of the governmentalization of the 
state, at least from a perspective focused on biopolitical normalization, lies with 
its claim that it must ensure participation by all relevant stakeholders.  Referring 
back to Dean‘s account of socialization, biopolitical normalization is far too 
dispersed a process to ever be formally integrated by governmental self-formation 
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practices.
277
  However, the EC paper is insightful as an example of is how a 
particular supranational organization is trying explicitly to get around their lack 
of sovereign power, which has traditionally been the nexus of political legitimacy.  
They therefore can be found engaging directly with ideas previously generated by 
Foucault, namely, the governmentalization of the state.  The above shows that 
they are, albeit implicitly, incorporating a biopolitical framework to help with 
their investigations into effective government, through which they hope to 
achieve democratic legitimacy without formal arrangements. 
The EC paper is thus part of a conscious project to governmentalize 
‗Europe‘, stemming from criticisms of an emergent democratic deficit concerning 
the implementation of EU regulations, and attempting to generate legitimate 
harmonization of regulations across EU member states.  It does so by 
institutionalizing processes of biopolitical normalization and therefore is no doubt 
a ripe entrance point to investigate international biopower.  However, the EU 
represents a special case, and so instead of continuing with an analysis of the EU, 
I will use this information to produce insights into international biopolitics that 
potentially affect international relations more broadly.  I will thus show that what 
I have identified within this supranational organization, can also be found 
animating international organizations, and, more importantly, processes not 
necessarily related to formal organization.  What is important to take from the 
previous discussion is the way formal governmental agencies are involved in 
practices of governmental self-formation.  The above discussion shows that the 
EU is working towards formalizing processes that subjectivize individuals as self-
governing individuals, and is trying to extend formal government activity as far 
as possible into those processes.  Two rationalities can be identified as being 
intimately linked to this process which is conceptualized as the formalization of 
(biopolitical) normalization.  First, a rationality that deploys its expertise as 
deeply as possible, and primarily to frame a process of normalization, echoes a 
continuing strategy to transform societies from ‗passive‘ systems to ‗active‘ ones, 
that is, a strategy of governmental self-rule is part of a broader strategy to 
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inculcate ethical self-rule.  Second, by formalizing normalization, governmental 
actors hope to generate political legitimacy and effectiveness.  I will now briefly 
explore how these two rationalities can be witnessed in a broader international 
context than that framed by the EU.  I will first show how Slaughter‘s notion of 
‗disaggregated sovereignty‘ helps us to identify biopolitical normalization in 
transgovernmental strategies which attempt to produce effective and thus 
legitimate governance that transcends state boundaries, and how this strategy is 
tied up with a project to elicit ethical self-government.  Using the OECD as an 
example, I will then elucidate the concept of international biopolitical 
normalization, and put forward some concrete examples through which this 
process can be identified. 
‘Disaggregated Sovereignty.’ 
The remainder of this chapter argues that biopower enters IR through the 
translation of techniques of biopolitical normalization beyond the biopolitical 
state.  I argue that for biopower to enter into world politics, the process of 
normalization that is immanent with (biopolitical) civil society must somehow 
connect to processes that occur transnationally.  That means a continuum of 
normalization must be genealogically linked to apparatuses located outside of the 
state.  This does not necessarily mean that biopower is transcending sovereignty 
and being modified from its original tripartite form.  Indeed, I argue that it is not.  
Instead, norms that are constituted immanently with additional recourse to 
processes occurring beyond the state can, and will still be enforced by state 
sovereignty.  I propose that the feedback loop that facilitates the constitution of 
norms has grown somewhat due to the increased capacity of communication 
processes.  I begin by arguing that this process of normalization can be witnessed 
in new governmental processes summed up by Slaughter (2004) as 
‗disaggregated sovereignty.‘278 
Slaughter‘s discussion of transgovernmentality reflects the processes of 
EC governmentality described above, that is, how new modes of governance are 
respecting the naturalness of processes of biopolitical normalization.  It also 
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indicates how these processes of biopolitical normalization are becoming 
transnational through the institutionalization of regulatory cooperation.  These 
regulatory networks are shown by Slaughter to, amongst other things, facilitate 
the flow of a certain type of information, expertise which facilitates liberal rule.  
Transnational regulatory networks thus facilitate networks that bypass sovereign 
mechanisms and inculcate self-regulation, a central biopolitical operation.  The 
biopolitical nature of the processes she describes can be identified through an 
analysis of Dean‘s three ‗foldings,‘ which shows how the biopolitical feedback 
loop framed by sovereignty now incorporate actors located above sovereign 
spaces, in this case, the EU.  Just how what she describes reflects processes of 
biopolitical normalization is also outlined. 
Slaughter‘s discussion of the nature of transgovernmental processes is 
broad, and not all of what she describes involves biopolitical processes.  However, 
she points out that a major impetus for the study of transgovernmental regulatory 
networks has been the entrenchment of a regulatory system centered on the 
OECD.  She also speaks of transgovernmental processes as blurring the line 
between national and international.  I argue that for this line to be truly blurred 
biopolitical techniques must also be going transgovernmental, and therefore that 
techniques that involve biopower will be identified as occurring beyond the 
OECD.  Also, following my earlier argument that it is with the blurring of the 
‗national‘ and ‗international‘ that Foucault‘s work will be most fruitful, then it is 
precisely when this claim is made by liberal analysis that Foucault should be 
recruited.  Indeed, I argue that it is the internationalization of biopolitical 
processes of normalization which illuminates their blurring, and that investigation 
of her work, A New World Order, is fruitful because it identifies just how some of 
the most innovative transgovernmental processes reflect the idea that biopolitical 
normalization is becoming linked to transnational processes.  I therefore focus my 
investigation of her work on what she thinks are the most interesting sites of 
transgovernmental activity: ―networks of national regulators that develop outside 
any formal framework.‖279  In particular, networks that ―result from agreements 
between domestic regulatory agencies of two or more nations,‖ and that have the 
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potential to evolve, if they have not already, into plurilateral arrangements.
280
  
What is specific about these agreements, and relevant to biopower, is that the 
institutionalization of channels of regulatory cooperation in this manner ―embrace 
principles that can be implemented by the regulators themselves; they do not need 
further approval by national legislators.‖ 281   It thus reflects the 
governmentalization of the state. 
Due to the nature of biopower I therefore focus on one of her three 
heuristic categories of transgovernmental process;
282
 information networks (in 
contrast to enforcement and harmonization networks).  The flow of information 
within an information network facilitates cooperation, but more importantly, the 
flow of information serves a biopolitical function, that is, expertise which 
facilitates liberal rule.  Hence she states that ―[s]imply providing information to 
individuals and organizations permits self-knowledge, which is the heart of self-
regulation.‖ 283   She expands on this to point out that transgovernmental 
information sharing is about a certain type of information sharing.  It is about 
sharing the sort of information that will empower regulatory agencies, and thus 
facilitate transnational governance, in spite of international legal arrangements.  
She thus links contemporary governmentality with transgovernmentalism.  First 
she points out that; 
―Instead of deciding how individuals should behave, ordering them to 
behave that way, and then monitoring whether they obey, 
governments are learning how to provide valuable and credible 
information that will let individuals regulate themselves within a 
basic framework of standards.‖284 
And then, that; 
―If governments can provide information to help individuals regulate 
themselves, then government networks can collect and share not only 
the information provided, but also the solutions adopted.‖285 
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On my reading, this presents us with a direct link between biopolitical 
normalization and what might be called transgovernmental normalization, and 
indicates a process of international biopolitical normalization..  Furthermore, 
implicit in Slaughter‘s reading of the normative implications of this 
transgovernmental idealism is the perception of societies exhibiting an emergent 
character that escapes discipline and more generally command-and-control tactics.  
This reflects Foucauldian insights about mechanisms of control, and their ability 
to govern according to logics of risk.  Thus she states that; 
―Cooperation across borders on a whole host of old and new issues 
will similarly have to address fast-changing circumstances and an 
astonishing array of contexts, as well as the need for active citizen 
participation in as many of the world‘s countries as possible.‖286 
As will be shown below, talk of citizen participation can be linked to the 
immanence of normalization within civil society, it echoes the points made above 
about EU governmentality, and inculcates legitimacy and effectiveness.   
One of the central points that Slaughter conveys from the literature is the 
importance of the credibility of information.  It is precisely the credibility of 
information that subjectivizes the governed as allies.  Speaking of information 
networks within the context of the European Union (EU), the credibility of 
information, or in Foucauldian terms, effective expertise, establishes what 
Slaughter refers to as a ―community of views,‖287 which generates a three-way 
flow of information that complements, from an IR perspective, Dean‘s three 
‗foldings.‘  First, there is the flow of information between a transgovernmental 
network; there is a second flow from this network up to formal EU policymakers; 
finally, this information flows down to ―interested members of national 
publics.‖288  Here, the first flow of information echoes government by other than 
formal state apparatus, in that they are regulatory rather than juridical.  This 
accounts for the fact that policy recommendations are reached through a process 
of normalization, both with reference to regulators from different countries and 
internal norms; the second flow echoes how non-governmental regulations are 
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incorporated into formal – regional – political considerations; while the third flow 
facilitates the normalization of governmental regulations by incorporating civil 
society.  It is important to note that this is the second point that civil society is 
incorporated into the process, and hence this part of the process – the third flow 
of information – is linked to the first, and produces a circular relation. 
The concern with citizen participation reflects the liberal strategy to 
empower civil society, to ―integrate expert and social judgment throughout the 
regulatory process.‖289  In techno-liberal parlance, it is a normative project to 
incorporate the widest possible range of stakeholders, and attempts to make social 
regulation immanent within, or coextensive with civil society.  Drawing on an EU 
White Paper with similar themes to the EC paper discussed above, Slaughter 
sums up this biopolitical normalization in techno-political terms as a process of 
―collective learning,‖ and as a process which ―abolishes hierarchy.‖ 290   Her 
analysis continues to echo biopower when she notes that ―what is striking is the 
apparent disappearance or dispersal of government authority.‖ 291   Her 
interpretation of these processes precisely coheres with Foucault‘s displacement 
of sovereignty to get at what is specific about the operation of power within the 
state; 
―Government does not lay down rules or monitor their enforcement; it 
neither teaches nor learns.  What it does is bring the network into 
being, constructing and animating a forum for dialogue and collective 
learning.  Then it steps back and lets the process run.‖292 
It is within what Slaughter describes as networks that biopolitical normalization 
occurs, and these networks are becoming linked transnationally to ‗blur the line 
between national and international.‘   
The process of normalization is perhaps most accurately touched upon 
when she talks about individuals; 
―[organizing] themselves in multiple networks or even communities 
to solve problems for themselves and for the larger society.  These 
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networks or problem-solving groups are not directly connected to the 
‗government‘ or the ‗state,‘ but they can nevertheless compile and 
accumulate knowledge, develop their problem-solving capacity, and 
work out norms to regulate their behaviour.‖293 
Slaughter‘s description of these processes revolves around contemporary 
exigencies of government based on ideas of complexity, a perspective that fits 
well with Foucault‘s approach to politics.294  This links to Foucault‘s discussion 
of modern liberal politics as a site of intervention framed by a milieu within 
which cause and effect is governed with reference to mechanisms of security.  
Hence her statement that; 
―[t]he state‘s function is to manage [problem-solving and information 
pooling] processes, rather than regulate behaviour directly.  It must 
help empower individuals to solve their own problems within their 
own structures, to facilitate and enrich deliberative dialogue.  It must 
also devise norms and enforcement mechanisms for assuring the 
widest possible participation within each network, consistent with its 
effectiveness.‖295 
It is Slaughter‘s description of aspects of transgovernmental processes that 
foster these sorts of effects, and especially her description of how the 
communicative aspect of transnational government is linked to government 
through normalization, that, I argue, illuminates a fruitful avenue to investigate 
biopower with reference to international relations.  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to explore these avenues more fully, but a number of aspects can be 
earmarked for future research.  This includes her identification of: ―mushrooming 
[transgovernmental] private governance regimes‖ that echo governmentalization; 
the way domestic and international society ―generates the rules, norms and 
principles they are prepared to live by‖ which echoes regulation by normalization; 
and the new political conception of society in which ―uncertainty and unintended 
consequences are facts of life, facts that individuals can face without relying on a 
higher authority,‖ an idea that refers both to the milieu as a site of uncertainty and 
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intervention, and to the government of oneself, albeit framed by regulations that 
encourages individuals to exercise their freedom responsibly.  Hence her belief 
that individuals ―have the necessary resources within themselves and with each 
other.  They only need to be empowered to draw on.‖296 
Slaughter‘s discussion of how transnational governance possesses a 
rationality which attempts to be effective and legitimate intimates at a 
governmentality that, in the least incorporates biopolitical techniques.  These are 
techniques which attempt to elicit the self-regulation of responsibilized 
individuals.  It is thus part of a broader process of governmental self-formation 
which attempts to subjectivize individuals ethically as willing participants in the 
project of managing society.  Due to their disaggregated nature, these 
transnational process of normalization tend to focus on the subjectification of 
individuals, and they thus fall short of properly being called international 
biopolitical normalization.  The next section continues the investigation of 
processes of biopolitical normalization that are of interest to the field of IR, and 
argues that the OECD represents something unique, and should thus be 
considered a privileged site for the analysis of international biopolitical 
normalization. 
OECD Governmentality. 
The biopolitical nature of Slaughter‘s explanation of 
transgovernmentalism thus fully complements the biopolitical nature of 
supranational EU governmentality.  This ‗transgovernmentality‘ can be further 
explored with more detail through an analysis of the OECD.  This analysis 
extends the identification of biopolitical normalization in IR by identifying 
biopolitical normalization as not only being linked to transnational processes, but 
also to international apparatuses.  Let me begin the discussion about the OECD 
with a comment by a former Secretary-General: 
―The OECD is not a supranational organisation but a place where 
policymakers can meet and discuss their problems, where 
governments can compare their points of view and their experience.  
The Secretariat is there to find and point out the way to go, to act as a 
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catalyst.  Its role is not academic, nor does it have the authority to 
impose its ideas.  Its power lies in its capacity for intellectual 
persuasion.‖297 
Teasing apart this summation of the role of the OECD, three points – apart from 
the non-coercive nature of its governmentality, which has already been pointed 
out – require highlighting.  First, the OECD is a forum in which member states 
come together voluntarily to compare their relative states.  Second, OECD 
governmentality is based upon its ability to facilitate norms of behaviour.  Put 
simply, I argue that the combination of these two factors makes of the OECD a 
forum that facilitates an interplay between different distributions of normality, 
and acts to bring the most unfavorable in line with the more favorable.  Third, the 
fact that ‗the OECD is not a supranational organization‘ implies that OECD does 
not exist ‗above‘ the states that constitute its membership, and therefore that its 
governmentality is in some way intimately related to biopolitical governmentality, 
that is, processes of normalization that occur within states.  This section expands 
on these three points, and in doing so argues, notwithstanding the third point, that 
the OECD represents a biopolitical node which facilitates the extension of 
biopolitical processes transnationally. 
I argue that the OECD should be considered as part of the continuum of 
regulation that determines biopolitical norms internally and that the OECD then 
connects this internal process to a process of normalization between states.  It 
thus constitutes a prime site through which we can analyze the blurring of the 
‗national‘ and ‗international,‘ that is, through which we can investigate 
international biopolitical normalization.  The OECD is part of a transnational 
process wherein domestic biopolitical norms are constituted with some sort of 
link to the OECD, whose governmentality is tied up with a techniques of 
comparison and peer-review which immanently ties this biopolitical 
normalization up with the normality of other states.    Biopolitical norms are thus 
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linked to a process of norm formation at the international level.
298
  This can occur 
according to two general processes.  The first, and much more formal process, 
occurs when the OECD produces a report on what it deems to be an issue vitally 
important to the welfare of the country in question.  The second is a less formal 
process whereby statistics and expertise produced by the OECD are used by 
various groups in their attempts to governmentalize society.  Both of these 
processes can be analyzed with reference to Dean‘s ‗foldings‘ described in 
chapter one, and discussed above. 
Drawing on Dean‘s ‗foldings‘ of the state-civil society double within 
liberal-biopolitical government, and based on an explanation of OECD 
processes,
299
 here‘s how I posit the more formal process interacts with biopower: 
First, statistics – with reference to indicators and a particular issue determined by 
the OECD – are collected by the state and then passed on.  With reference to this 
data, the ‗normality‘ of the state is determined through comparison with other 
states.  OECD representatives then engage with appropriate domestic 
representatives, both within formal state apparatus and from civil society, to 
prepare a draft report on the issue in question.  Through political technologies, 
devices such as surveys, this process is framed by the OECD.  Once this draft 
report is prepared, state representatives then participate in a peer-review process 
with representatives from other states.  The peer-review is a very critical process, 
in which ―the country under review [seeks] to blunt criticism, especially in 
domestically sensitive areas.‖300  Following this, a final report is released to the 
public which, although significantly influenced by the OECD, typically 
represents a compromise.  The expertise and truth claims of the OECD, in policy 
form and reinforced by state participation, are then conveyed to political society, 
through formal and informal government channels, as well as through the media, 
that is, through political and civil society.  This then prompts responses from the 
correlates of liberal society – ‗civil‘ and ‗political.‘  These responses form a 
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feedback loop which ultimately informs the state‘s response to OECD concerns.  
Due to the non-coercive nature of OECD governmentality, the state is in no way 
required to implement OECD generated policies, and domestic considerations as 
well as OECD concerns ultimately inform a state‘s final response. 
According to Dean, the three of foldings of liberal-biopolitical 
government represent; government by other than formal state apparatus (―an 
unfolding of the (formally) political sphere into civil society‖); non-governmental 
regulations incorporated into formal political considerations (―an enfolding of the 
regulations of society into the political‖); and the immanence of normalization in 
society (―a refolding of the real or ideal values and conduct of civil society onto 
the political‖).  I argue all three of these foldings are witnessed in the process 
above.  First, you have the direct participation of civil society in the draft report 
formulation process.  This includes participation by the OECD.  Second (and 
perhaps most contentiously), you have the enfolding of international societal 
regulations into the domestic political sphere.  This reinforces the claim that the 
OECD is part of domestic liberal civil society, which is non-governmental due to 
its non-sovereign nature.  Third, the final response of a state to OECD 
governmentality is subject to the real or ideal values of domestic society, the 
normalization of which is only partly influenced by OECD governmentality.  It is 
this final point, however, that problematizes the idea of the OECD possessing 
more formal biopolitical credentials; the OECD is only biopolitical to the extent 
that it is part of a feedback loop that originates from a biopolitical state.  In other 
words, the response of a state to OECD governmentality is a result of biopolitical 
normalization within states, and the OECD should be considered part of states 
civil societies‘.  The OECD is part of a process of biopolitical normalization 
because of societal internalization of its expertise within a domestic feedback 
loop that determines social norms and regulation.  
Although there is a formal relationship between states and the OECD, this 
is not what is most important to how the process of biopolitical normalization 
gets caught up with OECD expertise.  What is relevant for this discussion is the 
way OECD expertise gets absorbed within a biopolitical feedback loop which 
serves to normalize the target populations that specific deployments of OECD 
knowledge are directed at. However, I argue that OECD involvement has a dual 
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relationship with the notion of biopolitical normalization.  On the one hand, its 
expertise and techniques are internalized by domestic processes of biopolitical 
normalization.  On the other hand, and from the perspective of international 
governmentality, states are governmentalized in such a way so as to facilitate the 
appropriate governmentalization of their respective societies; that is, they are 
governmentalized so as to make their societies more ‗active.‘  The duality of this 
process can best be seen through an analysis of the way the OECD is involved 
with the governmentalization of education within liberal countries.  The 
following section will begin with an elucidation of the first part of this duality; 
how the OECD becomes involved with biopolitical normalization, that is, the 
relationship between the OECD and an individual state.  It will then move on to 
the second part of this duality; the way this first relationship is complicated by 
OECD governmentality, that is, how the OECD links this normalization process 
to other states.  The section will thus highlight a number of avenues through 
which biopower is becoming international. 
OECD governmentality is not biopolitical on its own, and yet the 
relationship between a state and the OECD on its own does represent 
international biopolitical normalization.  This occurs when biopolitical 
governmentality, or internal biopolitical normalization, of which the OECD is a 
part, is connected to an interplay between different states, each representing a 
normality.  This occurs due to OECD governmentality, which as has been noted 
above represents the diffusion of biopolitical techniques beyond the state.  (States 
that are not part of the OECD, from a liberal-international perspective, are 
understood in terms of other distributions of normality, and may or may not be 
governmentalized by disciplinary mechanisms.)  International biopolitical 
normalization thus exists at the intersection of two axes of biopolitical 
normalization, one vertical and one horizontal, an intersection which is 
constituted and facilitated by the OECD. 
The OECD and Biopolitical Normalization 
This section will show that, due to OECD expertise, the internal 
biopolitical normalization of societies is becoming linked to apparatuses and 
relations that are international.  This occurs in two ways; first, there is the 
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relatively straightforward relationship between the OECD and a particular 
sovereign society; second, there is a complexification of this relationship due to 
the governmentality of the OECD which, as noted above, is tied in to the liberal 
nomos of world order, and thus tries to extend liberal relations throughout the 
world.  It achieves this with recourse to techniques that have a biopolitical nature, 
namely through the technique of ranking which represents an interplay between 
different normalities.  The section begins by providing a concrete example of the 
way the OECD is tied up with an internal and sovereign feedback loop which 
facilitates biopolitical normalization.  It thus extends and substantiates the 
explication of this process put forward in the previous sections concerning EC 
governmentality and transgovernmental processes.  Following this, another 
example of the same phenomenon is given, which is then able to be extended to 
illuminate the complexification of biopolitical normalization with reference to 
international governmentality. 
The first example shows how OECD expertise becomes involved with 
biopolitical normalization. It does so with reference to a new regulation recently 
introduced in New Zealand, whereby the use of ‗booster‘ seats has become 
compulsory for children up to seven years of age, an increase in the required age 
from five.  It is a particularly helpful example because it extends the example of a 
mechanism of security, concerning the raft of regulations that govern the use of 
roads in New Zealand, elucidated in the first chapter.  The second example 
discusses biopolitical techniques reflected in the OECD Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA), with a particular focus on the way this 
programme is used not only to compare students but also countries.  It thus 
identifies that international biopolitical normalization is reflected in a number of 
different processes. 
In October 2012 the New Zealand Government regulated that children up 
to the age of seven must be restrained in cars with the use of booster seats that 
ensure seatbelts fit them correctly.
301
  This decision was partly a result of 
lobbying directed at the government by civil society groups concerned with the 
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health and welfare of children in New Zealand, and thus represents Dean‘s 
―enfolding of the regulations of society into the political.‖  However, what is 
important to note is that part of the impetus for the lobbying efforts of certain 
civil society actors came from the dissemination of OECD expertise in the form 
of rankings.  This can be seen in comments by Plunket‘s National Child Safety 
Advisor, who states that ―[New Zealand has] one of the highest child road fatality 
rates in the OECD. Around five children are killed or injured every week on this 
country‘s roads. Today‘s announcement by the Government is a positive step 
towards reducing this number.‖302  Thus the OECD is a part of the process of 
enfolding societal regulations into the political.  Furthermore, it will obviously be 
the sovereign capability of the state that enforces this regulation, but how it 
intends to go about this is illuminating.  First, it should be noted that OECD 
expertise actually specifies that children should be restrained with the use of 
booster seats up until the height of 148cm, which is more likely to align with 
children approximately 10 years of age, four years older than what the 
government has decided to mandate.  Remember, however, that biopolitical 
governmentality does not operate according to the unwieldy sovereign apparatus, 
and while the government has been influenced this way in part by OECD 
expertise, this regulation will instead be governed by other than formal state 
apparatus, thus representing Dean‘s ―unfolding of the formally political sphere 
into civil society.‖  The unfolding of the formally political sphere into civil 
society is achieved by groups like plunked successfully playing their part in 
normalizing individuals.  This occurs not only through Plunket‘s formal activity 
(Plunket staff attempts to visit every new baby and their family, sometimes a 
number of times up until the age of five
303
), but also through their participation in 
the communicatory feedback loop discussed above.  For example, Plunket, and 
another civil society group, Safe Kids, speak with expertise in public forums, and 
thus serve to normalize the ‗fact‘ that children should be in booster seats for 
longer than mandated by the new law.  Hence the Director of Safe Kids, on 
                                               
302  Plunket New Zealand, "Plunket Welcomes Government Increase in 
Mandatory Age Limit for Child Car Restraints,"  
http://www.plunket.org.nz/news-and-research/media-releases/plunket-
welcomes-government-increase-in-mandatory-age-limit-for-child-car-
restraints/. 
303  New Zealand Plunket, "Plunket Visits," Plunket New Zealand, 
http://www.plunket.org.nz/what-we-do/what-we-offer/plunket-visits/. 
108 
 
National Radio states, in conjunction with her disappointment that the new 
regulation ‗didn‘t go far enough,‘ how ―this will highlight to parents that this is 
an issue and that more parents and children will do this voluntarily rather than 
wait for regulation.‖304  This, then, is an example of a ―refolding of the real or 
ideal values and conduct of civil society onto the political.‖  What is more, the 
state‘s support of this strategy can be seen in the Minister of Transport‘s public 
comment that ―even if booster seat use [up until the age of 11] is not law by 2020, 
he‘s hopeful that parents attitudes will have changed, and children up to the age 
of ten will be using them without a second thought.‖305 
This example shows how the OECD is folded into biopolitical 
normalization, two aspects of which should be highlighted. First, OECD expertise 
was part of the expertise used to determine at what height a child should be 
restrained using a booster seat.
306
  Second, a technique of comparison was used to 
argue that New Zealand falls below the norm for liberal biopolitical countries in 
child road safety, and thus should be further governmentalized to address this 
deficiency.  The next example further explores this dual process, with reference to 
the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), and focuses 
on the second aspect,. 
 ―The OECD has, since 1988, been funding research to define indicators 
of education that enable valid comparisons to be made and has been reporting the 
results of their application in Education at a Glance (published regularly since 
1991).‖307  The OECD has used its governmental power to promote the use of 
comparative statistics, and education has become a privileged sight for such 
techniques due to ―the supposed link between education and economic 
prosperity.‖308  This has resulted in the production of league tables that focus 
solely on the performance of 15 year old students in scientific literacy, focusing 
on reading, writing and mathematics.  The data collected is then used to rank 
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countries, according to which the explicit purpose of this comparative technique 
can be identified.  Individual countries are normalized through an interplay with 
other country‘s results; an optimal bandwidth is established, to which countries 
below this bandwidth aspire.  The explicit purpose of this comparative technique 
is to inform policy decisions, and serves to normalize countries by homogenizing 
education policy.  Countries which fall outside and below the established 
bandwidth of normality are socialized to the extent that they modify policies to be 
inline with ‗well-performing‘ countries, thus becoming normalized.  The 
comparative technique, however, does not stop with the comparisons of different 
countries.  The data collected is also used by individual governments to compare 
individual students.  Thus, as well as normalizing countries, it also serves to 
normalize children, in that 15 year old students are deemed normal to the extent 
that they fit within a bandwidth of acceptable performance in specific subjects.  
This is how the OECD constitutes a nodal point of international biopower, and is 
thus a fruitful site for its investigation.  It is a part of the internal process of 
normalizing children, as well as possessing an international governmentality 
which makes use of the biopolitical technique of facilitating an interplay between 
different state normalities, remembering that OECD membership indicates a type 
of normality. 
 Moreover, due to the scientific validity of the technique, backed up by 
OECD expertise, the technique multiplies.  In 2010 in New Zealand, for example, 
the government introduced National Standards, designed to ―set clear 
expectations that students need to meet in reading, writing, and mathematics in 
the first eight years at school.‖309  New Zealand is an OECD member, and this is 
an extension of the OECD‘s PISA program, which only focuses on 15 year olds.  
National Standards are an extension of the PISA program, echoing its rationality 
to produce comparative statistics for children from the age of five to thirteen.  
This extension of a rationality influenced by NZ‘s participation in the PISA 
program serves to normalize the country vis-à-vis other countries, and constitutes 
a self-reflective modification of policies in an attempt to normalize the country.  
This can be seen to happen in a dual manner.  First, it can be partly attributable to 
                                               
309 The New Zealand Curriculum, "National Standards," Ministry of Education, 
New Zealand, http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/National-Standards. 
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a project to normalize children to perform well in the PISA program, which in 
turn helps to normalize New Zealand.  Second, the extension of OECD 
techniques to governmentalized children at a number of different ages helps to 
normalize New Zealand as an ‗active‘ country, that is, a country that socializes its 
citizens to be constantly measured, appraised, and hierarchically placed so as to 
subjectivize them as active citizens. 
What is important is the way league tables in this manner contribute to the 
process of normalization, both nationally and internationally.  Also, OECD 
governmentality is not biopolitical on its own; a relationship with an already 
liberal-biopolitical state is essential. It remains, however, an international 
apparatus, and as such serves to blur the line between the ‗national‘ and 
‗international.‘ Although biopolitical norms can ultimately only be enforced 
(when such enforcement is necessary) by sovereign power, and that such 
enforcement necessarily reflects biopolitical norms constituted by the values of 
domestic society, more and more, with such activity as the OECD is part of, the 
sovereign mechanism continues to be devaluated.  Moreover, domestic values are 
definitely influenced by the knowledge/power of the OECD; it is when OECD 
governmentality is socialized as a relevant civil society actor that it becomes 
biopolitical, and it is when it connects this internal process to biopolitical 
processes occurring in other states that biopolitics is internationalized.   
One might contend, at this point, that due to increased communication 
channels, it is a truism to claim that domestic values and norms are influenced by 
international phenomena.  Of course, this is true; however, I would argue that the 
OECD channel represents something unique.  The OECD can be viewed as an 
organization that, although nascent in this respect, is institutionalizing a process 
of international biopolitical normalization, keeping in mind that it is a process 
which can also be seen occurring in less a formal manner.
310
  This claim is based 
upon its ability, and the methods it uses, to align the interests of all biopolitical 
states in the international system.  As I have already stated, the OECD is not in 
itself biopolitical, but is instead a mechanism that involves biopower, and thus 
                                               
310 To complement the discourse of ‘democratic deficit’ at the international 
level, perhaps we could also talk of a biopolitical deficit, whereby neither are 
norms of international immanent with international society.  
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blurs the national/international divide due to its ability to simultaneously be a part 
of domestic and international processes.  It is a nodal point for transnational 
biopolitical normalization. 
I argue that this chapter has successfully described a new and valid 
approach for investigating biopower in IR, successful because it manages to 
reinforce and extend Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics.  It 
began by making a distinction between disciplinary indirect rule and biopolitical 
indirect rule and identified that biopolitical indirect rule can be found within the 
OECD, a site which is a component of international governmentality.  It was then 
identified that biopolitical indirect rule is related to biopolitical normalization, a 
process which is facilitated by expertise and linked to the socialization of 
individuals.  An attempt to formalize biopolitical normalization by governmental 
agencies was identified as an attempt to incorporate ‗natural‘ processes of 
normalization within an explicit governmental program, a rationality explained by 
Dean‘s notion of governmental self-rule.  The desire to ‗formalize normalization‘ 
was illuminated with reference to EC governmentality, and transgovernmental 
processes described by Slaughter.  It was argued that these analyses represent a 
fruitful site for the internationalization of biopolitical normalization, before a 
third site, the OECD, was used to supplement these analyses and provide concrete 
examples. 
The examples above show how OECD expertise is ‗folded‘ into processes 
of biopolitical normalization that fundamentally remain connected to the 
sovereign capability of the state.  It was shown that this occurs in (at least) two 
ways.  First, there is a relatively straightforward process whereby the OECD 
becomes socialized as part of a domestic feedback loop.  This relationship 
between international expertise and individual sovereign states is then 
complexified by a second process as it gets tied up with international 
governmentality, which is represented in this paper as techniques which rank 
countries.  Both of these processes were illuminated by Dean‘s three ‗foldings‘ of 
liberal government.  In addition to this complexification, it was also shown that 
these processes can either be formal or informal.   Generally it was shown that 
biopower enters IR through two processes, the normalization of individuals with 
recourse to transnational and supranational apparatuses, and the normalization of 
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countries with specific reference to the OECD.  The first process, it was argued, 
is witnessed in transgovernmental and supragovernmental processes that are 
trying to regulate individuals and societies, which operate according to a 
governmentality that is trying to get around their lack of recourse to sovereign 
mechanisms, and in doing so are involved in processes that are referred to as 
formalizing processes of biopolitical normalization.  The second process is 
facilitated by the OECD due to its deployment of biopolitical techniques in an 
effort to governmentalise states, namely a technique of comparison which 
facilitates an interplay between different distributions of normality, a technique 
that was developed by biopolitical rationality. 
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CONCLUSION: GLOBAL BIOPOWER AS INTERNATIONAL BIOPOLITICAL 
NORMALIZATION. 
This paper has argued that global biopower should be analyzed as an 
extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that are located domestically, 
that is, within a sovereign space.  It thus subscribes to a methodological 
commitment to an ascending analysis of power relations and has, I argue, 
successfully extended Foucauldian insights into the realm of world politics.  This 
is in contradistinction to predominant theorizations of biopower in IR to date, 
which have failed to methodologically account for sovereignty in such a way so 
as to provide the foundation for extending Foucauldian insights beyond the 
territorial boundaries of sovereignty. 
International biopolitical normalization is identified as consisting of two 
analytical axes; vertically, it constitutes an extension of domestic mechanisms of 
security, whereby international apparatuses are ‗folded‘ into a process of 
domestic biopolitical normalization.  Although this process effectively remains 
bounded by a sovereign mechanism, it intimates at the blurring of the ‗national‘ 
and international‘ and thus represents one aspect of international biopolitical 
normalization.  The process of international biopolitical normalization is extended 
and complexified when international apparatuses act as a nodal point that 
connects these domestic processes horizontally, through an extension of 
biopolitical techniques that facilitate an interplay between different distributions 
of normality.  This normality is determined by the fact that members of the 
international apparatus in question are sufficiently liberal states. 
The paper has thus successfully achieved its goal, which was to reaffirm 
central Foucauldian insights which had been elided by predominant theorizations.  
In doing so it has provided a theoretical framework that improves our 
understanding of the way individual bodies are inserted into global apparatuses of 
power, and has extended our understanding of how the general economy of power 
in modern societies can be conceived of as a domain of security.  It has thus 
identified how ‗domestic‘ mechanisms of security can be thought of as becoming 
transnational, and has provided a window onto one of the processes through 
which the boundaries between the national and the international are blurring. 
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The identification of how domestic mechanisms of security are 
contributing to the blurring of the line between the national and international 
helps us to understand the continuing relevance of sovereignty to world politics 
and reinforces the argument that international apparatuses serve as a means to 
reassert sovereignty.  It achieved this through a deconstruction of sovereignty that 
highlighted its ‗history of practices‘ and their continuing relevance, that is, the 
actual practices of government that capture, objectify, and regulate specific 
populations.  The scope of sovereignty was identified as a mechanism which 
bounded the internal dimension of government, that is, biopolitical government, 
by framing its field of vision.  In addition, sovereignty was identified as a power 
with an exterior, and thus is internal to a governmentality with a broader field of 
vision, an international governmentality. 
International governmentality was linked to the liberal nomos of world 
order which operates through both the existing internal governmentality of states 
and as a project to extend and generalize liberal governmentality globally.  To 
help explain how the nomos of world order operated I generated a distinction 
between different apparatuses tied up in this project.  This distinction drew on the 
fact that disciplinary and biopolitical techniques have escaped the institutional 
architecture which initially gave them meaning, and both have generated distinct 
techniques of indirect rule.  It was noted, then, that IOs can be analytically 
distinguished as either operating with reference primarily to disciplinary, or 
biopolitical techniques of indirect rule.  Disciplinary indirect rule was aligned 
with IMF and World Bank practices, while the OECD was identified as the most 
important IO operating with biopolitical techniques of indirect rule.  This was not 
to claim that these IOs were either disciplinary or biopolitical, but rather that they 
have successfully redeployed techniques developed within biopolitical or 
disciplinary institutions, and thus represent sites for further investigation of these 
rationalities. 
Before the example of the OECD was fully developed, the paper explored 
the processes which constitute biopolitical normalization.  This was to ensure an 
ascending analysis of power relations; the way biopolitical normalization occurs 
within a state was elucidated before they were inserted into an analysis which 
incorporated international apparatuses.  The sociological nature of biopolitical 
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normalization was highlighted, in particular how normalization is related to 
socialization, and how the process is linked to a multiplicity of agencies and 
authorities.  This led to Dean‘s fruitful distinction between political 
subjectification, ethical self-formation, and governmental self-formation, and it 
was argued that while biopolitical normalization involves all three distinctive 
governmental strategies, the international dimension of biopower is primarily 
reflected in processes of governmental formation.  The fact that only one of these 
strategies is witnessed ‗internationally‘ indicated that biopower cannot exist 
independent of sovereign biopolitical states, and that international biopower is 
more accurately defined as an extension of biopolitical practices that are 
essentially state-based. 
Governmental self-formation was then investigated from the perspective 
of EC governmentality, and it was pointed out that EC governmentality seems to 
have aligned itself with an understanding of biopolitical normalization, and is 
trying to work with those processes, thus reflecting the liberal critique of politics.  
This was described as an attempt by government agencies to formalize 
biopolitical normalization.  Insights generated by this analysis were then 
translated into a broader context than that of the EU, which represents a special 
case.  Biopolitical normalization was first linked to transgovernmental processes 
as described by Slaughter, before these compounded insights were applied to the 
role of the OECD.  An investigation of ‗disaggregated sovereignty‘ and OECD 
governmentality provided the basis for an explanation of how a continuum of 
biopolitical normalization can be genealogically linked to apparatuses located 
outside of the state.  It also reinforced the argument that biopower does not 
transcend sovereignty, and has not fundamentally changed from its original 
tripartite form.  Instead it pointed out that norms that are constituted immanently 
with additional recourse to processes occurring beyond the state can, and will still 
be enforced by state sovereignty.  Transgovernmentality and OECD processes 
thus represent the extension of a feedback loop which remains fundamentally 
connected to the scope of sovereignty. 
Slaughter‘s discussion of Transgovernmentality echoed EC 
governmentality in that the processes she uncovered reflected the implicit 
governmentalization of the state by governmental agencies in an attempt to 
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implement transnational regulations without involving the sovereign mechanism.  
This is instead strategized through the biopolitical technique of normalizing 
individuals by providing them with ‗credible‘ information, i.e. expertise.  
According to Slaughter, it is precisely the credibility of information that 
subjectivizes the governed as allies.  Furthermore, this strategy aimed at 
individuals is reinforced by a ‗community of views‘ which facilitates the 
normalization of governmental regulations by incorporating civil society.  What 
is striking for Slaughter, and is indicative of biopower, is the apparent 
disappearance or dispersal of governmental authority which is achievable because 
individuals are being subjectivized to govern themselves. 
The discussion about the relationship between supragovernmentality and 
transgovernmentality, and biopolitical normalization set up an analysis of the role 
the OECD plays in this process.  The OECD, it was argued, represents a 
privileged site for an analysis of biopower in world politics.  This is because it is 
a voluntary forum that incorporates itself within sovereign processes which help 
facilitate norms of behavior.  It thus represents a nodal point essential for the 
translation of biopolitical normalization internationally.  Specifically, it argued 
that the OECD should be considered as part of the continuum of regulation that 
determines biopolitical norms internally and furthermore that the OECD then 
connects this internal process to a process of normalization between states.  
Biopolitical norms are in this way explicitly linked to a process of norm 
formation at the international level.  An explanation of how this occurs was 
presented, which was then supported by examples. 
In conclusion, international biopolitical normalization was presented as an 
extension of processes of biopolitical normalization that occur within a sovereign 
space.  It thus methodologically adheres to Foucauldian ethics and produced an 
ascending analysis of power relations.  In doing so it overcame the deficiencies 
noted in predominant theorizations of biopower in IR; it accurately accounted for 
one of the ways in which individuals find themselves enmeshed in power 
relations that extend globally; and it identified a new and fruitful research 
paradigm. 
 
117 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
Abrahamsen, Rita. "The Power of Partnerships in Global Governance." Third World 
Quarterly 25, no. 8 (2004): 1453-67. 
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen. Edited by Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, 
Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
Barry, Andrew. "Lines of Communication and Spaces of Rule." In Foucault and 
Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of 
Government, edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne and Nikolas Rose, 
123-41. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Bartelson, Jens. A Genealogy of Sovereignty. Edited by Steve Smith. Vol. 39, 
Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
———. "Making Sense of Global Civil Society." European Journal of International 
Relations 12, no. 3 (2006): 371-95. 
Best, Jacqueline. "Why the Economy Is Often the Exception to Politics as Usual." 
Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 4 (2007): 87-109. 
Bigo, Didier. "Security: A Field Left Fallow." In Foucault on Politics, Security and 
War, edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008. 
Blencowe, Claire. "Foucault's and Arendt's 'Insider View' of Biopolitics: A Critique 
of Agamben." History of the Human Sciences 23, no. 5 (2010): 113-30. 
Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds. The Foucault Effect: Studies 
in Governmentality; with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel 
Foucault. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Calkivik, Asli. "Why Not to Choose a Secure "We" In a Security-Obsessed World." 
International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (2010): 207-09. 
Cerny, Philip G. Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Pluralism. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Chandler, David. "Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault, Forget Foucault..." 
International Political Sociology 4, no. 2 (2010): 205-07. 
———. "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics (Michael Dillon and Julian Reid. 
The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, London:Routledge. 
2009)." Journal of international cooperation studies 18, no. 1 (2009): 85-94. 
———. "War without End(S): Grounding the Discourse of 'Global War'." Security 
Dialogue 40, no. 3 (2009): 243-62. 
Coleman, Mathew, and John A. Agnew. "The Problem with Empire." In Space, 
Knowledge and Power, edited by Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, 
317-40. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007. 
Collier, Stephen J., Andrew Lakoff, and Paul Rabinow. "Biosecurity: Towards an 
Anthropology of the Contemporary." Anthropology Today 20, no. 5 (2004): 
3-7. 
Corbett, Maree. "Children Must Use Booster Seat until 7 Years Old." In Checkpoint. 
New Zealand: Radio New Zealand, 2012. 
———. "Children to Ride in Booster Seats until Age 7." In Checkpoint. New 
Zealand: Radio New Zealand, 2012. 
———. "Road Safety Rules Could Have Kids under 10 in Booster Seats." In 
Checkpoint. New Zealand: Radio New Zealand, 2010. 
118 
 
Cox, Robert W. "Global Perestroika." In The Global Governance Reader, edited by 
Rorden Wilkinson. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Curriculum, The New Zealand. "National Standards." Ministry of Education, New 
Zealand, http://nzcurriculum.tki.org.nz/National-Standards. 
Dean, Mitchell. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. 2 ed. London: 
Sage Publications, 2010. 
———. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage, 1999. 
———. "Liberal Government and Authoritarianism." Economy and Society 31, no. 
1 (2002): 37-61. 
———. "Nomos and the Politics of World Order." In Global Governmentality: 
Governing International Spaces, edited by Wendy Larner and William 
Walters, 40-58. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
———. "A Political Ontology." In Foucault: The Legacy, edited by Clare O'Farrell, 
385-97. Brisbane: Queensland University of Technology, 1997. 
———. ""A Social Structure of Many Souls": Moral Regulation, Government, and 
Self-Formation." The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de 
sociologie 19, no. 2 (1994): 145-68. 
Development, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and. Interdependence and 
Co-Operation in Tomorrow's World :A Symposium Marking the Twenty-
Fifth Anniversary of the Oecd. Paris: OECD, 1987. 
Dillon, Michael. "Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical 
Emergence." International Political Sociology 1, no. 1 (2007): 7-28. 
———. "Governing through Contingency: The Security of Biopolitical 
Governance." Political Geography 26, (2007): 41-47. 
———. "Security, Race, War." In Foucault on Politics, Security and War, edited by 
Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, 166-205. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011. 
Dillon, Michael, and Luis Lobo-Guerrero. "The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-
Being." Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 1 (2009): 1-23. 
———. "Biopolitics of Security in the 21st Century: An Introduction." Review of 
International Studies 34, (2008): 265-92. 
Dillon, Michael, and Andrew W. Neal. "Introduction." In Foucault on Politics, 
Security and War, edited by Michael Dillon and Andrew W. Neal, 1-20. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
Dillon, Michael, and Julian Reid. "Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex 
Emergency." Alternatives 25, (2000): 117-43. 
———. "Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War." Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 30, (2001): 41-66. 
———. The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live. Edited by Richard 
Falk and R. B. J. Walker, Global Horizons. New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Dingwerth, Klaus, and Philipp Pattberg. "Global Governance as a Perspective on 
World Politics." Global Governance 12, no. 2 (2006): 185-203. 
Donzelot, Jacques. "Michel Foucault and Liberal Intelligence." Economy and 
Society 37, no. 1 (2008): 115-34. 
———. "The Promotion of the Social " Economy and Society 17, no. 3 (1988): 395-
427. 
Dostal, Jörg Michael. "Campaigning on Expertise: How the Oecd Framed Eu 
Welfare and Labour Market Policies – and Why Success Could Trigger 
Failure." Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): 440-60. 
119 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics. Second ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983. 
Edkins, Jenny. "Biopolitics, Communication and Global Governance." Review of 
International Studies 34, (2008): 211-32. 
Evans, Brad. "Foucault's Legacy: Security, War and Violence in the 21st Century." 
Security Dialogue 41, no. 4 (2010): 413-33. 
Ewald, Francois. "Norms, Discipline, and the Law." Representations 30, (1990): 
138-61. 
Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics. Translated by Graham Burchell. Edited 
by Arnold I. Davidson, Lectures at the College De France, 1978-1979. New 
York: Picador, 2008. 
———. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin Books, 
1991. 
———. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." In The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul 
Rabinow. London: Penguin, 1984. 
———. ""Omnes Et Singulatum": Toward a Critique of Political Reason." In Power, 
edited by Paul Rabinow, 298-325. New York: The New Press, 2000. 
———. "The Political Technology of Individuals." In Power, edited by Paul 
Rabinow, 403-17. New York: The New Press, 2000. 
———. "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century." In Power, edited by Paul 
Rabinow, 90-105. New York: The New Press, 2000. 
———. "Questions of Method." In Power, edited by James D. Faubion, 223-38. 
New York: New Press, 2000`. 
———. Security, Territory, Population. Translated by Graham Burchell. Edited by 
Arnold I. Davidson, Lectures at the College De France, 1977-1978. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
———. Society Must Be Defended. Translated by David Macey. Edited by Arnold I. 
Davidson, Lectures at the College De France, 1975-1976. London: Penguin, 
2004. 
———. "The Subject and Power." In Power: The Essential Works of Foucault, 
1954-1984, edited by Paul Rabinow, 326-48. New York: The New Press, 
2000. 
———. "Two Lectures." In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980. 
———. The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality Volume One. Translated 
by Robert Hurley. London: Penguin, 1998. 
Gordon, Colin. "Introduction." In The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality; 
with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault 
edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1991. 
Gudman-Hoyer, and Lopdrup-Hjorth. "Michel Foucault, the Birth of Biopolitics: 
Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978- 
1979. ." Foucault Studies no. 7 (2009): 99-130. 
Hacking, Ian. "Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers." Humanities in 
Society 5, (1982): 279-95. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2000. 
Harlen, Wynne. "The Assessment of Scientific Literacy in the Oecd/Pisa Project." 
Studies in Science Education 36, no. 1 (2001): 79-103. 
120 
 
Hindess, Barry. "Government and Discipline." International Political Sociology 2, 
no. 3 (2008): 268-70. 
———. "Politiics as Government: Michel Foucault's Analysis of Political Reason." 
Alternatives 30, no. 4 (2005): 389-413. 
Hook, Derek. Foucault, Psychology and the Analytics of Power. Edited by Tod 
Sloan, Critical Theory and Practice in Psychology and the Human Sciences. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Hutchings, Kimberly. "Foucault and International Relations Theory." In The Impact 
of Michel Foucault on the Social Science and Humanities, edited by Moya 
Lloyd and Andrew Thacker, 102-27. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997. 
Jaeger, Hans-Martin. "Un Reform, Biopolitics, and Global Governmentality." 
International Theory 2, no. 1 (2010): 50-86. 
Jessop, Bob. "From Micro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault's Work on 
Statehood, State Formation, Statecraft and State Power." Political Geography 
26, no. 1 (2007): 34-40. 
Joseph, Jonathan. "The Limits of Governmentality: Social Theory and the 
International." European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 
223-46. 
Larner, Wendy, and William Walters. "Globalization as Governmentality." 
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29, no. 5 (2004): 495-514. 
Lebessis, Notis, and John Paterson. "Evolution in Governance: What Lessons for the 
Commission? A First Assessment." edited by European Commission 
Forward Studies Unit, 1-30. Brussels: European Commission, 1997. 
Lemke, Thomas. "From State Biology to the Government of Life: Historical 
Dimensions and Contemporary Persepctives of 'Biopolitics'." Journal of 
Classical Sociology 10, no. 4 (2010): 421-38. 
———. "An Indigestible Meal? Foucault, Governmentality and State Theory." 
Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory 8, no. 2 (2007): 43-64. 
Lowenheim, Oded. "Examining the State: A Foucauldian Perspective on 
International 'Governance Indicators'." Third World Quarterly 29, no. 2 
(2008): 255-74. 
Lui-Bright, Robyn. "International/National: Sovereignty, Governmentality and 
International Relations." In 1997 Australian Political Science Association 
Conference, edited by H. Manning G. Crowder, D. S. Mathieson, A. Parkin, 
L. Seabrooke, 581-97: Australasian Political Studies, 1997. 
Macherey, Pierre. "Towards a Natural History of Norms." In Michel Foucualt 
Philosopher, edited by Francois Ewald. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
Mahon, Rianne, and Stephen McBride. "Standardizing and Disseminating 
Knowledge: The Role of the Oecd in Global Governance." European 
Political Science Review 1, no. 01 (2009): 83-101. 
Mercer, Claire. "Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusions of Good 
Governance in Tanzania." Political Geography 22, no. 7 (2003): 741-63. 
Miller, Peter, and Nikolas Rose. "Governing Economic Life." Economy and Society 
19, no. 1 (1990): 1-31. 
Muzio, Tim Di. "Governing Global Slums: The Biopolitics of Target 11." Global 
Governance 14, (2008): 305-26. 
Neal, Andrew W. "Cutting Off the King's Head: Foucault's Society Must Be 
Defended and the Problem of Sovereignty." Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political 29, no. 4 (2004): 373-98. 
121 
 
OECD. "Executive Summary: Keeping Children Safe in Traffic." edited by 
Technology and Industry Directorate for Science. Paris: OECD, 2004. 
Ojakangas, Mika. "Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power  Agamben and Foucault." 
foucault studies 2, (2005): 5-28. 
Olssen, Mark. "Foucault as Complexity Theorist: Overcoming the Problems of 
Classical Philosophical Analysis." Educational Philosophy and Theory 40, 
no. 1 (2008): 96-117. 
Pasha, Mustapha Kamal. "Disciplinig Foucault." International Political Sociology 4, 
no. 2 (2010): 213-15. 
Plunket, New Zealand. "Plunket Visits." Plunket New Zealand, 
http://www.plunket.org.nz/what-we-do/what-we-offer/plunket-visits/. 
Rabinow, Paul, and Nikolas Rose. "Biopower Today." BioSocieties 1, no. 2 (2006): 
195-217. 
Raustiala, Kal. "Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law." 
Journal of International Economic Law 6, no. 4 (2003): 841-78. 
Read, Jason. "The Hidden Abode of Biopolitical Production: Empire and the 
Ontology of Production." Rethinking Marxism 13, no. 3 (2001): 24-30. 
Reid, Julian. "The Biopolitics of the War on Terror: A Critique of the 'Return of 
Imperialism' Thesis in International Relations." Third World Quarterly 26, no. 
2 (2005): 237-52. 
Rose, Nikolas. "Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism." 
Economy and Society 22, no. 3 (1993): 283-99. 
Rosenow, Doerthe. "Decentring Global Power: The Merits of a Foucauldian 
Approach to International Relations." Global Society 23, no. 4 (2009): 497-
517. 
Ruckert, Arne. "Towards an Inclusive-Neoliberal Regime of Development: From the 
Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus." Capital and Society 39, no. 
1 (2006): 34-67. 
Salter, Mark B. "The Global Visa Regime and Political Technologies of the 
International Self: Borders, Bodies, Biopolitics." Alternatives: Global, Local, 
Political 31, no. 2 (2006): 167-89. 
Schinkel, Willem. "From Zoepolitics to Biopolitics: Citizenship and the 
Construction of 'Society'." European Journal of Social Theory 13, no. 2 
(2010): 155-72. 
Selby, Jan. "Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of 
Foucauldian Ir." International Relations 21, no. 3 (2007): 324-45. 
Singer, Brian C. J., and Lorna Weir. "Politics and Sovereign Power: Considerations 
on Foucault." European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 4 (2006): 443-65. 
———. "Sovereignty, Governance and the Political: The Problematic of Foucault." 
Thesis Eleven 94, no. 1 (2008): 49-71. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2004. 
———. "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of Un Reform." 
The American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 619-31. 
Sparke, Matthew B. "A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of 
Citizenship on the Border." Political Geography 25, no. 2 (2006): 151-80. 
Stone, Matthew. "Levinas and Political Subjectivity in an Age of Global Biopower." 
Law, Culture and the Humanities 6, no. 1 (2010): 105-23. 
Swyngedouw, E. "Governance Innovation and the Citizen: The Janus Face of 
Overnance-Beyond-the-State." Urban Studies 42, no. 11 (2005): 1991 - 2006. 
122 
 
Tierney, Thomas F. "Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at 
the Collège De France, 1977-78 " Foucault Studies no. 5 (2008): 90-100. 
Vaughan-Williams, Nick. "The Generalised Bio-Political Border? Re-
Conceptualising the Limits of Sovereign Power." Review of International 
Studies 35, (2009): 729-49. 
Wonders, Nancy. "Global Flows, Semi-Permeable Borders and New Channels of 
Inequality." In Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control, edited by 
Nancy Wonders, Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber, 63-86. Dordrecht: 
Springer Netherlands, 2006. 
Zealand, Plunket New. "Plunket Welcomes Government Increase in Mandatory Age 
Limit for Child Car Restraints."  http://www.plunket.org.nz/news-and-
research/media-releases/plunket-welcomes-government-increase-in-
mandatory-age-limit-for-child-car-restraints/. 
 
 
